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**CAN
SOCIALISTS
AND
COMMUNISTS
CO-OPERATE?**



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Могут ли социалисты и коммунисты
идти вместе?

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1. A FIFTY-YEAR EXAMINATION

In a life-time 50 years is no short period of time. By the time a person in 50 his fate is nearly always clearly established: one can see what he has achieved, where he took the right step, and where he failed to make use of his opportunities. The same can be said about ideas and political parties: half a century provides enough material for their evaluation, and it is then possible to arrive at a conclusion concerning their vitality and importance to society. Our epoch settles these questions faster and more definitely than did any of the preceding epochs, and has the right to do so. No other generation ever lived through such stormy and significant years. Values are reappraised every day. Every idea, every political organisation is tested and examined historically, and not all of them have the right to be re-examined.

With regard to Communists, for example, the results of the past 55 years are clear. Since the October Revolution they have built a system embracing one-third of the world's population. The party, of which the general public in the West hardly had any idea less than six decades ago, brought about a global revolution, and since then everything in the world has continuously been changing. It is impossible to imagine the present day without Communists. In spite of differing political opinions, it is clear that the historical initiative has passed to the Communists and that they and those who are with them are leading mankind into the 21st century.

"Volcanic" changes have also taken place in the parties on the opposite side of the political front. Here, too, history has gone its own way regardless of any traditional conceptions and principles. So extreme a party of the Right as that of the fascists, at first captured nearly all of Western Europe, but was later routed and lost everything. The old liberal parties of the bourgeoisie dominant in most of the West European countries in the beginning of our century, have nearly all receded far into the background or have left the stage for good and are hardly likely to return. The Clericals, who in many capitalist countries replaced the old Liberals and Conservatives, have tried during this period to establish their own "Christian Europe", but have also been repulsed, although they continue to take a hand in affairs.

All the world's large political parties have endured storms which have left their imprint. Historians check and reappraise. But how has one particularly important party, operating on an international scale, the Social-Democratic

party, passed its 50-year examination? What marks has it earned?

This question is in fact of considerable interest, and not only to those who study the past. The Social-Democrats and Communists have for a period of many decades engaged in a big and heated discussion. Who is to lead the working class? Who represents the people's interests best? More than 50 years ago, when this discussion assumed a new character because the world was split into two systems, historians lacked enough material. Neither Communists nor Social-Democrats (formerly these trends were called Left- and Right-wing Socialists) had ever before governed a country. None of them could as yet produce anything but theoretical arguments and general considerations in their own favour. But already in 1917-1918 the situation changed. Both Communists and Social-Democrats began to assume power in different countries. The experience accumulated since then is truly tremendous. Today the question of the outcome of the controversy between Communists and Social-Democrats can be put on a broad basis. People know well enough what both Communists and Social-Democrats have accomplished.

Historical achievements may be summed up in different ways. Let us, for the time being, lay aside the question of programme and theoretical arguments. We have concrete facts; let us confine ourselves to them.

The significance and weight of parties are often estimated by means of figures. But politics is not arithmetic. Figures do not always give an answer to major problems of public life and sometimes even obscure them. Nevertheless,

they help to gain an understanding of the situation, especially if they are examined in their dynamics. The effect of ideas undoubtedly manifests itself primarily in the number of people they attract.

Some fifty-five years ago the number of Communists in the world hardly exceeded 400,000, while the Social-Democratic parties had a membership of more than 3 million. Ten years later (in 1928, to be exact) there were 1.6 million Communists and 6.5 million Social-Democrats,* i.e., four times as many Social-Democrats as Communists. Today Social-Democrats number 13.6 million** and Communists—about 50 million, i.e., there are now three times as many Communists as Social-Democrats. The position has changed. What has happened in the world in the course of 50 years has been reflected in people's convictions.

However, we cannot limit ourselves to this comparison. When it is a question of the political weight and influence of parties it is, of course, a matter not so much of the number of their adherents, as of the power of the positions they have won and the extent to which they have succeeded in advancing towards the realisation of their aims. What does the map of the world say when the positions of Communists and Social-Democrats are compared?

In the course of 50 years Communists have come to power in 14 countries spread over three

continents and now numbering more than 1,000 million people. Since the beginning of the seventies Social-Democrats are governing five European countries with a population of 24 million—Sweden, Austria, Norway, Denmark and Malta. In five other European countries with a population of 75 million—Italy, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium and Iceland, as well as the tiny Republic of San Marino—Social-Democrats participate in coalition governments headed by bourgeois parties; in one country—the FRG—they head the coalition government in which representatives of other parties participate. Outside Europe Social-Democrats now govern or head the governments of seven former colonial countries—Israel, the small Republic of Singapore, the islands of Jamaica, Trinidad, Madagascar and Mauritius, as well as Guiana.

Looking at the map of the world today we can in fact say that the great national liberation movement of our time has by-passed Social-Democracy, and that Social-Democracy has by-passed the national liberation movement. This is one of the most important facts of our epoch.

Such is the relationship of the two parties assessed in terms of political geography. A comparison of the territory now governed by Communists with that governed by Social-Democrats alone or in coalition with other parties shows the communist part of the map of the world to be 12 times that of the Social-Democrats. But this comparison is also far from accurate.

The countries governed by Communists now constitute a world system. Nothing can be said about the "Social-Democratic" countries except, perhaps, Sweden. It is true that in some countries millions of people have been voting for

* L. Lorwin, *The International Labour Movement*, N. Y., 1953, p. 28; *Handbook of the International Socialist Movement* London, 1956-1957.

** *The International 1969 to 1971. General Secretary's Report to the Helsinki Council Conference of the Socialist International, 25-27 May 1971*, London, p. 32.

Social-Democrats for decades already. More than 40 per cent of the electors vote for them in 14 countries (Sweden, Britain, FRG, Austria, Norway, Malta, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Singapore, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Madagascar, Mauritius), more than 30 per cent in three countries (Denmark, Luxembourg, Bermuda) and more than 25 per cent in three more (Belgium, Japan and Venezuela). By 1970 all the parties of the Socialist International had polled a total of nearly 73 million votes at parliamentary elections,* a large enough figure, to be sure. This can be explained partly by the force of tradition, but still more by the fact that many industrial and office workers, as well as petty bourgeois still hope to receive long-promised social reforms from Social-Democrats. And though Social-Democratic ministers are active in many bourgeois countries, the Social-Democratic regimes are not stable anywhere.

Social-Democratic governments and governments in which Social-Democrats participate, come and go. In the countries where this party enjoys any influence the situation usually changes every few years. The loss of a few hundred thousand votes by Social-Democrats in elections in one or another country may be enough for the bourgeois parties of the Right to supersede them in power. The reforms introduced by Social-Democrats may within a very few years be rescinded or brought to naught by reactionary governments. Governments, regimes and laws are continuously reshuffled. Under these conditions there is no guarantee, nor can there be any, of a

consistent implementation of even a minimal socialist programme; the state remains in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

In other words, there is no "Social-Democratic system" or zone anywhere in the world so far; there are only emerging and again disappearing Social-Democratic islands or islets. How long a particular islet will stay above water nobody can say, least of all the Social-Democrats; it is all subject to the winds of political change.

In Britain, for example, the last Wilson Labour Government held on in the House of Commons for one and a half years by an insignificant majority; the absence of one Labour MP because of illness or a mere fortuity in voting could result in the fall of the cabinet. In 1970 Labour was defeated in the election and the Conservatives—whom Labour sought to keep at bay for at least 5 more years—came back to power with a majority of 43 MPs. A number of important measures planned by the Labour Party in domestic and foreign policy were immediately cancelled. The Conservatives assumed an open and most vicious offensive against the British working class and completely altered the course of British foreign policy. Everything was turned back.

In the FRG the Social-Democrats did not achieve power for the first 20 years after the war, for the clericals and their allies were the parliamentary majority. In 1965, when the Social-Democrats received 39.3 per cent of all the votes in the elections to the Bundestag, the clericals took a few Social-Democratic ministers into their new cabinet. It became clear at once that Social-Democrats were tolerated in the government only as long as they were in agreement with them. In the autumn of 1969 the West

* *Socialist International Information* (hereafter referred to as *S.I.I.*) No. 6, 1970, p. 92.

German Social-Democrats brought up the number of their votes in the elections to 42.7 per cent and together with the bourgeois Free Democratic Party (FDP) formed their own government. How long this government will stay in power nobody can say for sure. It is clear, however, that the clericals and revanchists are determined to overthrow it at the first opportunity by winning over, for example, at least some of the deputies from the FDP. With the present correlation of forces in the Bundestag, at least in the early seventies, this would not be difficult.

Nor is the case any different in the other countries where Social-Democrats share the power with the parties of the Right. Everywhere, in any country and at any moment they may find themselves thrown overboard. This is not excluded even in Scandinavia, the bastion of modern Right-wing socialism. During the last few years, as we shall see, the Social-Democratic parties in Norway and Denmark sustained defeats in the elections and temporarily lost their power in the state; in Sweden the Social-Democrats lost their absolute majority. As a matter of fact, in the last 50 odd years Social-Democrats have not actually won over a single country.

The following question comes up: what have they achieved in so long a period of time? Hundreds of books and thousands of articles have been written by their members on this subject. It cannot, of course, be denied that during this time in some Western countries reforms have been introduced, and measures for improving the living conditions of the working people and granting them greater rights, have been carried out on the initiative of Social-Democrats. This occurred, for example, in Britain and the Scandinavian coun-

tries. A historian would fail to be a historian if he overlooked this. But there is something else that strikes the eye at the same time.

Nowhere, not in a single country where Social-Democrats were in power between 1917 and 1970, was the capitalist system abolished or at least impaired. Even where Social-Democrats at some time or other succeeded in getting a firm, absolute majority in parliament—that magic arithmetical majority which their adherents urged them to wait for—the old class society remained unshaken. Wherever Social-Democratic reforms were introduced, they stopped halfway, never going as far as a fundamental social change. Socialism, as it was conceived by its founders—a social system without exploitation of man by man—remained on paper. Today nobody even seriously disputes that the actual, supreme power in all these countries is still in the hands of the financial oligarchy, which is closely intertwined with the state apparatus.

In August 1966 the Austrian Social-Democrat Messenbock wrote in the Viennese journal *Die Zukunft*: "Instead of doing everything in their power to influence society and change it, as Marx demanded, the Socialist parties themselves have changed in the long process of adaptation [to capitalism—*Ernst Henry*]. They poured increasingly more water into the wine and became provincial. True, the Socialists of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Denmark, Norway and Sweden succeeded in heading governments, but they did not establish a socialist system. They became—and are becoming—victims of their own policy of adaptation."^{*}

^{*} *Die Zukunft*, Heft 8-9, 1966, S. 43.

Coming from the mouth of a Social-Democrat, these are bitter, but truthful and honest words. Few people are inclined to drink diluted wine. Only tiny, hardly noticeable traces of the idea of establishing a socialist society have remained both in the theory and practice of Social-Democrats. Moreover, today it may be beyond any doubt be considered that precisely their participation in bourgeois governments in the last 50 years has helped to stabilise capitalism in the West. No other force has made a greater contribution to this than has Social-Democracy; today this is acknowledged by all bourgeois politicians. The bourgeoisie not only never feared the Social-Democrats, but, on the contrary, needed them to consolidate their own power. In a number of cases they even called upon them for help. By introducing half-and-half reforms which were more often than not also advantageous to capital, restraining the masses from a determined onslaught in the struggle for power, and fighting the Communists, the Social-Democrats safeguarded the state of the bourgeoisie wherever they "wielded influence". Today their "sphere of influence", including not only the countries with Social-Democratic governments, but also states with Social-Democratic ministers in coalition governments, covers less than one-fifth of the whole of Europe. With the exception of "isles" and "islets" outside Europe, this is all Social-Democracy has "acquired" on the map of the world in more than 50 years. But even this part of Europe does not really belong to it.

Many Social-Democrats are now becoming aware of it and are beginning to think differently.

Why has this happened? Why has Social-

Democracy accomplished so little in all this time?

In this short book we cannot go into detailed research, but it is no longer difficult to note the sum and substance of the matter, which is so obvious after half a century. We shall try to recall the past without bitterness, taking only facts into account on this occasion as well.

2. SIX CARDINAL QUESTIONS

When future historians begin to appraise the role and importance of the big political parties that operated in our epoch, they will compare not only the number of their adherents, the size of the territory which they governed or participated in governing, but also the influence they exerted on the political life of their countries. They will take an even greater interest in what these parties gave the world in which they worked, how they helped the people of our epoch to live and struggle for their future and their security, how they understood the problems of our epoch, and to what extent they coped with the tasks of the epoch or shirked them.

The question will thus be approached by scholars for whom everything will already be in the past and every vital question of our time in some manner solved. But the man of our own time who looks back on the life of his gen-

eration is already justified in raising the same questions, even if not everything has been definitely settled and not all is yet clear, even if some questions can only be checked tomorrow. He has himself seen and learned a great deal, infinitely more than those who lived before him.

There are at least six cardinal questions on which we can base, even now, a broad historical appraisal of the two parties under consideration.

First question: what did the Communists and Social-Democrats do in the 1930s to bar the way to fascism and prevent the coming of Hitler to power?

There is no need to say what a great deal depends on the answer to this question. Fascism brought the world to the very brink of ruin. During the current millennium mankind has probably never endured such terrible calamities as it did under Hitler, and its wounds have not yet healed. The reputation of every big political party will for a long time to come, and in no small measure, be determined by the account it can render about itself during those years.

There may be many opinions on these questions and still more justifications, but the incontestable facts are as follows. The Communists realised the threat of fascism in the very beginning and called for a determined and irreconcilable struggle against it. In Germany they continuously insisted on decisive measures against Hitler's party, the merciless prosecution of the fascist bandits, and investigation into the secret connections of the nazis with the industrial and financial magnates. Had these measures been taken in time Hitler could never have seized Germany. This fact cannot be erased from the annals of history. It cannot be denied that in

pre-nazi Germany the workers organised in the communist ranks acted against fascists till the very end, although encountering the fierce resistance of the police led by the Social-Democrats. It was no mere accident that the nazis declared communism to be enemy No. 1. If it had been only for Communists, Europe would have had no Hitler.

A different answer has to be given to this question by the Social-Democrats. In the early stage they really had a chance to stop Hitler and break the backbone of nazism before it had gathered strength and seized Germany. Who can deny that over a period of 13 years, from 1919 to 1932, i.e., precisely during the years of the growth of the fascist offensive, the Prussian police was uninterruptedly and completely supervised by the Social-Democrats? The Prussian Minister of the Interior, Carl Severing, could easily have arrested Hitler and brought him to trial as a political bandit and conspirator. He never even made an attempt to do this. In 1932, when von Papen with a stroke of the pen withdrew the Prussian police from Severing's jurisdiction, the Communists proposed a general strike which was rejected by the Social-Democrats. All the Communists' proposals to unite the working-class movement for a decisive struggle against fascism were invariably rejected by the Social-Democratic politicians who depended not on the working class, but on the military clique which later handed the power over to Hitler.

We want to be fair. It cannot be denied that the establishment of a united anti-fascist front in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s was seriously hindered by the Left-sectarian error of the Communists who nicknamed the Social-

Democrats "social-fascists". No difference was made between the Right-wing reformist leaders, who were mainly not anti-fascist, but anti-communist, and the honest Social-Democratic workers, who hated fascism no less than did the Communists. This position was subsequently condemned by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. All this is well known, but it is just as true to say that the very origin and spread of this theory was in no small measure due to the behaviour of Social-Democratic leaders, especially in Germany. Any honest historian, of whatever trend, cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the Weimar Republic was surrendered to the nazis without a fight by the Social-Democrats who had themselves founded it. Social-Democracy did not merely "overlook" fascism; it actually and essentially cleared the way for it before it had pounced on Europe. Blinded by anti-communism the leaders of Social-Democracy knew little about the situation and what had to be done.

Second cardinal question: what did the Social-Democrats and Communists do to prevent the Second World War and then to win it?

Here everything is fresh in the memory of the generation still living and no special proofs are required from either side. The criterion is also clear. The only thing that could have checked Hitler in the 1930s was the unification of the European powers in a system of collective security; he was not afraid of anything else. The formula that "peace is indivisible" and a programme of united action against fascist aggression were at that time advanced by Communists. Not a single person who peruses the acts of history of those years can deny today that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did every-

thing to ensure the security of Europe and bar the way to war. Not one political party did so much for it then and not a single idea of international relations impressed itself in the 1930s on the minds of contemporaries more deeply than did the idea of collective security. Had the programme advanced by the Soviet Union been accepted in time by the West, Hitler could not have unleashed the war; he feared a world anti-fascist coalition more than anything else. When this coalition was nevertheless formed, a few years later, the main blow of fascism was sustained and the main blow at fascism was delivered by the Soviet Union—the bastion of communism. Without this bastion the Second World War would have been lost. There is hardly a person today who does not know this.

During the same period Social-Democracy remained in the shade; this is what can at best be said about its role during the decades when the fate of the world was being decided. Since it did not participate in the governments of the Great Western Powers during the period immediately preceding the war it is not directly responsible for the Munich treachery and the frustration of the collective security plan. But for some things it is, nevertheless, responsible; it failed to do what it could; it did not agree to a united front with the Communists during the decisive years; it refused in 1936 through the French Socialist Prime-Minister Blum to help the anti-fascists fighting in Spain (the "non-interference principle"); it did not call on the peoples of Britain and France during the year of Munich to offer determined resistance to the catastrophic policies of their governments, and Blum himself even supported these policies; and it did not demand the earliest

possible conclusion of an agreement with the USSR.

With folded arms and letting the parties of the Right govern Western Europe, Social-Democracy watched the approach of war. But when the war broke out, Right-wing Social-Democracy turned out to be outside the central leadership of the world anti-nazi forces. Rank-and-file Social-Democrats everywhere in the countries occupied by fascists participated in the Resistance Movement. But no Social-Democratic leaders headed the governments of the powers of the anti-fascist coalition; they were not equal to this role. As a matter of fact, the communist government of the Soviet Union had to save the situation by cooperating with the governments of Conservative Churchill and Liberal Roosevelt, and subsequently with the government of General de Gaulle. The reformists again failed to play a historical role. They proved incapable of heading the great anti-fascist struggle of the peoples. After what had happened in the 1920s and 1930s, the nations did not trust their leaders. It is hard also in this case to accept any extenuating circumstances in justification of Social-Democracy.

Third cardinal question, even more poignant for our contemporaries: what have both parties done since the war to stop the "cold war" and achieve peaceful coexistence? Can Right-wing Social-Democracy recoup itself and square up its historical account by answering at least this question? Apparently not. It has to be admitted that this time, too, it has failed to do what the epoch demanded.

To be sure, its adherents usually assert that Social-Democracy has never had anything to do with the "cold war", that since the end of the

Second World War it has formed an independent force, unrelated to the contending blocs and advocating some "third", special course. This is not true.

Since the end of the war Social-Democracy has never yet taken an independent stand in the international arena. A good deal would have been different in the world today if it had. The truth is that Right-wing Social-Democrats joined the Western bloc the moment it was formed and unlike many bourgeois politicians who are by no means Left-wing, they apparently intend to remain in it.

It is enough to recall that the founders of NATO included, in addition to Dulles, Churchill and Adenauer, such prominent leaders of European Social-Democracy as Bevin and Attlee. Spaak, the leader of Belgian Right-wing Socialists, was for a number of years the Secretary-General of NATO. In Western Europe there is hardly a Social-Democratic party whose Right wing has not supported the "cold war". There are some Social-Democratic leaders who at one time openly called for an atom bomb to be dropped on Soviet cities. The last Labour government advocated "atlantism" till its very last days (1970), thus propping up the US policy in Europe and Asia. The Right-wing Italian Socialists still refuse to agree to the dissolution of NATO and thereby to disbanding all military blocs.

As already stated, we are not recalling this for the purpose of squaring accounts, but historical results have to be summed up irrespective of persons.

The draft declaration of the Socialist International published in 1962 reads: "We do not wish anything so fervently as peace." Maybe they

meant it. But actions speak louder than words. The idea of peaceful coexistence was advanced not by Social-Democrats, but by Communists. The project for disbanding military blocs and establishing an all-European system of security was elaborated in Moscow and not in the offices of the Socialist International. No special Social-Democratic force advocating cessation of the "cold war", seriously and on an international scale, could be observed before the 1970s. Social-Democracy was unable to offer an alibi for this war.

Fourth cardinal question: how have both parties responded to the national liberation movement that has stirred up the whole modern world?

As far as Communists are concerned it does not need much thought to answer the question. Without their aid and participation the tremendous postwar victories of the national liberation movement would hardly have been possible. European Social-Democracy at first completely failed to understand the historical significance of national liberation revolutions. By failing to understand it, the Social-Democracy excluded itself from a vast part of the global political arena and in many places has even for a long time antagonised the local population. Although European Social-Democrats have tried in recent decades to correct their enormous mistake and now recognise the right of the former colonial peoples to independence, here, too, the past cannot be erased from history.

It is enough to remember the liberation wars and movements in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Algeria, Congo, Ghana, Nigeria and other countries. European Right-wing Social-Democracy did not stand up for the rights of the peoples of

these countries, and did not, to say the least, even confine itself to silence. In nearly all these cases, it at first approved of the colonial campaigns and in some countries (Malaya, Indonesia) initiated them.

It is true that after the war, Attlee's Labour Government agreed to grant independence to India and Pakistan. But this was done only after the British Empire began to fall to pieces and the British positions in Asia were threatened with an explosion; subsequently even the British Conservatives had to adhere to the same course. The last Labour government (Wilson's) itself waged a colonial war in South Arabia, supported the Americans in Vietnam and tried to come to terms with the racists in Rhodesia.

Until recently Social-Democracy had not brought the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America anything except disappointment. We shall yet return to this most important question, but it is already clear now that by actively or passively helping colonialism Right-wing Social-Democracy has suffered another terrible defeat which it is hard to remedy.

Fifth cardinal question, probably the most important to millions of people: what have the Social-Democrats and Communists done to bring closer the achievement of the main aim of socialism—the transition to a classless society? If we consider what both parties were founded for, the answer to this question must really be regarded as decisive.

Everybody knows the Communists' answer. The Communists have established a number of states in one of which, the first one, the construction of communism is already under way. Everything that the Communists now do in the USSR

and other socialist countries—in connection with politics, economic and cultural construction, diplomacy and day-to-day work—is aimed at building the society predicted in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels. People who are confident in communism have no other aim.

The Social-Democratic answer to the same question is not so distinct, but all the same it is clear enough. After all the upheavals that have taken place in the world during the past half century, the Right-wing Social-Democrats have in effect ceased to work for a classless society.

This is an indisputable fact that is proved by the current programmes of the Right-wing Socialist parties. Present-day Right-wing Social-Democracy not only takes no part in the active struggle against capitalism, but does not even want a different society. All it is now speaking of is a so-called welfare state, i.e., the present state-monopoly system in the Western countries consolidated and ensured by Labour-Party and Swedish-type reforms. This sort of a system is regarded by contemporary Right-wing Social-Democrats as the ultimate, final aim; they consider that they can go no further. Everything that at one time inspired the Socialist parties and motivated their actions and struggle, has been struck off the record. The idea of a reformed, but ever-lasting capitalism has superseded the idea of the equality of men. At the same time in many countries Right-wing Socialist parties ceased, even in their official policy statements, to consider themselves part of the working-class movement. They equally willingly invite and recruit into their ranks the bourgeoisie, including wealthy businessmen, and working people alike.

The results of a survey on this question are as follows. What do the Communists promise the modern world? The beginning of a great era of a just society, not some time in the indefinite future, but now. What do the Social-Democrats promise? Essentially the same as before, with perhaps minor alterations.

Lastly, there is still the *sixth cardinal question* to be raised. Although this question does not come directly within the province of political parties, life itself has put it on the agenda during the second half of the 20th century. How have Communists and Social-Democrats helped the modern world to clear the way for science to work unprecedented wonders?

As recently as yesterday this question could not be asked; it was irrelevant. Today, when the scientific and technological revolution is changing all of life on earth, the critical historian cannot do without it. Science has become a super-high-speed mover of world progress and every big party must render an account of how it has helped science.

Everybody, regardless of political convictions, will agree on one thing. Never in scores of thousands of years, will it be forgotten that the first to pave the way to the cosmos was the state built by Communists. It was followed on the same path by the state of the American monopoly bourgeoisie and then by others. Social-Democracy, although it participated in the leadership of some states, has never participated in initiating the great discoveries of our epoch. When they were made Social-Democracy by-passed them and they by-passed Social-Democracy.

In summing up all that we have said, we come to the following conclusion: Right-wing Social-

Democracy cannot be credited with any great accomplishments in the last 50 years. It has not made any great revolutions, it has not built any great states, and has not given man any great ideas. It is barren. And it is not surprising that hundreds of millions of people did not follow it.

We have tried in a businesslike manner to compare the 50-year balance of the Social-Democrats and Communists on six items, checking in each case as to how these parties solved the problems of our time. Nevertheless, we are not as yet satisfied with our survey. We shall try to approach the matter in another way: we shall recall what has happened to separate Social-Democratic parties during this period.

3. MARKING TIME

The political map of present-day Western Europe reveals a strange picture. The largest of all parties in this part of the world is undoubtedly the Social-Democratic party. The number of its supporters constitutes from one-fourth to one-half of all the voters. This is an impressive force, and any party with so many adherents is entitled to play the leading role in the political life of these countries. The actual situation, however, is that governments headed by Social-Democrats now exist only in the FRG, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Malta. All the rest of the countries (except Finland) are governed either by clericals, or coalitions headed by them, or by other bourgeois parties, or, lastly, by fascists. One-fifth of Europe's area is all that Social-Democracy may today consider to a certain extent its own. If Social-Democrats fail to

win elections in some countries, their influence may be even less.

It is clear that the actual number of Social-Democrats is not reflected in the position held by the party. The forces are enough to overturn political mountains, but their positions are of comparatively secondary importance and scattered along the flanks. In the largest capitalist countries on the continent—Britain, France, and Italy—the power is in the hands of other parties. It looks as though Social-Democracy itself does not seek to extend its influence in the West European states.

But this is not true. It is entirely wrong to think that Social-Democrats do not want to form their own governments and govern countries. On the contrary, they have invariably sought to do so.

It had been thus throughout the last 54 years.

Twice during this period there were moments when Social-Democracy seemed to be close to winning all or nearly all of Western Europe and thus directing the future history of this part of the world. The first time they had this chance was after the First World War. In 1918 Social-Democrats formed governments in Germany and Austria and at the same time won the leading position in the governments of Hungary and Poland (cabinets of Károlyi and Pilsudski-Moraczewski). In 1919 they came to power in Czechoslovakia (Tusar's Government) and formed part of the Bulgarian government. In 1921 the extreme Right-wing reformist Bonomi was appointed Prime Minister of Italy. The first Social-Democratic government was formed in Norway in 1924 and somewhat later in Sweden. In the 1930s Social-Democracy found itself in power

even in Spain (Caballero's cabinet). The doors were thrown wide open to Social-Democracy, even if not simultaneously, nearly all over Western Europe.

At that time many rank-and-file Social-Democrats thought their aim was actually within their reach—one more effort and half the continent would be governed by the Socialist International. Quite the opposite happened. By the end of the next decade the western half of Europe was in the hands of fascists.

History cleared the way for Social-Democrats for the second time after the Second World War. Exhausted by the hurricane of the distressing years millions of people eagerly expecting reforms began to vote for Socialists again. Attlee's Labour Government came to power in Britain with an unprecedented majority; three-fifths of the House of Commons members supported the new government. Soon after this Social-Democratic governments or governments headed by Social-Democratic prime-ministers appeared in France (Gouin's Blum's and dRamadier's cabinets), Belgium (Van Acker's and Huysmans' cabinets), Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland (Fagerholm's cabinet) and Iceland. In Austria the Social-Democratic leader Renner became prime-minister and then president; in Italy, Holland, Switzerland and Luxembourg Social-Democrats received posts in coalition governments. In West Germany the Social-Democratic Party received 6.93 million votes in the elections to the first Bundestag,* headed several land governments and nominated its leader Schumacher as successor to Adenauer.

* *Der Grosse Brockhaus*, Bd. II, 1957, S. 46.

Except for the FRG, fascist Spain and Portugal, ultra-clerical Ireland and the principality of Liechtenstein, there was not a single country in Western Europe without Social-Democracy at the helm or participating in the government during the first postwar years. It was an unprecedented fact—power was actually being offered to the Social-Democrats. The masses again expected great things from the Social-Democrats. Rumours of the probability of a powerful "third force" emerging in the international arena with the most prominent Right-wing Socialist politicians Bevin and Blum at the head were already circulating. Social-Democracy again had a chance of assuming real leadership in Western Europe and consolidating its positions in the countries of this area. But it retreated this time too. Today the clericals and other Right bourgeois parties form the leadership of Western Europe despite the Social-Democratic governments in a number of countries.

What holds Social-Democracy back? Why has it failed to achieve its aim despite its vast political resources and large armies of voters? It is safe to say that today it is farther from its aim than it was half a century ago.

Let us see what has actually happened by taking leading Social-Democratic parties as examples.

Two parties have long since been at the helm of European Social-Democracy: the German and the British. Each of them was considered a model for others, each of them was reputed to have had extensive and incomparable experience, and for each of them an early and final victory in their country was predicted. After the First World

War the Labour Party and the German Social-Democrats had the support of a considerable section of the British and German public. It was believed that as soon as these two parties, operating in the principal states of Western Europe, consolidated their absolute majority in their parliaments they would never yield the power to anybody, but would proceed in a peaceful, legislative manner to carry the ideas of socialism into effect. On this basis even rank-and-file Social-Democrats refused to cooperate with Communists. It was considered that Social-Democracy could do without them.

During the last 50 years the ability of Social-Democrats to govern a bourgeois state and advance it along the road to socialism was tested in practice in Germany and Britain, as also in a number of other Western countries. Life itself was the examiner. The examinees were given every opportunity: the question was clearly stated, there was an uncommonly long time for preparation, and they had even several chances for re-examination. It may, of course, be assumed that the examination continues, but after 54 years we are entitled to ask for the results of the examination to date.

At one time the German Social-Democratic Party was considered the strongest and most brilliant. It was called the "classic" party of the old Socialist International. Its authority was incontestable; it was admired; the other parties learned from it. The number of its parliamentary mandates steadily increased with every passing decade. In the 1871 elections German Social-Democracy received 3 per cent of all the votes, in 1881—6 per cent, in 1890—20 per cent and in 1898—27 per cent. August Bebel, its old and

respected leader, veteran of the working-class movement, was so certain of the closeness of victory and the beginning of a socialist reorganisation of Germany, that he publicly declared, at the party congress in Erfurt, as early as 1891: "I am convinced that the realisation of our ultimate aim is so near that but few of those present in this hall will not live to see it."*

The events came a quarter of a century later. The November 1918 revolution in Germany crushed the imperial regime and actually handed the state over to Social-Democrats. Everything was in their hands—the government, army, police, administration, finance and control of industry. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the Weimar Republic in 1919 the Social-Democratic Party polled 37.9 per cent of the votes which, together with those received by the Independent Social-Democrats, amounted to 45.5 per cent.** The advanced sections of the people waited but for one word from the Social-Democrats to embark on the path of socialism. However, only a few years after the November revolution it became clear that the Social-Democrats voluntarily had handed the power back to the bourgeoisie.

It may be taken for granted that nothing forced them to do it. The German working class was ready to defend the revolution and socialism against anybody; this was confirmed during the days of the Kapp Putsch in 1920 when the German working people crushed the reactionary

* *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, Berlin, 1891, S. 172.

** *Soviet Historical Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 4, p. 324 (in Russian).

conspirators within a few days. Had the Social-Democrats then taken the road towards consolidating the republic, had they taken at least the first steps in the direction of socialism, they would have helped to change not only the fate of Germany, but also the history of Europe in our century. Whoever looks back today sees that they had this chance and that by availing themselves of it the German Social-Democrats could really have played a historical role. They acted differently. It turned out that it was precisely the working class that Right-wing Social-Democracy feared the most. The masses were ordered to retreat, and troops were hurled against the Communists who demanded that the socialist programme be carried into effect. This was followed by a systematic surrender of all the positions won by the revolution.

Whoever remembers Germany of those years will never forget this; the tragedy of Bebel's old party renouncing its socialist past took place before everybody's eyes. The Communists were pressed back, but the power was lost by the Social-Democrats. Fifteen years after the establishment of the first Social-Democratic government in Germany, the country was seized by Hitler. It was clear beyond any shadow of doubt, that, without realising it, Social-Democracy had actually worked for fascism all that time.

"The struggle for the emancipation of the modern working class is the greatest and most glorious liberation struggle known in world history, and centuries of German disgrace are being washed away by the fact that German Social-Democracy is in the vanguard of this struggle," wrote the old German Marxist Franz Mehring in his book, *The History of German*

Social-Democracy, published 70 years ago.* Members of this party at that time were Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, Leo Jogiches, Franz Mehring himself and many other real Socialists who subsequently founded the German Communist Party which took over the historical mission that Mehring had expected Bebel's old party to accomplish. But German Social-Democracy had itself turned away from those who had built it in the hope of a great future. It took that downward path along which the German bourgeoisie itself rolled.

And yet, during the past period few political parties had so many real chances to keep their old promises as did the German Social-Democrats. Each time events gave their leaders an opportunity to achieve their aims, they turned round and ran away. Each time they had to take but one firm step forward to open the door into the socialist future they felt ill at ease and immediately found reasons for stopping or calling a halt. By pouncing upon Communists and other Leftists who demanded action, they handed the keys of the future to those who again locked the door to socialism in Germany. And, contrariwise, every time the enemies of socialism assumed the offensive the Right-wing leaders of the German Social-Democracy stood to attention without even daring to breathe. In fact, they forced their party to commit suicide.

Let us reckon up another, postwar, account of this party. During the first few decades everything indicated that Right-wing German Social-Democracy was travelling the same road for the

* F. Mehring, *Geschichte der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, Bd. 4, Stuttgart, 1919, S. 359.

second time, that it found itself again where it had been in the 1920s. History does not repeat itself, but relapses do occur. The same forces could be seen on the stage in the FRG: pseudo-democratic bourgeois politicians playing a coalition game with the Social-Democrats; the kings of monopolies and revenge-seeking generals who had seized the real power and on the sly were preparing for a new collusion with the fascists; a large Social-Democratic Party supported by almost 40 per cent of the voters and numbering more than 800,000 members, but coming to terms with irreconcilable enemies of socialism. When the reactionary CDU/CSU clerical party in the FRG was threatened with loss of power after the 1966 parliamentary elections it was helped precisely by Right-wing Social-Democrats who joined the "big coalition" with Kurt Kiesinger and Franz Josef Strauss.

In the course of 20 years (1949-1969) the Communists of East Germany united with the Social-Democrats in the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to build a new, socialist state. During the same 20 years the Right-wing leadership of Social-Democracy of West Germany helped the bourgeoisie to build *their* state.

This cannot be denied; this is recorded in history. By 1968 it could, without fear of contradiction, be said that German Social-Democracy had lost 50 years. If Bebel and Liebknecht, its founders, in whose time it had seemed a giant, could see what has become of their party after 50 years of struggle, they would be really shocked.

But what very few people expected happened in the autumn of 1969: the Social-Democratic Party of the FRG finally came to power. Al-

though it still polled fewer votes in the elections to the Bundestag than did the CDU/CSU, the old reactionary party of Adenauer and Kiesinger, Willy Brandt, the Social-Democratic leader, entered into an alliance with the liberal bourgeois party of Free Democrats and thus had a chance to form a new government. It is clear to everybody why the Social-Democratic Party of the FRG was successful. It won in 1969 because, tired of the endless "cold war", the West German people expected a policy of peace, a normalisation of relations with the USSR, the GDR and other socialist states in the first place. Brandt's government cannot fail to take this fact into account. In the summer of 1970 it concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union, recognising the inviolability of the postwar borders, those along the Oder-Neisse and between the FRG and GDR in particular. This is undoubtedly an important change.

Does it mean, however, that West German Social-Democracy has, indeed, at last begun to learn from the lessons of its past? It is still too early to answer this question. The situation will in all probability become clearer in the near future. If the Social-Democrats in the FRG adhere to this course and take further steps forward, both in domestic and foreign policy, it is quite possible that their party will long be able to stay at the helm beyond the Elbe. If, however, as has already happened before, after taking a step ahead they are frightened, after a while, by their own shadow, and take two steps back, nothing in the world will be able to guarantee their future. What will happen to their party then—will it split or will it merely again support clerical governments, it is hard to guess, nor is there

any need to guess. It is certain that a return to the past in our day would be a second historical catastrophe for the German Social-Democrats (the first being in 1933). History does not allow too many re-examinations.

Did the second "great" Social-Democratic party—the British Labour Party—succeed in accomplishing any more during the first 25 years since the end of the war? At one time it seemed they did.

The Labour Party considered itself more farsighted and wiser than the German Social-Democratic Party. It is true that for some time it really pursued a subtler policy. Conditions were favourable. Labour did not have to enter openly into a collusion with an infuriated counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, bow to fascism and, on the other side of the front, come into collision with a mass Communist party. Unlike the German Social-Democrats, they avoided participation in bourgeois coalition governments in peacetime. Dealing with a wiser and more refined bourgeoisie, manoeuvring under more tranquil conditions and being in a position to come to terms privately with the upper stratum of the ruling class, the leaders of the Labour Party were not afraid of introducing, from time to time, moderate and long since necessary reforms (laws on public health and social insurance, and the nationalisation of a few, mostly unprofitable branches of the economy).

In this way the British Social-Democrats have earned the reputation of being more courageous and successful politicians than their counterpart in Germany. They formed their government 6 times in 46 years and during that period governed Britain for a total of 13 years. In the 1966 elections

they were supported by 47.9 per cent of the electorate. However, they failed to win over the country for good.

All the Labour Party achieved during that time was the right to replace the Conservatives when they were having a hard time, and then withdraw in its own turn; it meant that Labour could be an alternative when the "pendulum" swung to the Left. The power of Labour governments and the Labour programme of reforms always depend on the political climate. So many more votes for Labour in elections meant a step forward; so many less votes—a step (sometimes two steps) back. The "pendulum" continues to swing, but which way it will swing is not decided by the Labour Party. Not only a withdrawal of disappointed voters, but even a mere panic on the London or even the New York stock exchange is enough to put an end to any Labour government. It is on these terms that British Social-Democracy was admitted and, apparently, will continue to be admitted to power.

It is no secret to anybody in Britain that the British ruling class fully supports this system that guarantees its inviolability; the Labour Party does not dare touch the foundations of the capitalist system. According to the statement made in February 1968 by Dickens, vice-chairman of the financial and economic group of the Labour parliamentary faction, 5 per cent of the adult population of present-day Britain owns 75 per cent of all of the country's private property.* Four-fifths of the country's economy is still in the hands of private capital; one-fifth turned by Labour into state property is managed jointly by monopoly

* *Pravda*, February 6, 1968.

and Labour bureaucracy.* British Social-Democracy never went farther than that. According to official figures, in Britain 345,000 families live "on the verge of poverty" and 3 million families live in slums. In the meantime many Labour leaders become capitalists without leaving their posts. When Hugh Gaitskell, the then leader of the Labour Party, died in 1963, it turned out that he left a fortune of £80,000.**

Nor did the last Wilson Labour Government, which governed from April 1966 to June 1970, take a single real step in the direction of socialism. The British people had given this government full power and a green light in the 1966 parliamentary election; in the House of Commons the number of Labour votes increased from 3 to 97 and Labour had 70 per cent of all the seats. Had Wilson and the other party leaders wanted they could have, as they also could have several times in the past, begun to carry the programme of the Labour Party into effect and could have kept the promise given decades previously, namely, to establish in Britain a more equitable, more progressive society. Had they wanted to do it nobody could have prevented them; the majority of the people would have followed them. But this was not done. The Labour Party continued to mark time.

Its leaders plead a poor state of affairs in the country's economy. What's true is true: capitalist and NATO Britain cannot make ends meet. There is a large gap in Great Britain's balance of payments, prices are rising, the state budget

* *Right-Wing Socialists Against Socialism*, edited by L. Leontyev, Moscow, 1960, p. 95 (in Russian).

** *Daily Worker*, April 27, 1963.

is on the point of collapse and the exchange value of the pound sterling is dropping. But it would seem that precisely this should reinforce Labour's determination to begin switching Britain onto a socialist track. Everybody in the country knows that the main reason for the protracted economic crisis is Britain's enormous military expenditure; the country has also continued under the Labour government to spend about 2,300 million pound sterling on armaments and other NATO affairs. It is common knowledge that, if Britain threw off even half this burden and if the profits of the monopolies were curtailed, British economy could be saved, the burden on the people would be lifted and thoroughgoing and long overdue social reforms would be possible.

However, the Labour Party does not care to take this road. This is one more proof that its leaders fear socialism when it is seriously put on the agenda. Wilson's Government chose something else: it announced the devaluation of the pound, curtailed expenditure on social needs by 400 million pounds, raised taxes, cancelled a number of benefits to the population and froze wages, i.e., acted exactly like bourgeois governments do in such cases. During the period of Wilson's government the cost of living in Britain went up some 30 per cent. The people paid for the failures of the capitalist economy. At the same time Labour Britain failed to score a single success in foreign affairs. Captive of Churchill's old "Atlantic policy", the policy of the military bloc with the USA, the FRG and other NATO states, Britain continued to lose one position after another and miss its opportunities in the international arena.

Thus Wilson's Government pursued its policy in the 1960s, rushing about and failing to see but one way out of its labyrinth—the way to socialism. In the summer of 1970, when it managed temporarily to improve its balance of payments by continuously putting pressure upon the working people, it announced a general election absolutely certain of victory and suffered sensational defeat. Although the number of voters in the country increased by 3.6 million compared with the previous elections, the Labour Party lost a million votes, and the Conservatives had 328 seats in the House of Commons while Labour had 287. Compared with 1945 the percentage of voters who cast their votes for Labour dropped from 48 to 43 per cent.* The sixth Labour government was overthrown essentially by itself. The "pendulum" had swung back again.

Theoretically speaking, this game can continue *ad infinitum*, even into the 21st century. In the past the British bourgeois parties—the Tories (Conservatives) and Whigs (Liberals)—played precisely such a game with each other, replacing each other at the helm for a period of more than two centuries. However, this has little to do with the struggle for socialism in Britain. It may, of course, be assumed that some Labour leaders are not averse to alternate in government endlessly with the Conservatives, thus making a career. But was it for this that Socialist parties were founded?

It must be emphasised once more that at one time British Social-Democracy acted more wisely and subtly than did German Social-Democracy and managed to add a number of reforms to its credit. But it can in no way be said that it had

* *Horizont* No. 37, 1970, S. 19.

passed its 50-year examination in socialism even with a satisfactory mark. When Labour inflicted unprecedented defeat on the Conservatives in the first postwar (1945) election and won 394 of the 640 seats,* the British workers had no doubts that construction of socialism would begin in their country the very next day. Their popular slogan was: "Socialism in our time!" But essentially the same thing happened in Britain as had at one time in Weimar Germany. Despite the six Labour governments the bourgeoisie has remained the master of Britain. Today Right-wing Labour is again awaiting a change of heart in the electorate. When it will come nobody knows. One thing is clear again, however. If the British Labour Party fails to understand that it cannot continuously swing to and fro, and up and down, and call this a socialist policy, the British working class, which has voted for it for so many years, may finally really lose patience, and one day the British Labour Party will find that it has no future.

During all these decades most of the other European Right-wing Socialist parties followed in the footsteps of West German and British Social-Democracy. To assert that they all copied the policies of the two "older" parties, would be simplifying the matter, because national peculiarities undoubtedly made themselves felt. In the main, however, the Right-wing Social-Democrats of the other countries for the most part chose either the "German" or the "British" variants on questions of policy and tactics. Only the Social-Democrats of Austria and Sweden should be considered separately. The former tried to

* *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 13, 1963, p. 558.

use and improve in their own way the "experience" of the German party, the latter—to develop and improve the Labour variant.

Fifty years ago Austrian Social-Democracy also belonged to the nucleus of international reformism and likewise never doubted its great future. Its leaders, the creators of "Austrian Marxism", enjoyed the reputation of the best theoreticians of the Socialist International in the struggle against Communists. Books by O. Bauer, K. Renner and other Austrian Marxists who advocated the attainment of a parliamentary majority as the only way to socialism, were considered as the Social-Democratic gospel.

Having polled more than 40 per cent of the votes and having formed its own government after the First World War, Austrian Social-Democracy believed that the final transition of the country under its control was a question of the morrow. After that, the same things began to happen to it as had to the German Social-Democratic Party: it started surrendering its positions and slipping back year after year. At first power was wrested from it by the clericals, who with its consent disarmed the workers. Then came fascism in the same inexorable manner as it had in Germany. Austrian Marxism, which taught that the thing that mattered was the number of parliamentary votes, died in Hitler's concentration camps.

There were no signs that Austrian Social-Democracy had learned anything new since the end of the war. Everything points to the contrary, for after the fall of fascism Austrian Social-Democracy, like the German Social-Democrats, began everything all over again. When the Austrian clericals could not form their own one-

party government the Social-Democrats entered into a coalition with them helping the Rights to retain power. When, as it happened in Austria in 1966, the clericals achieved a majority and turned the Social-Democrats out of the government, the Social-Democrats merely waited for the next election. The party, numbering more than 700,000 members and polling close to 43 per cent of the country's votes,* remained politically impotent. The communist proposals to unite the working-class movement in a decisive struggle against the clerical regime, consolidate Austrian neutrality, and advance towards real socialism invariably met with a refusal. Despite the tragic example of the fate of German Social-Democracy and their own fate in the 1930s and 1940s the Austrian Right-wing Socialists took this road for the second time.

Despite all this, the Austrian working class gave the Social-Democrats an opportunity to form a government in March 1970 and show what they could do. The same thing happened in Austria that had happened in the FRG six months previously. In the parliamentary election, the Austrian Social-Democratic Party received 81 of the 165 seats, less than half, but nevertheless enough finally to form its own government. The Social-Democrats could not refuse to form a government because they would lose their authority with the voters who expected a good deal from their victory. They did not refuse, but they did something else: they proposed a coalition with the Austrian clerical People's Party which had just been rejected by the people. They are just as afraid of carrying

* *S.I.I.*, May 24, 1969, p. 128.

their own programme into effect as is the British Labour Party.

The clericals refused; they could gain a lot more by remaining in opposition and showing the people that the Social-Democrats would not dare to do anything new. A Social-Democratic government was formed in Vienna for the first time since 1918; the government was headed by Bruno Kreisky, the party leader. Already the same year (1970) it became clear that the Austrian Social-Democrats really did not intend to do anything new and continued quite consistently to pursue the old course of the clericals both in domestic and foreign policy. Kreisky's government publicly vowed to abstain from nationalising any companies and, on the contrary, promised to consolidate their competitive positions. Despite Austria's neutrality legalised in postwar agreements, it endeavoured to tie the country to the Common Market, refrained from recognising the GDR and did not hinder the so-called Cold Anschluss, i.e., the methodical penetration of West German capital into Austria's economy. The differences between the policies of the ruling Austrian Social-Democracy and those of the Austrian clerical governments can be detected only under a microscope.

The clericals are satisfied: they are sure that sooner or later the voters will draw their own conclusions. And when the Social-Democrats at long last win an absolute majority in the October 1971 elections and remain in power, almost nothing changes in the country. Everything indicates that deep in their hearts the Austrian reformists do not care for anything but establishing in their own country the British system of the "swinging pendulum". It may, at

any rate, be asserted that during some 30 odd years of their "second life" (after the collapse of their party under nazism) the heirs of the "Austrian Marxists" have manifested even less desire to make any real headway than has the Labour Party.

Nevertheless, they still lay claim to the ideological leadership of international reformism. One of their representatives, Bruno Pittermann, is chairman of the Socialist International, and another, Hans Janitschek, is its general secretary*; one of their leaders, Benedikt Kautsky (Karl Kautsky's son) was considered the most prominent theoretician of Right-wing socialism during the postwar years. The son turned out to be even more conservative than the father. When the new programme of the Austrian Social-Democracy written by B. Kautsky was published several years ago it became clear that it did not contain a single word about establishing a classless society. All of Austria was so stunned that one of the clerical leaders said: "The socialist leaders are putting on bourgeois clothes." The day after the publication of this programme B. Kautsky was appointed assistant general director of the Kreditanstalt, one of Vienna's major banks.** Absorption of socialism by state-monopoly capitalism is all that the old teachers of the Socialist International can finally propose. In October 1968 this was openly confirmed by the new economic programme adopted by the

* S.I.I., July 26, 1969, pp. 139-40; October 4, 1969, p. 212.

** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 28, 1957; see also *Right-Wing Socialists Against Socialism*, p. 145.

Congress of the Austrian Socialist Party, which actually recognised the inviolability of private property and fixed the policy of social partnership with the bourgeoisie.

Judging from appearances, marking time has so far been the sole activity of European Right-wing Social-Democracy. Its parties did not dare move forward even during the most dynamic periods of history. Have there been any exceptions? Has there been a Social-Democratic party that has actually achieved anything essential in the last few decades?

In the West it is often asserted that there is such a party. Reference is made to Swedish Social-Democracy which has almost uninterruptedly governed Sweden for 38 years, during which period it claims to have established some sort of new, "welfare society". The thing is not so simple, however.

It is true that Swedish Social-Democracy polls half of all the votes in the elections and that its party numbers 940,000 members; every ninth Swede is a member.* It is also true that the Swedish Social-Democrats have succeeded in improving the material standards of the population to a greater extent than have the Socialists in any other country. The working people have won a number of social reforms. It is likewise true that Sweden, unlike the two other Scandinavian countries, adheres to a policy of neutrality, that it maintains good-neighbour relations with the USSR, that it has recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (although it has not recognised the GDR) and has refused to participate

in the Common Market. But there are also other things that are true.

No *fundamental* social changes have occurred in Sweden during this time. The Social-Democrats form the government, but the state still belongs to the monopolists and is actually ruled by the bourgeoisie. In Sweden private capital owns a still larger part of industry than it does in Britain. Its share of the industrial output amounts to 90 per cent and it almost completely controls the most important branches of the economy. Ninety-nine per cent of the shipping and shipbuilding, 93 per cent of the steel production and 90 per cent of the wholesale trade turnover is controlled by private enterprise. Fifteen oligarchic families—Wallenberg, Jonsson, Broström, Bonnier, Wehtje, Wenner-Gren, etc.—dominate Swedish economy. There are more than 4,000 millionaires in the country. And it is no accident that, according to data for the year 1968, about every fourth entrepreneur and industrial leader in Sweden votes for the Social-Democrats.

As early as 1964 it was announced at the congress of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party that the nationalised sector of the economy was intended to play the role of a sort of safety valve that opens at times of serious economic difficulties, in other words, when private capital cannot itself cope with affairs without the aid of the state governed by Social-Democrats. Such a "welfare society" suits the oligarchy.

Nor are the roles in the state machinery of this society distributed differently. It has been calculated that representatives of the bourgeoisie and the landowners, who constitute 6 per cent of Sweden's population, occupy 80 per cent of

* O. K. Timoshkova, *Swedish Social-Democracy in Power*, Moscow, 1962 (in Russian).

the posts in ministries and other government agencies, while representatives of the workers fill 1 per cent of these posts. The officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are still recruited only from among the big bourgeoisie and nobility. The machinery of the country's foreign policy remains in the hands of the class that has been ruling the country for centuries. The composition of the state bureaucracy is such that, according to Landström, a bourgeois researcher, present-day Sweden in many respects resembles the society that existed "before the appearance of democracy and parliamentarism in the country".*

There are also other figures concerning the class order in this "Social-Democratic state". In present-day Sweden the working class constitutes about half the total population, but students coming from this class number only one-fifth of those receiving higher education. Moreover, in those branches of the economy, in which the highest-paid jobs go to graduates, the number of workers' children in such jobs is still smaller; according to some data, it does not amount even to one-tenth. Is this a state of "democratic socialism"?

And, if everything is right and proper in the country and is dictated by the interests of the working people, why were there so many mass strikes in Sweden in 1970 and 1971? Thus a very big miners' strike broke out in the north of the country in 1970, and civil service employees went on strike in February 1971. Why does the Social-Democratic government support the

* S. S. Landström, *Svenska ämbetsmans sociala ursprung*, Upsala, 1954. See: O. K. Timoshkova, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

employers when they refuse to meet the demands of the workers and do not raise wages in connection with the rise in prices and rent? Why do 70 per cent of all the working women in Sweden belong to the lowest-paid category of workers? We read the following lines in the *Aftonbladet* (the newspaper of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation) on June 29, 1970:

"It can be definitely asserted that today there is more discontent with conditions in the labour market in Sweden than, say, 15 or 20 years ago. Purely outwardly the Swedish manual labourer has, of course, improved his position—his working hours have been reduced, he is entitled to a pension, etc.—but at the same time it cannot be denied that the work has been speeded up, there is more industrial strain, labour processes have become harder, and the workers now have much less chance to influence their labour position as a result of intensified automation and the continuing increase of production units."*

This is said not by Communists, but by Swedish trade union men who are themselves members of the Social-Democratic Party.

The Swedish Right-wing Social-Democrats may say that at any rate there is a high standard of living in the country they govern. One factor, however, must be taken into account. It is not so much their own policy that helps the Social-Democrats to maintain these standards as the peculiarities of the Swedish economy with its highly developed and extremely specialised industry which has a direct bearing on foreign trade. And, last but not least, it should be

* *Aftonbladet*, June 29, 1970.

remembered that Sweden and Switzerland are the only European countries which for more than 150 years have not participated in any war and on whose territory not a single house has been destroyed as a result of military operations. The Swedish Social-Democrats continue the traditional foreign policy of the Swedish bourgeoisie based invariably on neutrality, and they benefit from it. The Swedish Social-Democracy has in fact some special features, but they are in no small measure determined by the special conditions of Sweden herself.

In any case, the position of the Swedish Social-Democrats after their 38 years in power is not at all so strong and impregnable as they believe. Despite their reforms and the really high standard of living in the country the conservative Swedish bourgeoisie is still strong enough to assail the Social-Democrats and seriously to threaten the existence of their government. Nor does it intend to leave the stage. In 1970 this fact was suddenly demonstrated in a sensational manner. In the September 1970 elections the Social-Democrats won 166 seats against the 185 in the former Riksdag, while the parties of the bourgeois opposition won 167 seats against their former 165. Much to their surprise, the Social-Democrats lost their absolute majority. It was only with the aid of the Communist Party that they were able to retain power. We shall come back to the notable events in this Scandinavian country in the chapter dealing with the possibilities of extensive cooperation between Social-Democrats and Communists in different countries. Here it is only important to emphasise that even in Sweden, the Promised Land of

reformists, the latter cannot consider their power assured.

Such are the results of the 50-year test of the "forces" of international Social-Democracy. The results in the different parties confirm the sum total. A comparison of the time and achievements reveals a large deficit. Social-Democracy has made no attempt to change the social system on socialist principles anywhere. It could not even consolidate itself in power within the bounds of the bourgeois system in a single country. Wherever the people vested Right-wing Social-Democrats with power, sooner or later the latter surrendered it to an alien class. They have gone up to come down, time and again—such has been the course traversed by the Social-Democratic parties.

Fifty years ago their leaders expected to master the European and then the world politics, and then to drive the Communists far into the background. Things turned out differently. Right-wing Social-Democracy has suffered a historical defeat. Its insecure position on the map of the present-day world is quite natural. So far, however, we have looked nearly all this time at only one part of the map—Europe. We must now recheck our conclusions on a world scale.

4. GLOBAL FAILURE

It has already been stated that in the first half of our century Social-Democracy could not be considered a real, international force. Its influence applied almost exclusively to one continent; the world outside Europe was of little interest to it. Even in the main capitalist country—the United States—the number of members of the Social-Democratic organisation does not exceed 3,000 today, although here, it would seem, the reformists specialising in class collaboration and anti-communism should have a particularly broad field of action. Outside of the Labour-type parties in Australia, New Zealand and Canada the Social-Democrats did not have any large organisations overseas up till then. About four-fifths of the world's territory were for decades outside the sphere of their action.

Nor did the picture change immediately after the Second World War when the colonial and semi-colonial peoples began to stir and fervently seek paths to socialism. Failing to recognise the national liberation movement, turning its back upon it and in a number of areas directly opposing it, the old, Right-wing Social-Democracy again cut itself off from a vast part of the world. Unlike the Communists whose parties operated in 18 colonial and dependent countries already in 1917-1922 and are now represented in more than 50 countries of the "third world", Social-Democracy remained essentially a West European party. Its leaders continued to believe that in the 20th, as in the 19th, century this was enough to affect the fortunes of mankind.

Social-Democracy made tremendous miscalculations and did not realise it was in a new century. It was totally insignificant in dozens of countries which soon after the war occupied most important positions in the world arena. The share of Social-Democracy in international political calculations decreased at once. Its leaders came to realise this rather late.

But what has happened since the European Social-Democrats came to realise that the liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples is a fact and they began to think the matter over, while their like-minded people across the ocean began urgently to form their own parties?

Have the Social-Democrats succeeded during this time in catching up with the Communists, or at least in laying down for their party a reliable, firm foundation in the "third world"? Can it be asserted that *Right-wing*, typically reformist Social-Democracy plays any important role anywhere in the "third world"?

This question is undoubtedly of appreciable interest. A special, new chapter will be devoted to it in the history of the international working-class movement.

When the reformists realised that they were losing in the "third world" they mobilised all their forces. Their overseas adherents had enough time during the last 15-20 years to remedy the situation. Neither in Asia, Latin America nor Africa did events bar their way. On the contrary, during that period, whole countries on these continents found themselves at the cross-roads, choosing directions, studying the European examples, intensely and agonisingly seeking a model they could follow. The reformists were ready nearly everywhere. Newly formed Social-Democratic organisations announced their existence in dozens of overseas countries, their leaders with fresh programmes sat in their offices, or occasionally in parliament or ministerial chairs, their relations with the European Social-Democratic parties established. Everything appeared to be ready for an offensive. But looking at the present-day politico-party map of the "third world" we see that they have miscalculated. The face of the Socialist International is also today essentially a typically West European face. The attempts to make this union a serious global force have failed.

Let us check up on it by looking at the map. Let us begin with Asia.

When Social-Democracy came into being and was maturing, Asia was considered impenetrable to socialism. Before the First World War this vast continent was completely closed even to local liberals. But in the middle of our century Asia suddenly turned out to be as

fertile and insatiable a soil for the working-class movement as Europe had been 100 years previously. Whole nations in different parts of Asia began to think and dream of socialism. Colonialism was thrust back, put to flight or forced to retreat. The feudal systems that it guarded were collapsing. The young national bourgeoisie in the countries where it succeeded in seizing the leadership of the national liberation movement proved incapable of acting without the working class, peasantry and progressive intelligentsia. Its parties came to power, but the masses of the people needed their own parties. It was clear that there was a great future for those who would succeed in leading the socialist movements of the Asian peoples. Everybody knows what forces the Communists were able to mobilise in Asia after the war. What have the Asian Social-Democrats accomplished?

At first it seemed they were not losing any time. Only two years after the war there was a conference in Delhi of the three main reformist organisations of Asia—the Indian Socialist Party and the recently formed Burmese and Indonesian Socialist parties. A further step was taken in January 1953. A conference of nine Social-Democratic parties was held in Rangoon, capital of Burma, and the organisation of something like an Asian Socialist International under the name of Asian Socialist Conference (ASC) was proclaimed.

Outwardly this International appeared quite imposing. The people who took the floor were leaders of the Right-wing Socialists of Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Japan, Malaya, Israel, Lebanon and Nepal. The total membership of their parties exceeded half a million. U Ba Swe,

the well-known Burmese reformist and general secretary of the ruling organisation of the Burmese national liberation forces—the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League—was elected chairman of the ASC, and Wijono, Indonesian Social-Democrat, was elected general secretary. The existence of a sort of new “socialist teaching for Asia” was announced; those assembled were given to understand that Asian Social-Democracy, which had opposed both imperialism and communism, was now uniting, coordinating its activities and making ready for big achievements.^{*} All the resolutions and statements emphasised the strictly “Asian” principles of the new organisation; a line of demarcation was drawn with respect to European Social-Democracy which was guilty of collusion with colonialism. The ASC proclaimed itself a neutral “third force”.

Nevertheless it was clear that that was not at all the case. Behind the backs of the Asian Social-Democrats one could see their patrons in Europe. The conference in Rangoon was attended by the leader of the Labour Party, former British Prime Minister Attlee. The ASC was formally admitted to the Socialist International, although as an “independent organisation”. J. Braunthal, the then General Secretary of the Socialist International, hailed the organisation of the ASC in a special article printed in the *S.I.I.*^{**} U Ba Swe, the head of the ASC, stated that the Asian Socialist Conference and the Socialist International “had to work out a common point of view on all contemporary questions”.

^{*} Interestingly enough, at that time the Maoists also asked to be admitted to the ASC, but their request was turned down (*S.I.I.*, February, 1970, pp. 14-15).

^{**} *S.I.I.*, September 1953.

In particular, it was decided that a joint programme on the colonial question should be prepared. Connections with London—the seat of the European Socialist International and Labour headquarters—were consolidated and recorded in the Rules. Representatives of the ASC began to take part in the congresses of the Socialist International, and delegates from the International—in the sessions of the ASC. Whether the leaders of the ASC were also given financial aid is unknown.

International Right-wing Social-Democracy was making an important attempt to “smooth over” and erase from the history of recent years the scandalous miscalculation of Western Social-Democracy in the matter of the national liberation movement. They aimed at establishing in Asia a broad base for reformism and opposition to Communists. Of course, this attempt was not confined to coordinating the activities of the Social-Democratic parties. The leaders of the ASC were clearly preparing to establish in Asia a large system of states. In Burma and Indonesia, Nepal and Israel (later also on Ceylon) Social-Democratic politicians by that time filled prominent or even decisive posts in the governments of their countries. The efforts were directed towards drawing the neutral Asian states into a political and economic bloc built on the Rangoon-Jakarta axis, i.e., around the principal founders of the ASC.

An Asian Economic Council and a Coordination Committee for studying the trade union movement were set up under the ASC Bureau in Rangoon. According to one of the projects, a conference of Asian countries was to be called for the purpose of establishing a “common

market", while another project was aimed at establishing a federation of "non-communist" countries of Southeast Asia—Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia—a spearhead against people's Vietnam. A similar subsequent expansion was planned in West Asia. In 1958 the ASC even took a decision to send a mission "to reveal the socialist forces in the Middle East".*

How far these plans went can be seen from the allusions made in those years in influential organs of the British bourgeois press which was very well informed of the intentions of the Labour politicians dominating the Socialist International. As early as October 1952, three months before the establishment of the ASC in Rangoon, the London *Times* wrote in an article entitled "A Counter-Force to Communism?":

"It is possible that nationalist movements in Africa and elsewhere may, through associations with the West, find in democratic Socialism a healthier alternative to Communism. . . . There is opportunity here for international Socialism to play an important part. . . . European Socialists will no doubt want to go on discussing their own problems among themselves. . . . But if the International is to attempt seriously to become a world body, it will have to recognise that these are subsidiary matters. . . ."

Several years later the *Economist*, organ of the City, said the same thing, stating that if the new International (Social-Democracy of the West—*Ernst Henry*) displayed a really vigorous

* *Special Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental Studies*, No. 60, II, 1960, pp. 160-65 (in Russian).

** *The Times*, October 22, 1952.

initiative in Asia within the next few years, it could accomplish a good deal in world politics.

The operation was conceived broadly and its results came to light as early as the first half of the 1960s.

The Social-Democrats did not succeed in placing themselves at the head of the national liberation movement and consolidating themselves in power in Asia anywhere except on a single island in one of the former mandated territories of the British Empire. In a few large countries they seemed, at first, to make headway, but after taking a sharp turn to the Right and joining the reactionary wing of the local bourgeoisie, they failed and lost all their initial positions. In other countries the Socialist parties, after suffering similar failure and some vacillations and zigzags embarked on a new path, i.e., they turned to the Left and began to cooperate with the Communists and other Left-wing forces. There they really succeeded and consolidated their positions. But this resulted in the following: the connections of such Social-Democratic parties in Asia with the Right-wing Social-Democracy in Europe weakened or even broke off altogether. The plan of the international Right-wing reformist leadership to strike root in Asia and take revenge on the Communists failed in both cases.

Let us take a look at Indonesia, one of the key Asian countries with a population of 115 million. Here the Social-Democrats really seemed to have a chance of success. Only a few months after the establishment of the independent Indonesian Republic, Sutan Sjahrir, leader of the newly organised Socialist Party, became the head of the

government and, with a short interruption, stayed in power until the middle of 1947. This, as it turned out, was enough to discredit Indonesian Social-Democracy.

What happened in the country was a tragedy for the rank-and-file Indonesian Socialists who had joined the party with enthusiasm. As soon as Sjahrir and his companions-in-arms became ministers, instead of launching reforms they entered into a collusion with the Dutch colonialists, the old enslavers of Indonesia, who refused to recognise the independence of the republic. At the same time the Socialists began to work for a rapprochement with the Masjumi, an ultra-reactionary Moslem party organised by merchants, usurers and landowners. Social-Democrat Sjahrir's government surrendered Indonesian bases to the Dutch, concluded agreements with them and removed the troops from the front, hurling them against the peasants, who were carrying out a land reform on their own. The matter can be easily explained; the main thing for Sjahrir and his group was not anti-colonialism, but anti-communism. But when the Dutch were, nevertheless, driven out by the people, Sjahrir objected to establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR, and began to advocate a rapprochement with the West and cooperation with foreign monopolies. Not a trace of socialism remained in his policy.

The Indonesian Socialist Party never recovered from this shock. Workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals began to leave it, and during the 1955 general elections it polled no more than 2 per cent of the votes. Things went so far that in 1958-1960 Sjahrir's adherents and the leaders of the Masjumi Party openly sided with the ultra-reactionaries who raised a revolt against Sukarno's

government. The party was banned as a subversive organisation. Fifteen years after its birth, Indonesian reformism disgraced itself by siding with the extreme reactionaries, and ingloriously left the stage, incapable of consolidating itself in this important position in Southeast Asia. Today a number of the old leaders of the Indonesian Socialist Party are supporting the ruling military and police system.* Sumitro, one of its former leaders, entered the cabinet of General Suharto who carried out mass executions of Communists. Other Indonesian Socialists are pondering over what had taken place and thinking about what lies ahead.

What happened in the large neighbouring country of Burma? Almost the same. Here, too, it looked at first as though the wave of Asian Social-Democracy would flood its banks. Then it fell back. The reasons were the same as in Indonesia.

The Burmese Socialist Party was headed by a man, who, like the Indonesian Sjahrir, was considered one of the most adroit reformist leaders in Asia, the very same U Ba Swe who in 1953 was placed at the head of the ASC. His adherents servilely called him the "big tiger" and predicted the career of an Asian Bismarck for him. As early as 1947 U Ba Swe became the General Secretary of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. In the first Burmese parliamentary election in 1952 the Socialists won 60 per cent of all the deputies' seats; they were followed by the petty bourgeoisie and a considerable part of the working people. But the party leadership consisted of representatives of the *comprador* bourgeoisie and landowners, i.e., those who feared socialism the most. U Ba Swe,

* *S.I.L.*, March 1, 1969, p. 50.

who clearly coordinated his actions with Sjahrir, proposed that the Burmese Communists should be expelled from the AFPFL, the Communist Party declared illegal, and the revolutionary patriots suppressed by military force. In Burma, as in Indonesia, the Social-Democrats found themselves to the Right of the moderate group of national bourgeoisie.

For a short time U Ba Swe managed to concentrate almost dictatorial power in his hands: he became Prime Minister, War Minister and Minister of Planning. It was on his orders that the army and police were hurled against the Communists. When the moderate wing of the national bourgeoisie refused to pursue this policy and decided to stop the civil war, U Ba Swe was dismissed from his various posts, and, like Sjahrir, started secret intrigues with military circles. In the 1960 election the Burmese Socialist Party polled only 20 per cent of the votes, and even U Ba Swe failed to get into parliament. The position formerly held by the party was lost. Two years later General Ne Win's government came to power, and disbanded the old political parties.

Burmese Social-Democracy lost its importance after an existence of less than two decades. The plan for establishing the Rangoon-Jakarta axis, which was supposed to inspire the Right-wing Socialists in India, Malaya, Nepal, Ceylon and other neighbouring countries, and create a counterbalance to communism in Asia, failed before reaching its first stage.

Did the Asian reformists manage to succeed at least in India where their first party was founded as early as 1934 and where some national conditions and traditions of non-violence should, it would appear, have favoured them?

In the London Bureau of the Socialist International it was undoubtedly believed that a similarly strong Labour, or at least semi-Labour-type, party would appear in India as did in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and later in some other parts of the former British Empire. Thousands of Indian students were for decades trained in British universities, and many of them became friends of Labour Party members. European Social-Democracy was very greatly in need of a powerful ally in the heart of Asia. But in India, too, many people were ready to join the Socialist Party. Seventeen million people voted for the Socialists in India in 1957. It looked as though the way was open here, too.

In order to advance, however, and occupy key positions in a country that had just thrown off the age-old British yoke and had at once encountered acute social problems, Indian Social-Democracy should have taken at least one step. It should have had to oppose the policies of the bourgeois leaders of the Indian National Congress (INC) with a programme that would immediately win over to its side scores of millions of people of the lower classes, i.e., a programme of social reforms. Nothing else could have brought real success in this country exhausted by centuries of oppression by colonialists, landowners and usurers.

It turned out that the Indian Social-Democrats, although more experienced and less adventurist than the Social-Democrats of Indonesia and Burma, nevertheless lacked courage. All they did was to decide on a programme of decentralising the economy and state administration, developing small-scale industry, using "small machinery" and attracting foreign capital. They did not dare to go

further, or get at the root of the problems of Indian society.

In the 1950s there were already two socialist parties in India—the All-India Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the Samyukta Socialist Party (SP). The PSP which belonged to the Socialist International and whose leaders were directly connected with Sjahrir and U Ba Swe took the road of irreconcilable anti-communism. Things repeatedly went so far that this party moved far to the right of the bourgeois Indian National Congress. Mchta, its former chairman, who at the 1960 session of the Socialist International Council reported on "Social-Democracy in Asia" subsequently went over to the National Congress and was appointed minister in its government. In 1957, when, after the victory of Communists in the elections in the State of Kerala, a new, Left-wing government was formed there, the PSP, in order to overthrow this government, went as far as joining forces with extreme reactionaries, including the Catholic Church and British planters. During the violent class riots that broke out in the Indian towns and villages the Social-Democrats from this party actually continued to side with the reactionaries. At one time they even made advances to Swatantra, the party of the extreme Right established by big landlords, monopolists, and former princes.

The account had to be settled here too. In the course of 10 years, from 1957 to 1967, the number of votes polled by the PSP decreased from 11 million to 4.5 million. The party was supported by only 3 per cent of the voters.* The SP, which was pursuing a more cautious policy, tried to improve

the situation. In districts, where the sharpest political struggle was taking place, particularly in West Bengal and the State of Kerala, the SP began to cooperate with the Communists, although continuing in its inconsistent course. New opportunities arose before the Indian Socialists in 1969 when, in connection with the split in the National Congress and the regrouping of the social forces in the country, the situation began to change. But the results of the first two postwar decades were clear to them. Despite their numbers and far-reaching plans they failed to come any nearer to achieving power. Both South and Southeast Asia remained actually outside the sphere of influence of international Social-Democracy, and in these areas, if we take only India, Indonesia and Burma, it was a question of nearly 600 million people.

The next question, as we look at the map, is: have Social-Democrats penetrated into one of the most important areas farther west—the Near East, one of the present-day centres of world politics?

If we regard the Right-wing Baathists as a variety of Asian reformists, the answer to the question should apparently be "yes". As a matter of fact, extreme Right-wing Baathism of the former trend, which at one time wielded power over several Arab countries, could be considered a mixture of reformism and unrestrained nationalism and rabid anti-communism. At that time the Right-wing Baath parties in Syria and Jordan officially affiliated themselves with the ASC. In the summer of 1963, during the rule of the bloody regime of the extremist wing of the Baathists in Iraq, and three years later the *London Bulletin* of the Socialist International openly called these parties "fra-

* *S.I.I.*, May 24, 1969, p. 128.

ternal ASC parties". It goes without saying that the then leaders of the extreme Right wing of Baathism also had far-reaching plans. They intended to unite Syria, Iraq, Jordan and other Arab states under their leadership, eradicate the ideology of communism on Arab soil by mass executions and arrests, and, in the end, establish in the zone stretching from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf their own "system" closing on U Ba Swe's and Sjahrir's "system". Nothing was accomplished from this programme save mass murders of Iraqi Communists. Thus smeared with blood, extreme Right-wing reformism in the Arab East reached the verge of fascism, but failed to build the big system of states of which it had dreamed. As a result of a coup d'état the Baath group again came to power in Bagdad in July 1968 and declared that now it would pursue a different policy. It sharply opposes imperialism and works to put through progressive socio-economic reforms. At the same time it still has not discarded the survivals of anti-communism. The Iraqi Communists are calling for the establishment of a united front of progressive and patriotic forces, including the Baath party, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Communist Party, in which these parties would retain their ideological and organisational independence. Time will show how things will develop in Iraq. But what is clear, however, is that nothing has essentially remained of the former "great" plans of Right-wing Baathism in the Arab East.

Another group of Baathists, which cooperates with Communists, is now in power in Syria. The Syrian Government includes two Communists. The question of organising a front of patriotic and progressive forces for further democratisation of

internal political life, ensuring the fundamental interests of the working people and preparing for a transition to construction of a socialist society in Syria is under consideration. A National Front is already operating in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. It is striving to rally the anti-imperialist, democratic forces in close cooperation with the other progressive Arab states and the socialist countries.

In the Arab Republic of Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia there is no Social-Democracy. In the Lebanon the Socialist International tried a few years ago to utilise the Socialist Progressive Party, which was affiliated with it through the ASC, in order to promote "a proper socialist structure in the Arab area"* with its aid, but today this party stands on the left flank of Social-Democracy, advocates the union of all the progressive forces in the Arab countries and a strengthening of relations between the Lebanon and the socialist states, and actively participates in the all-Arab struggle against Israeli expansionism and American imperialism. The Lebanese Communists are cooperating with this party and are preparing to act in a united front with it, with the Baath Party and other progressive forces in the coming parliamentary elections.

In Aden an organisation called the People's Socialist Party appeared on the list of the Socialist International. By taking an anti-colonialist stand it influenced the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) organised in 1965 and hoped to place itself at the head of the country with its aid. But when it came to liberating Aden the FLOSY (now the National Libera-

* S.I.I., April 9, 1966, p. 74.

tion Front) carried the day. In the summer of 1968 a FLOSY group headed by Abdullah al-Asnag contacted American circles, raising a revolt against the new government in Aden, but it failed.

It may be added that at one time, European Social-Democracy, the French in particular, also hoped to extend its influence to North Africa, to the Mahrib countries, where the national liberation forces began to form their own parties and governments in the 1950s and 1960s. In Algeria hopes were centred on the group formed by Ben Khedda, whose views somewhat coincided with those of the Right-wing Social-Democrats. In 1961 Ben Khedda became the head of the Algerian government, and this inspired a number of leaders of the Socialist International with optimistic expectations. Some of them even believed that the coming of this group to power in Algeria might result in a serious re-arrangement of forces in the Arab world. But two years later Ben Khedda lost his power for ever. In Tunisia, similar hopes were pinned on some leaders of the ruling national-reformist Destour Socialist Party organised before the Second World War. But here, too, the national liberation forces embarked on their own path, and remained outside the pale of the Socialist International. In Morocco there is no Social-Democracy, and, therefore, European reformism could not be imported to the Arab East.

Only in Israel, established on a former British mandated territory, did the MAI (formerly MAPAI), a Right-wing Social-Democratic party, succeed in coming to power in the very beginning, and has continuously governed the country for 23 years now. It would be hard to deny that the main results of its policies during this period are

truly tragic: Social-Democrats have turned Israel, a country that can in no way be considered part of the "third world", into an international powder keg that may blow up tomorrow. At any rate, it goes without saying, that not a single Social-Democratic party in the world is playing such a risky game with peace today as is Israeli Social-Democracy.

There is no need to remind the reader of what has been happening in Israel: the newspapers are full of it every day. The Arab-Israeli conflict increasingly tends to aggravate international relations with each passing year and may become a pretext for most serious complications. Everybody knows, however, that the principal participants of this conflict in Tel Aviv are precisely Social-Democrats. Golda Meir, the present Prime Minister of Israel, is the former general secretary of the MAI which was established by Israeli reformists in 1930 and was the first to affiliate itself with the Socialist International in Asia. It is equally true that this party may be considered the most important support of American imperialism in the Middle East. Without the money, arms, diplomacy and 6th Fleet of the USA the MAI cannot stay in power. The policies it pursues are, in the final analysis, dictated by Washington; this is an open secret.

There was a time when Israeli Social-Democracy could at least assert that it was governing its state alone and had nothing to do with Israeli reaction. Now it cannot do even that: in May 1967, on the eve of the aggression against the Arab countries, the MAI (then still called MAPAI) formed a coalition with three Israeli Right-wing parties—the Herut (an extremely nationalist party advocating the building of a

"Great Israel"), the Religious National Party supported by the rabbinate, and the Israel Liberal Party founded by the big and middle bourgeoisie. The aggression against the Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria and Jordan was carried out by this coalition. The Israeli Social-Democrats thus embarked on the same path as the Social-Democrats of Indonesia and Burma had taken before them by allying themselves closely with the parties of the Right and extreme Right.

It is as yet hard to say what price Israel will have to pay for the aggressive MAI policy. At any rate Israel cannot become a firm base for international Social-Democracy in the Middle East as some of its strategists in London at first contemplated. That the MAI has, like no other party, discredited reformism in this area, there can be no doubt.

During the postwar years many other hastily set up reformist organisations, on which their patrons at first pinned particular hopes, also appeared on the Asian stage. Some of them still seem to be dragging out a miserable existence, but nobody knows what they are doing. The Social-Democratic parties in Iran, Thailand, Pakistan and South Vietnam have vanished as if they never existed.

Even in Malaysia where, as is well known, British influence still persists, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which belongs to the Socialist International, has but one seat in parliament.* The only corner, besides Israel, where reformism could really consolidate itself, is another former British possession—the small Island of Singapore with a population of 2 million—where Britain

still has military bases. Here the ruling Social-Democratic People's Action Party has all the seats in parliament and is supported by a large part of the local, particularly Chinese, bourgeoisie. Of late, it has been trying to embark on a path of independent policy, strengthen its relations with all countries, including socialist, and begin the industrial development of the island. And, although the average wages of the Singapore workers are still only one-half those of the Japanese workers, the Social-Democratic parliament passed a labour law in 1968 that infringes upon the rights of workers. Singapore is a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a bloc organised in Southeast Asia under Anglo-American control and, since April 1971, a member of the latest military bloc formed in Southeast Asia by Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. This isle with a Social-Democratic government is but a speck in the wide spaces of Southeast Asia.

Speaking of Right-wing Social-Democrats, the results of their operations in postwar Asia are clear to every observer, however they may be estimated and re-estimated: despite their enormous efforts they have failed to achieve their aim. Of about the 20 Social-Democratic parties that began to operate on this continent after the war not one has accomplished anything worthwhile and not one—not counting the Israeli MAPAI, tossing in the vortex of the Middle-Eastern crisis and putting the life of its country in jeopardy—plays any role in the present-day international scene. Some of these parties, as, for example, the Indonesian Social-Democrats, have been driven away in disgrace; nearly half of these organisations have disappeared from the surface

* *S.I.I.*, March 29, 1969, p. 75.

of political life. The former far-reaching plans of the ASC, the Asian reformist International, are no longer mentioned.

The reason for this failure is obvious. Operating under entirely different historical and geographic conditions than did the European reformists, the Asian Right-wing Social-Democrats nevertheless repeated the main mistakes of European Social-Democrats. They also depended not on the lower strata of the people, but on a union with the anti-communist bourgeoisie. And they had to pay for it here, too. The experience of Sjahrir, U Ba Swe and those who held the same views, only confirmed in the specific Asian situation the experience of Noske and Scheidemann. European Social-Democracy was unable, while in power, to stem the onslaught of fascism, just as Asian Social-Democracy failed to protect the national liberation movement of the peoples of its continent from both imperialism and Asian reaction.

Does this mean that all Asian Social-Democracy is moving along such a path and that it has suffered similar defeat?

No, it does not, and this is confirmed by what is happening to its Left wing.

The experience of the Japan Socialist Party which in 1967 polled 12.6 million votes may serve as an example. Highly developed Japan, one of the most important countries in Asia, does not belong to the "third world". After a number of vacillations and failures during the years when the Socialists participated in governments together with representatives of the pro-American bourgeoisie their party without asking the ASC for permission chose for itself a way that differs from that of the Indonesian, Burmese and other Right-wing Asian reformists. Breaking with the conserv-

ative wing which established its own party the Japanese Socialists quite resolutely came out against American imperialism. They demanded the repudiation of the Japanese-American military pact, withdrawal of the American troops from the country, liquidation of the US military bases on Japanese territory, and the establishment of an atom-free zone in the Pacific. The Socialist Party was not afraid to advocate friendship between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The old vacillations of the Japanese Socialists still persist. Many of their leaders continue to incline now to the Right and now to the Left. Although the Socialist Party concludes local election agreements with Communists and thereby helps the working-class movement to achieve serious successes (we shall yet return to this), it does not as yet dare to form a broad united front of the democratic forces on a national scale and pays for it with election failures, as it did in the 1968 and 1969 elections. But some sort of a step has already been taken. Today the Socialist Party is supported by every fifth voter in the country. Only one-fourth this number votes for the Right-wing Social-Democrats, who broke away from the party under the mask of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party. It may be inferred that no other Social-Democratic party in any of the large Asian countries has gained such influence as the JSP. It is clear that the turn against imperialism has played the decisive role in this. It is also clear how important for the cause of peace in the Pacific area the unity of the Japanese working-class movement may be.

An even more courageous policy than that of the Japanese Socialists is pursued today by the Socialist Party of Ceylon which was once affili-

ated with the Socialist International; we shall come back to it in the fifth chapter. Left-wing tendencies are also in some measure observed today in the Socialist parties of Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. Everything indicates that the forward-moving Social-Democratic parties in Asia have a future. It is similarly clear, however, that these are no longer the old Social-Democratic parties which the world has known. The best and most courageous of its representatives have other political brains and other hearts.

There are also many indications that the most viable Socialist parties are moving further and further away from European Right-wing Social-Democracy on another continent of the "third world"—in Latin America. In the last decade most of them have been in an unenviable position. During this period the number of Communists in the Latin American countries has doubled, several mass Communist parties have come into being, and a state that is building socialism has emerged in the Caribbean area. Latin American Right-wing Social-Democracy has as yet failed to do anything worth-while. As a matter of fact, the most significant and active Socialist parties on this continent—the Partido Socialista (Chile) and the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS, Mexico)—do not even belong to the Socialist International and pursue their own course. At the same time the influence of Leftist elements, which disorganise the working-class movement, is noticeable in some of the local reformist parties.

In the past the European reformists were interested in this continent even less than in Asia; the countries south of the USA were considered an out-of-the-way political area that merited no attention. After the war, when popular move-

ments against imperialists, latifundists and military juntas flamed up in various Latin American countries, the European reformist politicians still hardly reacted to them. Later, when the flames intensified and their light could be seen even in the windows of the London Bureau of the Socialist International a Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International (LASSI) was hastily established in the capital of Uruguay where a Socialist party had existed since 1910. It was assumed that this secretariat would become a coordinating body similar to the ASC Bureau in Rangoon, that it would help local Social-Democracy to get on its feet and grow into a serious political force. Nothing of the sort happened. The second continent of the "third world" also rejected Right-wing reformism.

Not in one Latin American country, not counting the few small isles and colonies belonging to Britain (Trinidad, Jamaica and Guiana), did the Social-Democrats of the old, "European" type come to power. Serious influence has been achieved only by the Partido Socialista (Socialist Party of Chile) which is standing on firm Left-wing positions. In Argentina the Socialists were followed by 3.8 per cent of the voters, in Uruguay by 3.5 per cent; in Panama they received one seat in parliament and in Colombia none. Latin America seethed, flared up and emerged in the arena of big world politics, but Right-wing Social-Democracy lagged behind.

It turned out that to the Right of the Communists the leading positions in the struggle against the imperialists, oligarchies and military juntas were taken up not by Social-Democrats, but by bourgeois radical parties. In some countries even Catholic Christian Democrats found themselves

to the Left of Social-Democrats. In Ecuador the Social-Democrats at first sided with the military junta that had accomplished the coup d'état. In Bolivia they did the same and entered the government of General Barrientos who had seized the power. In Guiana they came to an understanding with the United Force, a reactionary party organised by European businessmen. In Jamaica they conspired with the local trading and industrial circles. In Argentina they supported the reactionary government of General Aramburu who tried to fight the working-class movement by means of a state of siege. The initiative in the struggle for solving the urgent social and national problems of the awakened Latin American countries was retained by the Communists and Left-wing bourgeois revolutionary parties. The Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International continued to exist, give advice and issue instructions, but the plan to create a new reformist "system" west of Europe misfired.

When this became clear to everybody, the Latin American Social-Democrats began to reconsider their own fate as did the Japanese Socialists. Many of their parties have of late turned to the Left. This happened in Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Costa Rica and partly in Mexico and other countries. In Chile where the working class is organised particularly well the Socialist Party joined forces with the Communists in the Central Union of Chilean Workers and the Popular Unity Movement (Frente de la Unidad Popular—FRAP). In the 1967 municipal elections this party polled more than 14 per cent of the votes and in 1970, merging with the Communists and other parties into the Popular Unity Movement, it triumphantly elected its leader Salvador

Allende to the presidency of the country. Today it may be considered the leading and most active Socialist party in Latin America. As we shall see, its example is beginning to be followed by a number of other Socialist parties and groups on this continent. But in a number of other Latin American countries the Right-wing Social-Democrats continue to mark time. The Asian experience of the reformists was confirmed under entirely different geographic and political conditions.

In 1966 the Socialist International strategists in Latin America at last did something which they themselves apparently thought almost brilliant. They invited representatives of Latin American parties which never had anything to do with the socialist working-class movement to the congress of the International in Stockholm: bourgeois reformist parties of Peru (APRA), Costa Rica (National Liberation Party—PLN), Venezuela (Democratic Action Party) and Paraguay (Febrerist Revolutionary Party) were included. Despite the fact that the membership of these organisations contains broad sections of working people and some of them have Left-wing groups, many of their leaders openly advocate anti-communism. Betancourt, leader of the Venezuelan party, and Figueres, leader of the Costa Rican party, who at one time were in power, outlawed the Communists in their countries. In 1966 all these parties were solemnly admitted to the Socialist International as observers.

It cannot be denied that this step considerably extended the boundaries of the international reformist organisation, and seemed to make it a real political force in Latin America. The national reformist parties in Venezuela, Peru and Costa Rica are supported by 25-49 per cent of the

voters in their countries; the Venezuelan Democratic Action Party was in power for years. In 1967 the bulletin of the London Bureau of the Socialist International even stated that the joining of the International by this group of Latin American parties "can form a significant beginning for a future coordination of efforts on a world-wide basis".* But what good will this deal do to international Social-Democracy? Will not its rapprochement with purely bourgeois parties hasten the turn to the Left of the old socialist organisations in Latin America, organisations which originated in the working-class movement? Do its leaders believe Social-Democracy will win, if the polarisation in its ranks spreads over to the new part of the world twice as fast?

Such is the postwar experience of reformism on two of the three continents where the countries of the "third world" are located. And now what does Africa's experience show?

It is still too early to judge; the process of the establishment and demarcation of the political parties on this continent is far from complete and in a number of countries has not really started. However, a good deal can already be discerned here, too.

As early as the 1950s the leaders of Social-Democracy made fairly determined attempts at interfering in the political life of Africa and, wherever possible, even at taking government policy into their own hands. They made diligent use of the old connections of the British colonial authorities and the French Socialists in the African colonies. Contacts with various new political organisations and leaders in African countries

* *S.I.I.*, March 4, 1967, p. 52.

began to be established both in London and Paris. In Paris special attention was devoted to a rapprochement with the influential group of the Senegalese politician Senghor reputed to be a theoretician of so-called African socialism.

In 1957 the old local branches of the French Socialist Party in the African colonies were united in a new organisation under the name of the African Socialist Movement. The leadership was vested in Lamine Gueye, Senghor's countryman and former member of the socialist faction in the French parliament. The new party did not achieve success, but Senghor, who organised his own party, became President of Senegal. This politician is considered an adherent of European Social-Democracy in Western and Equatorial Africa, although his party is not officially affiliated with the Socialist International. Senghor's group is still operating under the banner of "African socialism", but the main support of his ruling party in Senegal actually comes from the chiefs of feudal tribes, Moslem clergy, new African officials and the petty bourgeoisie. The people of Senegal are not satisfied with the regime. In 1968 there was even mass unrest among the students and workers, and Senghor's government had to declare a state of emergency. It is not so easy to implant the African variant of reformism in the tropics.

Besides Senegal, a country with a population of 3.5 million, African Social-Democracy was able to strike root only at two points—in both cases islands. On the Island of Madagascar (now the Malagasy Republic) formerly owned by France, after the declaration of independence, the power was vested in the party established here, too, on the basis of the former branch of the French Socialist Party. As in Senegal its leader became

the president of the Republic. But here, too, the upper strata of the local trading and rural bourgeoisie have become the real kernel of the new Social-Democratic party that controls the votes of the peasantry; here, too, the officials and Catholic clergy serve as the support of the party. The Social-Democratic Government and the Republic of South Africa signed an agreement under which the latter will finance the construction of military installations on Madagascar. The Island of Mauritius, formerly part of the British colonial empire, is governed by a party patronised by the British Labour Party, bearing the same name and consisting mainly of people of Indian origin. Although the independence of Mauritius was declared in 1968, the Labour government was unable to cope with the planters and religious fanatics who had provoked bloody conflicts. The state of emergency proclaimed on this occasion could be rescinded by the government three years later.

In Somalia the London Bureau of the Socialist International maintains relations with the ruling party—the Somali Youth League. The main adherents of the party are tribal chiefs, big landowners, Moslem clergy and officials. Intertribal strife still prevails in the country, half the banana plantations on the best lands and most of the industrial enterprises are owned by Italian companies who owned them under the colonial regime.

Recently efforts have been made in London to establish firm contacts between the reformist International and the ruling classes of four other African countries—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. It is hard to say what headway they are making. European Social-Democracy is trying to ingratiate itself with the leaders of these countries.

One thing is clear. From the very moment the independent African states came into existence, European Social-Democracy has been seeking support among the well-to-do intellectuals coming from the ranks of officials, tribal chiefs and other strata of the African bourgeoisie. What occurred in Asia is being repeated with amazing regularity in Africa. Wherever this bourgeoisie has already taken root, the Right-wing Social-Democrats reach an understanding with it, and here and there even come to power, but where the national liberation struggle continues, efforts are fruitless, or nearly so. Something is in the way. What this something is was in some measure revealed, for example, at the May 1966 Congress of the Socialist International in Stockholm.

One of the main points on the agenda of the Congress was "Socialist thought and action in the new countries". Representatives of the national liberation movements of Rhodesia, Mozambique (Frelimo movement) and other African countries were invited as guests. To all intents and purposes Western Social-Democracy planned to conclude something like a general pact with a number of leaders of fighting Africa. Things did not go that far, however, because, when the African guests wanted to speak on the vital problems of their movements, they were not given the floor. It turned out that that was the ultimatum of the British Labour Party which was afraid of public criticism of its government's attitude to the Rhodesian racists. Three years later, in the report to the regular Congress of the Socialist International in Eastbourne in March 1969, its leaders had to admit that, although some European Socialist parties maintained "valuable bilateral contacts" in Africa, "there is as yet no desire [on the part of

the Africans—Ed.] for commitment to international association”.*

There is no African Social-Democracy outside a few islands and small countries. Nor is it known whether it is coming into existence on a wide scale. The Western reformists intended to implant it and attach it to themselves with the aid of some layers of the emergent African bourgeoisie and the officials supporting it. But when it comes to practical decisions on fundamental questions vital to Africa they cannot overcome their fear of the people of this continent: *they fear an African revolution as they formerly feared the European and Asian revolutions*. That is why the doors of Africa are in most countries still closed to the Socialist International.

We have tried briefly to check up on what Right-wing Social-Democracy has achieved during the postwar decades on three continents in countries of the “third world” after it had decided to go beyond the limits of Europe. As has already been said, this is an important historical question.

One cannot say that it did not accomplish anything. It managed to establish, revive or “affiliate” in Asia, Latin America and Africa several dozen parties, attract votes from among working people and the petty bourgeoisie, and in some places come to power. In some important countries it was, as it seemed, close to taking up one of the first places in social and state life.

But years passed and the first places were taken up by others—either parties to the Left of it or military groups. It lost political battles in the “third world” exactly as it lost them in Europe,

* *S.I.I.*, May 24, 1969, p. 111.

lost positions here as it had at one time in Germany, Austria or France. Everything repeated itself in a new manner, but essentially for the same old reasons. Here, too, on “fresh” territory, Right-wing Social-Democracy helped the bourgeoisie against the working class; here, too, it conspired against the Communists; and here, too, it hindered the countries from embarking on the socialist path of development.

But the main reason for its defeat in the “third world” is not only this, not merely its usual policy of forming blocs with the forces of the Right. The reason lies in the special conditions it encountered in these areas of the world. On the economically backward continents, the working class just coming into existence has not been subjected for decades to systematic corruption by reformists as in the highly developed countries of Western Europe. By the time of the stormy development of the working-class movement Right-wing Social-Democracy did not have at its disposal anywhere here either a working-class aristocracy hardened in its replete egoism, or a well-established and refined bureaucratic apparatus. This does not, of course, mean that this will continue under any and all conditions, and that Right-wing Social-Democracy has no prospects in the “third world” at all. It cannot be gainsaid that in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which are moving along the capitalist way of development, there is room for Right-wing Social-Democrats. It should not be forgotten that reformism is tenacious.

But today the balance of its activity in these areas causes no doubts.

Not on one of the three continents has Right-wing Social-Democracy, with rare exceptions,

done anything to solve the urgent, immense social and political problems of the "third world". It either pretended not to notice these problems or invented pitiful palliatives in response, or, in collusion with reaction, directly prevented their solution, as it did in Indonesia, Burma and Israel. Only the Left-wing forces in the ranks of Social-Democracy on these continents were able to break out of the vicious circle at the price of severing their connections with Western reformism. This price may subsequently become too high for the present leadership of the Socialist International.

The result was everywhere the same. Neither in Asia, Latin America nor Africa was Right-wing Social-Democracy able to improve the situation that had come into being after the clash between its European parties and the national liberation movement. Reformism could not be made a really global force.

Today many Right-wing Social-Democrats admit this themselves. They no longer expect a victorious offensive of their allies in the "third world". On February 4, 1967 the London bulletin of the Socialist International published an account of an interview of one of the European Social-Democrats with leaders of the suppressed Socialist Party in Indonesia. The account reads in part: "The Indonesian leaders admit openly that they hunger for international contacts, after having been isolated during all these years. But while they are happy to welcome visits from the Socialist parties of Western Europe and to receive material aid from them, they rule out any possibility of an Indonesian Socialist Front joining the Socialist International. They are hoping that Socialist cooperation in Asia, in which the PSI participated with heart and soul before it was

banned, can be brought to life again. As we gave them the report of the situation of the different Socialist parties in Asia and hinted that that possibility was remote, they agreed..."*

The Sub-Committee on Developing Areas organised under the Socialist International continues to work untiringly, call conferences, establish relations and distribute literature. In June 1969 London even decided to repeat the ASC experiment, i.e., to call a conference of the Social-Democratic parties of Asia and Oceania. The London organ of the Socialist International declared that there was an urgent need "for the restoration of a regional centre of democratic socialism in that area" and that the task of the conference was "to confirm that Orient and Occident are indeed united in a common ideology".** The conference was called not in Asia, but in Wellington, the capital of New Zealand. When it assembled it turned out that a number of the conference participants—from Indonesia, Burma and South Korea—were political shadows; they did not represent anybody but themselves; they had no parties or hardly any behind them. The Japanese and Indian Socialists did not send any representatives. The representative of the New Zealand Labour Party became the head of the newly formed Asia-Oceania Liaison Bureau of the Socialist International, an Israeli Social-Democrat was appointed vice-chairman, and an Austrian Social-Democrat (General Secretary of the Socialist International) was put on the governing body. Such is ASC No.2. You can call all the conferences and institute all the committees you want, but you cannot fit Asia,

* *S.I.I.*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, February 4, 1967.

** *S.I.I.*, Vol. XX, No. 2, February 1970, p. 14.

or the other continents except Europe, into extreme Right-wing, London-controlled Social-Democracy.

Do Socialists, despite all this, have a future on these continents? Emphasising the importance of their mutual understanding with the peoples of these areas Alsing Andersen, former chairman of the Socialist International, stated at the opening of the session of the Socialist International Council in Oslo on June 2, 1962: "The Socialist International must develop or die."* The same year Jan Tinbergen, a Dutch Social-Democrat, wrote in the organ of the Socialist International:

"Democratic Socialists will be able to play a part, however modest, on the stage of world politics only when they have a common international programme which accords with the interests of the peoples of the world.... In origin it [the socialist movement—*Ed.*] was international.... But it has not kept pace with the times; it is still European in character."**

"Develop or die." A dilemma correctly presented. But who will solve it? Let us go back to the stronghold of reformism—European Social-Democracy.

* *S.I.I.*, Vol. XII, No. 24-25, June 16, 1962.

** *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1962.

5. NEW PROSPECTS

Where is Social-Democracy going? We know where it has been going for the last 50 years. It is no use discussing the fact that it has suffered serious historical defeat, for this has been witnessed by people living in our own day. What next? Will it continue to mark time, win and then lose positions as before, make a step forward and then two steps back and be afraid to advance towards real socialism? Can we believe, as do some people, that it does not and cannot have any alternative?

To answer this question with a simple "yes", would, in our opinion, be wrong. The situation is much more complicated. We must not identify Social-Democrats with social-democratism and Socialist workers with the reformist ideology and reformist policies. We cannot therefore assert that in our time Social-Democrats no longer have any future. They are still followed by more than

73 million voters all over the world. History never completely bars the way to organisations involving broad masses even if the leaders of these organisations lead them into a blind alley. To be exact, two ways are open to present-day Social-Democracy.

The old way was tried and tested to the very last turn. If Social-Democracy does not try a new road, its historical fate as that of one of the largest international political organisations will be settled sooner or later. It will not withstand the political and social battles in the remaining decades of the 20th century, and will either finally degenerate into an ordinary bourgeois Liberal party, or will suffer a deep split and fall into decay.

It is no secret that many Right-wing Social-Democratic leaders are ready for the former, and want nothing else. One of the prominent West German Social-Democrats, for example, once stated, that Liberal socialism attracts Conservative and Liberal forces because it has itself adopted Liberal motives and Conservative elements. Norbert Leser, an Austrian Right-wing Social-Democrat, called on the Socialist parties "to do away with the vestiges of the Marxist teaching". Nor is it an accident that the idea of the eternal existence of capitalist or, according to the latest reformist terminology, "neo-capitalist" relations in some hardly disguised form appears in the postwar programmes of many Social-Democratic parties.

It is hard to say whether or not the Right-wing leaders will succeed in fulfilling such plans, but the Social-Democratic parties will have to make a choice. Social-Democracy cannot stand aside from the decisive battles between capitalism and socialism; it cannot wait and see which way the scales

will tip, and it cannot act on the principle of "this is none of my business". The choice must be made now or very soon. The course this party has pursued so far has undoubtedly been a choice in favour of capitalism, whether it is called "neo-capitalism" or "industrial society".

Why did Right-wing socialism make this choice in its time? This is a very important question, and much depends on the answer to it. It is now clear that it was not merely a matter of gravitating towards the bourgeoisie; there was also something else which derived from it; it was a sort of special, it may be said, pathological *fear of communism*.

It is precisely this fear that accounts for nearly everything in the actions of modern Right-wing Social-Democracy. Not anti-capitalism, but anti-communism has been the mainspring of its policy in the last 50 years. Hence its final renunciation of the class struggle, its agreement with the bourgeois parties, and its retreat before fascism without a fight.

Out of fear of communism German Social-Democracy surrendered its position to the counter-revolutionary brass hats who, in their turn, handed the power over to Hitler, while in the 1930s French Social-Democracy preferred a split of the Popular Front which barred the way to the collaborationists. Because of their anti-communism the Social-Democratic parties did not support the Soviet programme of European collective security on the eve of the Second World War and sided with NATO after the war. Because of their anti-communism the Social-Democratic parties in Europe turned away from the national liberation movement and from the peoples of three continents. The main motive has always been

the same fear of the world revolutionary forces.

What hurts communism is good for Social-Democracy—that is how Aneurin Bevan, a Left-wing British Labour Party member and opponent of Right-wing Socialists, summed up their secret doctrine in the 1950s. It is impossible to live with such a doctrine and not to suffer defeats in the epoch of society's irresistible movement towards socialism. The conflict with Communists is becoming a conflict with time; as long as anti-communism determines the policies of Social-Democracy, time is against Social-Democracy. It was thus yesterday and, if the Social-Democrats continue to obey their Right wing and travel along the old road, it will also be thus tomorrow.

To get an idea of what they can expect does not require any particular studies or conjectures. It is clear even to the naked eye.

First, so long as the capitalist powers themselves do not take the road of peaceful coexistence Social-Democracy, which is connected with their policy, will have to remain in alliance with NATO, the organisation that was formed for the purpose of preparing a third world war.

Second, in these conditions it will have to continue linking its fate with the adventures of American imperialism, i.e., letting itself be involved again into the dangerous "cold war".

Third, Social-Democracy may willy-nilly become an accomplice in strengthening the new German militarism which seeks, despite the coming of a Social-Democratic government to power in Bonn, to remain the main NATO bulwark in Europe.

Fourth, it will, for the same reasons, have to antagonise millions of people in the countries of the national liberation movement.

Fifth, in a number of continental European countries Social-Democracy will have to continue depending on a coalition with clerical and other parties of the Right, i.e., the parties whose masters mortally hate socialism and do the bidding of capital.

Sixth and last, Social-Democracy will once more, during a critical period in history, take upon itself the responsibility for continuing the split of the working-class movement, the split of the forces which are destined to oppose war, reaction and neo-fascism.

What all this holds in store for Social-Democracy is clear. Not a single big political party, however skilful and experienced, can in our day and age retain its influence and its adherents while proposing such a programme. Social-Democracy has gone through many hard years; nevertheless, owing to the traditional loyalty of its adherents it repeatedly managed to retain and again consolidate its positions. This much is well known. But perhaps never in its history have its prospects, counting in decades, been so vague as they are today.

Many thoughtful and honest Social-Democrats understand this. A sense of perplexity, dejection and hopelessness has mounted even among reformist leaders in the postwar years. Karl Czernetz, a prominent theoretician of the Austrian Socialist Party, stated that "anxiety, diffidence and uncertainty reign in the socialist working-class movement". In his speech at one of the congresses of the Italian Socialist Party delegate Vigliandi said that the defeats of the European Social-Democratic parties may continue until the Social-Democrats finally find themselves entirely dislodged from the political arena because of their inability

openly to oppose the monopolies with a programme of fundamental reforms.

Indeed, what and whom can this party rely on as long as it pursues its old course? This question cannot be disregarded either.

In the distant past Right-wing Social-Democracy was invariably supported and, during hard times, rescued by the old guard of reformism, i.e., the working-class aristocracy. Now the situation has changed. The composition of the working class is changing and the old type of working-class aristocracy has left or is leaving the scene. The pittance it has for so long a time received from colonial superprofits is running out.

Today it is precisely the comparatively well-paid, highly skilled workers in large capitalist countries, for example, France and Britain, who quite often turn to the Left. The scientific and technological revolution has also turned against Right-wing socialism. The engineering and technical intelligentsia, which this revolution is advancing and part of which in a number of countries supports Social-Democracy, in most cases takes an incomparably more progressive and courageous stand than did the working-class aristocracy. It is also rather inclined to move to the Left.

Nor can the old reformist guard be replaced by the Social-Democratic layer of the newly created state-monopoly bureaucracy. These officials who are closely connected with businessmen do not lead the masses; moreover, the workers do not particularly like them and do not trust them; and what is more, it is a comparatively thin layer.

The petty bourgeoisie, who since the end of the war often sided with Right-wing Socialists and helped them win elections, can hardly be con-

sidered a reliable support for reformism, especially during economic recessions and political crises. In many countries these strata vacillate between the Conservatives and Clericals, on the one hand, and the Left forces, on the other. In the case of a serious depression in the West, those of the unstable petty bourgeoisie who do not turn to the Communists or Left-wing Socialists may again, and very quickly, reorientate themselves towards fascism, as they had already once done in the FRG. This again threatens to narrow down the social base of the Right-wing Social-Democracy.

Lastly, and this is particularly important, it has clearly ceased to attract young people. The present-day young people are sick and tired of marking time. They demand daring ideas and daring action against the threat of war, unemployment and the stagnation of bourgeois society. Right-wing Social-Democracy has no daring ideas, and is terrified of daring action. However, not a single party in the world, that does not want to die, can afford to lose the support of the young people.

True, the reformists, nevertheless, have considerable reserves which cannot be underrated. In many capitalist countries they are still followed by rather broad sections of office and professional workers; here and there, as in France and Sweden, these workers have become or are becoming the social kernel of the Social-Democratic parties. Of course, the whole thing is not limited to this section of the working people. In such countries as Britain, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, where Social-Democrats have, under pressure of the lower classes, carried out a number of measures that have improved the standard of the working people's living, a large majority of the

working class continues to vote for these parties, although at the same time it demands of them a more courageous domestic and foreign policy. But at such stormy times as ours this does not guarantee the reformists any future.

The world is moving faster and faster. The struggle between capitalism and socialism is intensifying, everywhere new developments are appearing and making themselves felt. At such a time people who depend on the support of the masses cannot merely stand by. It is quite possible that the Right-wing leaders of Social-Democracy, who always liked to "wait and see" and postpone decisions, would like to postpone socialism till the 21st or even the 22nd century. This would please many of them most of all. But life does not wait and demands that a choice be made today. The parties that prefer to stand still have no future. Sooner or later history will bury these parties under a heavy layer of sand.

Have the Social-Democrats, at least the sincere Socialists among them, any chance, if they really want to, to remedy the situation and play a positive part in the working-class movement? Yes, they have. Despite all that has happened in the past, the doors are not closed to them.

The same 50-year experience emphasises one circumstance. Wherever the Social-Democrats at least temporarily relinquished anti-communism and marched shoulder to shoulder with Communists and other forces of the Left in the struggle for the economic and political rights of the working people, for peace and against reaction and fascism, they quite often together with the Communists achieved big and at times extraordinary successes. This can be seen in one country after another.

It was thus in Spain in the beginning of the 1930s when the Social-Democrats, together with the Communists, headed the building of a new republic. It was thus in France in 1934 when the Popular Front, established by the decision of the two parties and the Radical Socialists, victoriously stemmed the first onslaught of the fascists and, had it not been split, the fate of France may have been different.

It was thus in the 1940s in a number of West European countries where the Communists and the Social-Democrats fought jointly in the underground like brothers against the nazis and quislings.

It was thus during the first postwar years again in France and Italy. The French governments of that time, which included Socialists and Communists, managed to nationalise the coal, power and gas industries, and a number of banks, as well as to introduce a system of workers' social insurance. The Italian government, formed in 1945 with the participation of Socialists, Communists and other parties, turned over to the landless peasants the untilled landowners' lands, reduced rents, introduced a differential wage scale, and prohibited the dismissal of workers without trade union consent.

It was thus in the 1930s and 1940s. The same thing is confirmed by the experience of the sixth and seventh decades. Wherever Social-Democrats and Communists have already begun to march in step they score substantial successes for their own movement and for the cause of peace, real successes not in word, but in deed. Entirely new and considerable prospects open up before them, prospects that only recently were even hard to imagine. This merits more detailed treatment.

Let us examine the problem in a broad, international aspect in anticipation of history. From such a position everything can be seen more clearly.

How will conditions change in the capitalist world in the coming 10 years? What forces are likely to emerge? What parties will take the lead? What governments will come to power in the principal countries?

What can rather be expected in the bourgeois world today? A shift to the Right, in the direction of extreme reaction or even neo-fascism? A balancing in the "Centre", i.e., an increase in the so-called Left-Centrist coalitions of bourgeois parties with Social-Democrats, or a turn towards Left-wing democracy? What is most likely to occur?

It is important for everybody to foresee it; not only for the mature generation that is already at the helm, but also for all the young people, i.e., those who will still be alive in the next century. The 1970s will determine a good deal and possibly for a long time to come. Ten years is not a short period in these times when each month, sometimes each week, is filled with more historical events than formerly occurred in a year. It can hardly be doubted that the questions which the current decade will have in some way or other to answer will include that of European security, Asian security and the end of the arms race—in a word, all the complex questions of war and peace. And today this is the most important problem of all.

We cannot, of course, expect that it will be completely solved by 1980. We have already become used to the complexities and vicissitudes of modern international relations. But something

important, something significant for the future will undoubtedly be solved. Who, then, will represent the capitalist world at the international round table when the decisions are taken? Who will discuss the vital problems together with the socialist states? There is no need to explain how much will depend on this.

We know what forces have predominated in the bourgeois world during the last quarter of a century, essentially since the end of the war. Whatever they may have called themselves, frankly anti-communist and anti-Soviet parties ruled almost everywhere. All or nearly all of them used NATO as a cover. All or nearly all of them followed the lead of American policy. All of them were openly against disbanding the military blocs, against ceasing the arms race and against a serious effort to make peaceful co-existence possible. The map of the countries of the bourgeois world could almost completely have been painted an anti-communist colour.

Most capitalist countries were ruled by Right-wing or Right-Centrist governments. In some parts of Europe—Britain, Norway and Denmark—Social-Democratic governments were now and then formed; other countries—Italy, the FRG, Belgium and Holland—were governed by Left-Centrist coalitions. But none of them renounced NATO policies. As a party the Communists stood almost alone. The other parties and all the governments were against them.

That is what the capitalist world was like from the end of the 1940s. That is what it seems to look like everywhere, at least in Europe, also today. The system of Right-wing, Right-Centrist and Left-Centrist governments of one anti-communist trend or another has taken root in it to

such an extent that many people already seem to regard it as inevitable. It is believed that it cannot be otherwise.

But it is no longer true.

Something in the bourgeois world is clearly beginning to change. There are reasons to believe that in the 1970s the monopoly of anti-communist governments will come to an end.

We shall say beforehand: we must not hurry with conclusions and expect quick changes on the other side of the socialist borders. Deep changes involving movement of large class forces require time and a very accurate policy of the progressive forces. Unexpected turns are quite conceivable. But some things can already be seen with the naked eye. The contours of coalitions and governments of a new type are beginning to show in a number of important capitalist countries in Western Europe, as well as in Asia and even Latin America. We are referring to the possibility that Left-wing fronts may come into existence. It cannot be gainsaid that it is their appearance that will mark a most important historical turning point in the current decade.

There is no secret in all this. Nobody ever invented or is inventing Left-wing fronts. Nobody is hatching any "plots" to establish them; everything is done openly, in daylight. It is life itself that begins to insist on such associations. Their powerful class base is the striving of the working class for a unity of action, the striving that is continuously increasing in the capitalist world.

Communists and Social-Democrats, the two parties of the international working-class movement, have, as we have seen, for more than 50 years been proceeding along different paths. A good deal has happened during this time to drive

them apart. At times it seemed that their paths would never converge again. The ideas and methods of the two parties clashed in nearly everything. The Communists guided socialist revolutions and the establishment of socialist states, while the Social-Democrats opposed revolutions and defended the bourgeois states. The Communists advocated a radical reorganisation of society, while the Social-Democrats did not go any farther than reforms. The Communists were joined by the lower classes, the poorest sections of the working class and peasantry, the colonial and semi-colonial proletariat, while the Social-Democrats were supported by workers with higher wages, white-collar workers and petty-bourgeois voters. The tenser the situation became in the capitalist countries the more acute grew the controversy between the Communists and Social-Democrats.

It would be hard to estimate the effects this controversy produced on the fate of the world in our epoch. It is clear, however, that a great deal, a very great deal would have been different in the history of the 20th century had the two detachments of the international working-class movement marched in step during their own and the whole world's critical moments. It is hard to deny that Right-wing Social-Democracy has impeded historical progress for many decades, that its policies of collusion with bourgeois parties and capitulation to reaction was in no small way responsible for the fact that so much blood was shed in the world, and that it failed to do what it could to bar the way to nazism, prevent the Second World War and stop the "cold war". We have already mentioned this. But at this point it is not a question of the past.

Today Communists and Social-Democrats are still pursuing their own policies. The ideological differences between them have not disappeared, and in some respects have even deepened. The Communists still advocate deep-going social change, while Social-Democrats continue to favour reforms of bourgeois society. The theoretical and political controversy begun many years ago still continues and will undoubtedly continue. But the historical conditions under which the controversy is carried on have sharply changed, and this factor is new for both parties.

Today mankind is faced with problems of which the past generations never had any idea.

How can one prevent a thermonuclear war, a catastrophe that may result in the extermination of a large part of the population of the earth and perhaps a protracted paralysis of civilisation?

How can one repel the onslaught of forces in the capitalist world which seek to encircle it with a chain of dictatorial and semi-dictatorial regimes, and which may, at the critical moment, press the atom button?

How can one in full measure secure for the working people the fruits of the great scientific and technological revolution?

How can one, under the conditions of this revolution, guarantee further endless progress in science without jeopardising international security?

How can one put an end to the dreadful poverty in the "third world"—the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America—by bringing world economic and social progress within their reach, and giving them proper and equal rights?

How can one stem the continuously rising wave of crime?

How can one eliminate the "non-political" dangers arising in connection with the dynamic growth of population, the pollution of the atmosphere, water, etc., which threaten all of mankind?

Compared with the times when the controversy between the Communists and Social-Democrats was just beginning, this is a new and unprecedented agenda. But it is precisely *these* questions that rivet the thoughts of people all over the world today; it is undoubtedly on their solution that the fates of billions of people depend. And it is precisely these questions that are now becoming decisive in the practical relations between the Communists and Social-Democrats, for they have to be settled first.

The past cannot be erased from history; nor should it be. The fundamental differences remain. But the new developments demand immediate attention from all and refuse to wait. In politics, as in everyday affairs, life by-passes those who concern themselves only with the past. No one can advance rapidly and confidently with his head turned back; nobody, except an acrobat, has as yet been able to do this for any length of time. That is why the new developments may and must also be discussed in the relations between the parties of the working-class movement. Each of them is, as never before, interested in unity of action for the sake of peace and democracy. It is enough to cast a glance at the vast international stage in the early 1970s to get concrete proof of this. We see flashes of lightning and feel underground shocks now here and now there nearly all the time.

The storm in Southeast Asia is not subsiding. The earth continues to shake in the Middle East. The Maoists won't abandon their dangerous, dissentient position in the Far East. The Japanese militarists are beginning to rearm and recall their past. The clouds over the southern part of Africa are not dissipating. All this was also observed before, but the longer these processes operate the more dangerous does the situation become. We know this from experience.

Let us take a look at Western Europe. Only the short-sighted fail to see that reaction is preparing for a new offensive. The Right parties, the monopolistic forces, military cliques, fascists and semi-fascists are acting openly or secretly nearly everywhere. In West Germany the revanchists and neo-nazis rebuffed by the people in the last election are not laying down their arms. Those who think that in the FRG the neo-hitlerites from the NDP were done away with in the autumn of 1969 are sadly mistaken. This is far from being true. In his time Hitler also repeatedly suffered serious defeats, now and again (in the 1920s) seeming completely to vanish from the stage, but reappearing with redoubled forces as soon as an economic or political crisis broke out in the country. No more new illusions. The neo-nazis have not left the stage; they are redeploying their ranks, devising new methods of influencing the petty bourgeois and young people, and training new SS-men ("Ordnern"). Strauss has not relinquished his plan for becoming Adenauer's legal heir; he is setting in motion the revanchist countrymen's associations, conspiring with generals and biding his time.

In Britain the Conservatives have replaced the Labour Party. In Norway and Denmark the

Social-Democratic governments have returned to power though not without difficulty, while in Sweden the Social-Democrats have not always commanded an absolute majority in parliament. In Italy the ultra-generals hiding behind the scenes continue secretly to prepare for a "Greek-type" coup d'état; on their side is the extreme Right wing of the ruling clericals. In France reaction is gathering strength as it looks beyond the Atlantic. In Greece, Spain and Portugal the military-fascist regimes are entrenching themselves. And everywhere NATO is behind it all.

The capitalist world is seething. The cyclones may not come or may pass by, but we cannot depend on that. If the Right tendencies in the leading bourgeois countries are not curtailed in time, the situation during the current decade may become serious. One does not have to be a pessimist to see this.

Is there an alternative? Can the cyclone be barred? Yes, it can; today the chances to do so are very real, indeed. The eruption of reaction and war-mongering can be prevented only by Left-wing fronts, i.e., alliances of democratic parties and organisations, with the labour movement united for common action as the centre. The talks conducted by Soviet leaders in France and Canada, their talks with FRG leaders, which elicited great satisfaction by the population of these countries, have demonstrated that the forces of progress and peace are immeasurably greater than the forces of reaction.

Incurable professional sceptics, people with their heads always turned back, will say and reiterate that Communists and Social-Democrats cannot be united for any important political action because there is too much that divides them.

Yes, they can, responds political reality. Not always and not everywhere is it easy to achieve this unity, yet it can be achieved. Before us is the practical experience of four countries on three different continents—Finland, Ceylon, Chile and India, which is already part of history.

Not so very long ago Finnish Social-Democracy was considered the most conservative, most anti-communist and most anti-Soviet of all the Social-Democratic parties in the world. Not one party in the Socialist International was more conservative. It was the only Social-Democratic party in the world that fought on Hitler's side in the Second World War. Tanner, its leader, very openly advocated "brotherhood-in-arms" with the German nazis and Finnish fascists, and in 1944 he was called "the most valuable ally of the German mission in Finland" in the *Dagens Nyheter*, Swedish conservative newspaper. The leaders of Finnish Social-Democrats adhered to their extreme anti-communist positions after the war too, while cooperating with the Right-wing National Coalition Party. There seemed to be no chance of any rapprochement between the Social-Democrats and Communists in Finland.

But in the 1960s life itself brought about a change. It turned out that the Finnish Social-Democrats could no longer go on as they had before. In the 1962 presidential election they lost one-third of their votes and in the parliamentary elections that followed they polled the lowest percentage of votes since 1907. Their adherents began to turn away from them and the people openly and sharply expressed their dissatisfaction. Unemployment increased, prices and rents continuously rose, but the Social-Democratic leaders refused to change their policy. The party, at one

time the first in the state, was threatened with total decay.

At that critical moment the most far-sighted of the Finnish Social-Democrats decided to act differently. Wresting the helm from the hands of the extreme Right-wing leaders they suggested a programme that could hardly be implemented without the support of the Communists. Although many Finnish Social-Democrats did not shed their anti-communist prejudices, practical considerations, the Finnish economy and Finnish foreign policy forced them to cooperate with the party of the Left. The results were not long in coming. In the 1966 election the Finnish Social-Democrats and Communists together considerably outpolled the bourgeois parties. Several weeks later a government of a new bloc—Social-Democrats, Communists and the Centre Party—came to power in Finland. The bloc was subsequently also joined by the Swedish People's Party. A Social-Democrat became the prime-minister. In the next (1968) presidential election nearly 70 per cent of all the Finnish voters cast their votes for the candidate of this bloc.

The viability of the bloc of Social-Democrats, Communists and moderate bourgeois politicians has been confirmed. No "explosions" or shocks have occurred in Finland. On the contrary, the country that weathered so many storms in the last 50 years now lives a more tranquil life than do most of the world's capitalist countries.

The Finns do not quarrel with anybody, nor fear anybody. Despite the fundamental difference in their social systems a sincere friendship has been reigning between Finland and the USSR since the Second World War. The Soviet Union is helping to develop the Finnish economy on

principles of complete equality and fully approves of Finland's endeavours to make Northern Europe a peaceful, atom-free zone. The voice of Finland was hardly ever heeded in the international arena as it is today. If all this is compared with the position of Finland a few decades ago, the importance of the change becomes clear.

Has everything in the relations between the parties of the Left-wing bloc run smoothly and evenly? No, by no means everything; nor can it be thus. Only extremely naive people could suppose that after 50 years of sharp, vehement and at times bitter struggle could the Social-Democrats and Communists, having assembled at a "round table", at once understand each other, immediately settle all their old issues and become unanimous on all questions.

In life and in politics it is never like that. The thing is not only that the fundamental ideological differences between Communists and Social-Democrats persist and are not eliminated by agreements on urgent, current questions. The thing is that after decades of dissension and struggle even practical cooperation in such spheres of politics where the points of view of the two parties have already drawn nearer is not so easily achieved. It just cannot work out without any friction, difficulties and doubts on both sides. In politics there can be no automatic, mechanical unity, by mere edict or by virtue of some legal agreement. Real unity is attained and consolidated only by actual deeds, in the course of a common struggle, by discussion and persuasion, and, in the end, only through the testing of policy in real life.

No wonder, therefore, that differences, often quite significant, continued to crop up between

the Finnish Social-Democrats and Communists despite their joint participation in the government under Social-Democratic leadership. The Communists criticised the government's economic policy and advocated more daring and decisive social reforms and adoption of measures, for example, in labour legislation, old age pensions and housing construction. The Communists most vigorously insisted on raising wages. The Right-wing Social-Democrats, on their part, spared no efforts in trying to turn the party back into the anti-communist blind alley. In Finland it became clear that formal agreements alone are not enough for unity; the working-class parties have to implement the programme that fulfils the aspirations of the people resolutely and in a businesslike manner.

But the example of Finland, a country where relations between the Social-Democrats and Communists had been strained to the utmost, has, nevertheless, proved that in our day, with enough will and patience exercised in the course of settling vexed questions, cooperation between these two parties is quite feasible. As was already stated, the Finnish Communists did not discontinue criticising the Social-Democrats, although not denying that in the past the stand taken by their own party had not always favoured unity. Cooperation was established in the trade unions, parliament and local municipalities. This was also admitted by the Social-Democrats. "The experience of the members of the Social-Democratic Party in establishing personal contacts with Communists, as well as contacts on governmental and parliamentary levels and on a very broad level in the communal bodies revealed positive results," said one of the prominent Finnish Social-

Democrats. "Direct information dispelled many prejudices and erroneous ideas."

The points of view of the two parties also drew nearer on such questions where the differences in the past seemed to be particularly far-reaching. In April 1968 the Executive Committee of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party published a resolution on the German question where it pointed out the necessity of recognising the existence of the two German states and the Oder-Neisse border, as well as the renunciation of nuclear weapons by both states. In November of the same year, when the NATO leaders attempted to include Finland in the so-called "grey zone" of their "defensive" measures, the *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, organ of the Finnish Social-Democrats, stated openly: "Leave Finland alone." When the Budapest Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties put forward the idea of calling an all-European conference on problems of security, the Finnish government headed by a Social-Democrat suggested Helsinki as the place for this conference. If we recall the role the reactionary Finnish governments played on the European stage in the past, the significance of these changes cannot be underestimated.

One more "survey of actual conditions" occurred in the spring of 1970 when the workers' parties lost their absolute majority in the parliamentary elections. The reactionaries immediately assumed the offensive. Everything was done to force the Social-Democrats to break with the Communists then and form a government together with the Right-wing Coalition Party and other reactionary forces. The pressure continued for months, but the policy of unity once again passed the test. A new government was formed

in Helsinki in July 1970, the government including Social-Democrats, Communists, the Centre Party, the Liberal Party of Finland and the Swedish People's Party. This time the leader of the Centre Party became the Prime Minister. The Communists did all they could to strengthen the coalition. They withdrew from it only when (in March 1971) the other government parties decided partly to desist from regulating the prices and planned to raise them. The Communist Party, the party of the working class, could not do anything else. It could not agree to a cut in real wages. The "Finnish experiment" was suspended only for this reason.

Thus far there is absolutely no reason to idealise its results. The Right-wing forces in the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party in 1971 once again acquired enough strength to make the Party terminate its cooperation with the Communists and resume its deal with the bourgeoisie. But will it last long? Prices, taxes and rent are rising in the country, unemployment is mounting, and big capitalists are trying to take advantage of the situation to tie Finland to the Common Market, with complete disregard for her national interests. On their part the Communists have not given up their efforts to reunite the working-class movement. They proposed to the Social-Democrats to work out a common programme of action for both parties. So far obstacles in the way to unity have not been removed, and disputes have not abated. But if life itself calls for unity and those who should unite come to realise this, then disputes can be resolved, grievances forgotten, and traits changed. Such is the Finnish six-year experience. It is instructive both as regards the possibilities and the difficulties it has brought to light.

Is this experience applicable to other capitalist countries? We shall cite another example.

We are looking outside Europe, at a small island—Ceylon—south of India. All the conditions here—natural, economic, social and political—are entirely different from those in Finland; it would be hard to conceive two countries more unlike each other than Ceylon and Finland. Ceylon is a typical South Asian state. A tropical climate, an economy of tea and rubber plantations, a people with a 2,500-year-old history, and membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The heritage of the colonial regime still persists; more than half of the tea plantations accounting for 40 per cent of the world tea export, are owned by foreign companies. Four leading political parties: the United National Party supported by former compradors and landowners on the right flank, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party representing the interests of the national and petty bourgeoisie and affiliated with the Socialist International in the centre, the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party relying on office, professional, technical and plantation workers, and the Communist Party of Ceylon on the left flank.

A dramatic struggle for power has been waged for years, the working-class movement and the national bourgeoisie opposing the big bourgeoisie with its United National Party. In 1959 the reactionaries killed Solomon Bandaranaike, the country's Prime Minister and leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party; he was succeeded by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, his widow. The Right-wingers who refused to do away with the economic and social heritage of the British colonial rule had been in power since 1965. A chronic crisis reigned on the island; there were hundreds of thousands of

unemployed, the cost of living was rising, the rice ration issued to the population was decreasing, and foreign capital continued to exercise its sway over the country. A wave of anti-government demonstrations swept through the country; the workers of the plantations and the commercial employees went on strike. In 1966 the Right-wing government proclaimed a state of emergency, a direct threat to the working-class movement. Two years later it became clear to the three opposition parties that they could overthrow the Right-wingers and raise the living standard of the people only by common effort. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party affiliated with the Socialist International, the Socialists and Communists formed a united front and acted jointly in the parliamentary elections of May 1970. The united Left-wing forces did not confine themselves to the urgent demands of the day; in their pre-election manifesto they put forward a daring programme of broad political and social reforms. The situation in Ceylon did not in any way resemble that in Finland, but here, too, life itself impelled the Socialists, Communists and Left-wing bourgeoisie to march in step.

The results resounded all over Asia. The united front of the opposition won 122 of the 157 seats in parliament, the conservative United National Party losing 49 of its 66 seats. If we speak of a parliamentary battlefield, then the defeat of the reactionaries, whom all honest Socialists in Ceylon hate no less than do the Communists, was a real rout. It turned out that the overwhelming majority of young voters in the country voted for the Left-wing bloc because they were attracted by its courageous programme. The parties that

came to power began to implement their programme at once.

S. Bandaranaike's new government, which includes 4 Socialists and Communists, declared that Ceylon would be proclaimed a free, sovereign and independent republic and that it would secede from the British Commonwealth of Nations. It would nationalise the banks and the import and export trade in the most important goods and would establish state control over the British companies; it would also plan the industrialisation of the country with the state-owned sector predominating. The Left-wing government advocates non-participation in military blocs, promises to take part in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism and to recognise the German Democratic Republic, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. Prime-Minister Bandaranaike declared: "The new constitution will strengthen the unity of the Ceylonese nation and will favour the establishment of a society of socialist democracy in the country."

Such are the first results of the unification of the Left-wing forces in Ceylon. This important advance towards translating the age-old aspirations of the people into reality was made peacefully and democratically, and only the most resolute advocates of socialism could have imagined this possible. It cannot, of course, be considered that the goal in Ceylon has already been achieved, that all issues have been settled and all differences reconciled; it is not so. As in Finland the reactionary forces in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party affiliated with the Socialist International have not abandoned their attempts to press the Com-

munists and Left-wing Socialists back. As in Finland the country's reaction is not getting out of the way. But the people favour the Left-wing forces. This was confirmed in the spring of 1971 when the counter-revolutionary anti-government forces engineered a rebellion and tried to seize the capital. The plot had failed. It is quite possible that new storms will sweep over Ceylon. But nobody can deny one thing. What was demonstrated in the North of Europe was also demonstrated in tropical Asia: a victory of united Left-wing forces by peaceful, democratic methods is quite feasible. By closing their ranks the Left-wing forces are able not only to remove the entrenched reaction from power, but also to open to society long-awaited social prospects. This is equally advantageous to Socialists and Communists. It should be noted in passing that both in Finland and in Ceylon the leading role in Left-wing governments is played by Socialists or representatives of Left-wing bourgeois parties. The Communists, it must be assumed, will lay claim to leadership only when they are followed by the majority of the voters.

We shall now deal with the third continent—Latin America. This continent is neither like Europe nor like Asia; all the conditions here differ from those on the other two continents. On the one hand, there is the traditional rule by oligarchic, landowning families, generals' juntas and American diplomats and, on the other, peasants deprived of all rights and living in abject poverty. An atmosphere of alternating military putsches, terrorism of dictatorial regimes, and the relatively weak working-class movement as compared with Europe. Such was Latin America until very recently and many people in the West

thought that it would be such for many years to come, perhaps to the very end of our century. But here, too, one can discern changes which in the near future may reshuffle all the cards in Latin America. The key to the changes here is the same as in Western Europe and South Asia—unity of the Left-wing forces, Communists and Socialists in the first place. Chile is a good example. What happened and is happening in this country is extraordinarily interesting to anybody who is concerned with the relations between the two workers' parties.

Chile is a country with a population of 9 million of whom 70 per cent are Metises, 25 per cent—Creoles and 5 per cent—Indians. A large territory, three times that of the FRG; copper, iron ore and saltpetre mining; backward farming and cattle-breeding. But since the end of the Second World War this country with so small a population has had the most advanced working-class movement in Latin America. As early as 1953 a Single Centre of Chilean Workers came into being in this country with a Socialist as chairman and a Communist as general secretary. The Chilean Communists are supported by the workers of the mining areas and the progressive sections of the peasantry and intelligentsia, while the Socialists lead the office workers, petty bourgeoisie, part of the intelligentsia and industrial workers. Rather than waste their strength on strife with each other the Communists and Socialists of Chile have been cooperating for the last 15 years. In 1955 they formed the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP, a movement of popular action), which was later joined by the Left-wing bourgeois Radical Party (RP), which is affiliated with the Socialist International, and a new Left-

wing catholic Popular Action Party. In 1965 the Communists, Socialists and Radicals together polled more than one-third of the Chilean votes. The Left-wing parties then arrived at the conclusion that it was high time a Left-wing government came to power.

The country really urgently needed such a government. The pauperised, landless peasants demanded land. Half a million families, one out of every six, had no roof over their heads and just as many lived in hovels. Unemployment was growing in the towns, strikes were increasing and violent clashes occurred between the strikers and government troops; the country's finances were in a sad state. In four years (1965-1968) the rate of exchange of the Chilean currency dropped 60 per cent with respect to the American dollar. During 1968 alone the prices on consumer goods rose 35 per cent, while wages were frozen. Chile's vast natural resources, which could provide ample means for improving the people's standard of living, were owned by American concerns. The bourgeoisie was clearly unable to cope with the situation, the ruling Christian Democratic Party could not make ends meet, and the Right-wing forces were preparing another military putsch. The people clamoured for a new government. And rather than compete with each other and struggle for a predominant influence in the ranks of the opposition the Chilean Communists, Socialists and their Left-wing bourgeois allies united, as in Finland and in Ceylon, in a popular front—the Movement of Popular United Action (Frente de Acción Popular). The candidate of this front was to oppose the two other candidates—the representative of the reactionary National Party (Partido Nacional) of landowners and businessmen

and that of the Christian Democratic Party supported by the church. How did the Left-wing forces arrive at an agreement?

At first the Communists intended to nominate the world-famous Chilean poet Pablo Neruda as their candidate. But then they took another decision. Luis Corvalán, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Chile, said in reference to this: "Pablo Neruda is perhaps the most popular candidate our party has ever had, but the main thing for us is to bar the way to reaction, and this requires unity of the Left-wing forces and an agreement on the candidate to be nominated. Pablo understands this very well and is completely in agreement with us concerning the withdrawal of his candidature so that we should come to an agreement with the other parties."

Salvador Allende, one of the leaders of the Socialist Party, was nominated as the common candidate. The Chilean Communists showed in actual practice how they value unity. They gave an example of how to meet each other halfway and make mutual concessions. Here, too, the results were not long in coming.

In the Chilean elections on September 4, 1970 Salvador Allende, the candidate of the Movement of Popular United Action, polled 36.3 per cent of the votes, Jorge Alessandri, candidate of the Right-wing forces—34.9 per cent, and Radomiro Tomic, candidate of the Christian Democrats—27.8 per cent. For the first time in Latin America a Marxist won the elections under the bourgeois system. The people of Chile were so happy about his victory that they danced and sang in the streets. Trade unions, peasant conferences, the presidents of all the universities, the leaders of 11 of the 12 university student federations, and

societies of intellectuals declared their recognition of the victory of the Left-wing candidate, which was as yet to be confirmed by the National Congress. Some opponents of the Left-wing bloc expected relations between the Communists and Socialists to change for the worse after this victory and strife between them to begin. The contrary was the case. In his message to the Communists Allende said that he wanted to avail himself of the opportunity to reiterate his gratitude for the loyalty and selflessness with which the entire Communist Party, from its leaders to the local organisations, struggled for the triumph of the Movement of Popular United Action.

Socialists do not usually waste such words on Communists.

It is interesting how the Chilean Communists themselves appraised the victory of the Left-wing forces and their interrelations in the course of the struggle to win it. In answering the question as to the role of the Communist Party "during the many years of struggle for the people's unity", Luis Corvalán told a newspaper correspondent: "Of course, it was a hard struggle. To unify the popular, democratic forces, we had to surmount quite a few obstacles, overcome a good deal of resistance, fight avowed and sometimes disguised enemies, and engage in continuous polemics concerning the erroneous positions of those who made *bona fide* mistakes. I should like to emphasise that the victory of the Chilean people is in no way a victory only of Communists, but also one of the other popular forces, of all parties of the Movement of Popular United Action. Some did more, others less (which is quite natural), some by taking part in the common struggle from the very outset of the movement,

others by joining it later, after deciding to embark on our common path, forgetting the differences and abandoning their sectarian positions, in helping in one way or another, with some action or other, to strengthen the unity which made our common victory possible."

To forget the differences and abandon the sectarian positions, patiently to surmount the obstacles to unity, including the "erroneous positions of those who made *bona fide* mistakes"—is not this the task the Communists and Socialists set themselves today in Finland and in Ceylon and will tomorrow set themselves in other countries? Victories, like defeats, are very instructive.

A little more than six months have elapsed since the Left-wing government came to power, and the Chileans can take stock of what it has done. So much has, in fact, been done that to outsiders it seems almost incredible.

A broad land reform giving landless peasants the land taken from big landowners is under way; the copper mines, the main natural resource owned by foreign companies, the iron ore deposits, the ferrous metallurgy, coal industry, saltpetre mines, cement plants, large textile mills and a number of private banks are being nationalised. The real wages of workers are being raised at the expense of the profits, and an end is being put to the chronic devaluation of the Chilean monetary unit. Measures are being taken to do away with unemployment, start large-scale housing construction, introduce state medical services, organise a school system and eliminate illiteracy.

Is there anything unacceptable or dangerous in this programme from the Social-Democratic point of view?

As in Ceylon, it is not a question of palliatives which merely act on the outer membrane of the country's economic and political organism, but a broadly conceived project for the social revival of the nation. For a backward Latin American country such a programme is equivalent to a revolution, but a bloodless revolution supported by a vast majority of the people. Is not this what Social-Democrats have for decades claimed as their ideal in all countries?

In the spring of 1971 Chile already started nationalising the richest copper deposits and preparing for the nationalisation of the steel mills and saltpetre mines, launched a broad land reform, and worked out projects for nationalising the banks and raising the wages of the lowest-paid workers. Decisive measures are being taken to do away with unemployment, the old and chronic disease of the Chilean economy. In the few months that the bloc of Popular United Action has been in power it has done much more than the former Chilean governments could or wanted to do in many years.

Allende declared that the Left-wing government would be the first truly democratic, national, popular and revolutionary government in the history of Chile. The Chilean reactionaries claim that a "communist dictatorship" is being established in the country. In reply to them Z.O. Cantuarias, present-day Minister of the Mining Industry and leader of the Radical Party, the very same party that belongs to the Socialist International and stands to the Right of Allende's Socialist Party, says that the Radical Party with its centennial history has had enough experience to recognise those who have now started a hullabaloo and are using their money for the purpose

of deceiving public opinion. Salvador Allende's Government will be a multi-party government and its sole purpose will be to carry into effect the programme of the Movement of Popular United Action.

If this is said by a person who is trusted by the London centre of international Social-Democracy, can anybody doubt the intentions of the Left-wing front? The Left-wing multi-party government will stand on guard for democratic liberties. Neither the Communists nor any other single party, but *all* the Left-wing forces stand to gain by it.

Of course, as in Finland, the cooperation of the Left-wing parties does not in any way mean a mechanical or automatic unity on all questions. Here, too, there are argumentations and discussions. L. Corvalán, leader of the Chilean Communists, said in April 1971: "Good, stable relations exist between the forces forming the Movement of Popular United Action. Naturally, there are some differences between them since this movement includes different parties. It is not the differences, however, but the agreement on the basis of the common programme and the common determination to carry out this programme that prevail."

That is why the Left-wing parties have the country's support. Although, as is well known, the Chilean reactionary forces are preparing for a counter-attack, are seeking US aid and are inciting the Right-wing Chilean military to a putsch—it was precisely for this purpose that General Schneider, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Armed Forces, was killed at the end of October 1970—it is no longer so easy to overthrow the government of the united Left-wing forces. A people that sees for the first time in its history

a practical chance to achieve what it has for centuries dreamt of, will be ready to defend its victory. These are no mere words. Characteristically, today the Chilean people are *themselves* participating in the work of the Left-wing government. Local committees of the Movement of Popular United Action—finance, technical, housing, women's, medical, etc.—composed of ordinary citizens, study the situation locally and decide what must and can be done. Students form illiteracy elimination teams, medical people suggest measures for improving the sanitary conditions in the settlements of the poor, and writers make plans for a mass publication of cheap and useful books. The country's ordinary people have started moving. Time will show whether or not the old Latin American system of conservative generals' pronunciamientos can oppose such an awakened people. It is in this that the particular significance of the Chilean experiment lies.

Can this experience serve as a model for the workers' parties in other Latin American countries? Perhaps not everywhere and not exactly. The situation in the different countries of this continent is not the same. But the signal from Chile cannot fail to be heard. All serious observers of the Chilean events recognise their historical importance to Latin America. Luis Corvalán said the following with regards to this:

"We are far from believing that an election victory, like the one won by the Chilean people, can be easily repeated in any other part of our continent, although this possibility should not be left out of account. . . . We must arrive at the conclusion that the unity and mobilisation of the popular, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic forces, the unity of the proletariat, the unity

of the working people above all, are the most valuable aspect of the Chilean experiment. On the basis of unity of the popular, anti-imperialist forces and, in the particular case of Chile, on the basis of a mutual understanding between the Communists and Socialists, the two parties which enjoy the greatest influence among the working people, the liberation movement may and must be led forward. On this basis a way can be found perhaps also to another election victory, but likewise also to another possibility, other forms of struggle which must correspond to the actual situation in each country. It has been said, and in our opinion with good reason, that the victory of the Chilean people, the victory of Salvador Allende in the last presidential election has been the most important event in Latin America since the Cuban Revolution in the last 25 years."

The key is a "mutual understanding" between Communists and Socialists. There is apparently nothing impossible, nothing unreal in achieving such mutual understanding. To all appearances this is now held to be true in Latin America also outside Chile.

In Uruguay a broad front set up by Communists, Socialists, Christian-Democrats and other organisations in June 1971 advocates formation of a people's government and introduction of fundamental social reforms, including a radical land reform and nationalisation of the natural resources, as well as consolidation of the national sovereignty. In Bolivia, where a military coup took place in the summer of 1971, there was a Bolivian Workers' Centre which united about 400,000 working people and included Communists, other Left-wing parties and trade union organisations. The Political Command of the Working People set up by

this Centre advocated formation of a united anti-imperialist popular front and a people's government. A coalition of Communists, Socialists, the People's Democratic Union and national Union of Revolutionary Leftists has been formed in Ecuador. In Venezuela the Communists are participating in the Front of Progressive Forces. In Colombia the Communists have formed a bloc with the Revolutionary Liberal Movement which unites the middle and petty bourgeoisie, as well as part of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia.

In Argentina Communists form part of the National Meeting of Argentines movement which includes Peronists, the Civil Radical Union of the People and other opposition forces. The movement advocates the formation of a provisional government that will guarantee social liberties, nationalise the main branches of the economy and carry out a land reform. In Peru Communists advocate unity of all of the country's patriotic forces which favour economic and social reforms; in the Dominican Republic the Communists are struggling for the establishment of a front of adherents of a national liberation revolution with the participation of Professor Bosch, former President of the country and leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party; in Colombia the Communists favour convocation of a national congress of anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic forces for the purpose of forming a popular opposition front.

At the 24th Congress of the CPSU in April 1971 R.D. Sousa, head of the Communists of Panama, said: "We believe that the union of Communists and Socialists is the living nucleus around which our experience will develop....

Each party defends its own positions, but we always strive to find a common way...."

This is precisely what is taking place in Latin America, as also on the other continents.

As has already been stated, the political situations in the different Latin American countries cannot be reduced to the same denominator. Not everywhere have the Communists managed to form mass organisations; nor do Socialists everywhere play an important role; their place is often taken by Left-wing bourgeois parties. There are fundamental factors, however, which in some measure or other coincide in nearly all these countries, namely, the poverty of the peasants, the low living standards of the workers, the dominance of American monopolies, unemployment (one-fourth of the able-bodied population of Latin America has no work today), arbitrary rule of the latifundists and conservative soldiery, intensified activity of the trade unions, a shift of the intelligentsia to the Left and so on. All these objective factors are impelling and will continue to impel the Communists, Socialists and adherents of other Left-wing organisations in Latin America to unite. In the course of the 1970s it will become clear to what extent the tendency to such unification assumes a general continental character.

Lastly, one more example of successful co-operation between democratic forces (even if not Right-wing Socialists) taking place lately may be cited. We refer to a country as important as India, with a population of more than 540 million, which is about one-seventh of the world's population.

Here, as is well known, the Communists, Socialists and the leading bourgeois party—Indian Na-

tional Congress—were for decades divided by extremely sharp and, seemingly, irreconcilable contradictions. The Communists sharply criticised the Congressists and the Socialists of both parties, while the Congressists and Socialists regarded the Communists as their sworn enemies. In 1969 a good many things began to alter here, too. A dangerous attack of the Indian reactionaries, i.e., the attempt of the Right wing of the ruling Congress Party to force the country to submit to the rule of monopolists and landowners, thereby betraying the Indian people, served as an impetus for the change. When the Indian Left-wing and democratic forces saw that their division might result in the triumph of the Right-wing parties—servants of the oligarchy—they began to draw nearer to each other. There was no other way to stop the reactionaries.

Until very recently India was one of the few capitalist countries where a single bourgeois party could, as was believed, independently rule a country on principles of parliamentary democracy. The Indian National Congress had 11 million members, its faction numbering 284 of the 521 members in the House of the People in Delhi; the central government machinery and a number of states were completely in its hands. Year after year the bulk of the electorate voted for the Congress which followed a middle-of-the-road policy.

It seemed that the parliamentary positions of the Congress were impregnable and that it would continue to rule alone for many years, if not decades. But towards the end of the 1960s history decided differently. The class struggle suddenly intensified to such an extent that the Congress split.

The majority headed by Prime-Minister Indira Gandhi advocated economic reforms without which the Indian state could no longer make ends meet. The minority, incited by industrial magnates, bankers and landowners immediately attempted to overthrow Indira Gandhi. The entire old system of government in India was disturbed. In 1970 the Indian National Congress lost its absolute majority in the Delhi House of the People, its faction retaining only about two-fifths of the total number of the members. It became clear that, if the progressive wing of the Congress did not want the Right-wing forces to wrest the power from its hands and hurl the country backwards, it had to seek support from the Left. In other words, the same situation arose at that time in India as did in Ceylon and Chile, i.e., only co-operation of the Left-wing forces could safeguard the country against the most dangerous shocks and ensure its development. On the Left of the Congress were Communists and, supposedly, Socialists.*

The Indian Communists said "Yes" at once. Since 1969 they have been doing everything to support the Indian National Congress and help it to repulse the attacks of the Right-wingers. There are no Communists in Indira Gandhi's Government, but in parliament they vote for its progressive measures. Their motto is a union of India's Left-wing and democratic forces in and outside the Congress in the struggle against the Rightists who are trying to frustrate these measures. Without their support and the help of other

* In June 1971 the two Socialist parties of India decided to unite in a single organisation—the Socialist Party—which promptly opposed the unity of Left-wing forces.

democratic forces in the country this government could not have stayed in power in 1969 and 1970. It is similarly obvious that precisely the support of the Left at that time enabled the Congress to decide on the programme of new reforms, which may mark the beginning of a new era in the history of this ancient country. Addressing the session of the All-India Committee of the Congress in Patna in October 1970 Indira Gandhi promised to carry out "profound social and economic reforms" in the country, put an end to the extreme poverty of the masses and the economic inequality between the classes and between different areas, and ensure the economic independence of India. Those who know the conditions under which the Indian people lived and are still living today will understand that the implementation of such a programme alone would be a historical achievement for India. But without the unity of all Left-wing and democratic forces this programme cannot be carried out. And it is precisely unity that the Indian Communists are calling for.

Are the Socialists pursuing this course? No, not yet. The past still seems to weigh upon the minds of many Indian Socialist leaders and, as is well known, it is not so easy to throw off the burden of the past. In the March 1971 parliamentary elections the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) entered into an alliance with Right-wing parties and together with them opposed Indira Gandhi's government. The result? While the Indian Communists retained their positions the SSP was veritably routed, losing 20 of its 23 seats in the House of the People! Will this dreadful experience be a lesson to its leaders? The Indian Socialists have the living example of their fellow-Socialists in Ceylon before their very eyes. But

they can also find an example in India herself—in the southern State of Kerala.

This state is in some measure India in miniature. It has a population of 21 million, which equals that of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland taken together. The overwhelming majority of these people are poor peasants, the main problem in the state is the land problem, and the most influential party is that of the Communists who upon coming to power some years ago began to abolish the landed estates. The main question of the 1970 elections was the completion of the land reform, i.e., a question affecting the vital interests of the peasants. The Right-wing forces were against the reform which was supported by the United Front of Left-Wing Forces consisting of Communists, the Muslim League, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, which is affiliated to the Socialist International, the Praja Socialist Party and three other parties. The Indian National Congress had its own list, but it actually cooperated with the Left-wing Front. The results of the elections were: the United Front headed by Communists—37 seats, the Indian National Congress—32 seats, the Right-wing and other parties—the remaining 65 seats. Here the policy of Left-wing unity is being carried out in accordance with the local conditions. In India's central parliament the Communists helped the largest party—the Indian National Congress—to win the majority without entering its government. In Kerala the Congress supported the United Front without entering its new government. A Communist, as the representative of the largest party, became the head of the Kerala government, but five of the nine ministerial posts were given to the other parties of the Left-wing bloc, including three posts to the Social-

ists. In September 1971, five representatives of the Indian National Congress entered the new Kerala government also headed by a Communist. The democratic order is observed in the strictest possible manner. The government has declared that the landowners' plots will be distributed among the poorest peasants and agricultural workers, the electricity will be laid on in the villages and the plantations owned by foreigners will be nationalised. A total of 2.5 million lease-holders in the state have been granted the right to own land.

If we recall that the most unfortunate people of the Indian countryside—agricultural workers and farm labourers—constitute nearly one-fourth of the country's total rural population and that these people, as a rule, belong to the lowest castes and the untouchables, the enormous social significance of the political experience of the Kerala Left-wing unity becomes obvious.

Together with the Congress and four other Left-wing and democratic parties the Communists are participating in a Left bloc in one more South Indian State—Tamilnadu. In the last elections this bloc won 209 of the 234 seats in the legislative assembly of this State.

We have named four countries where this policy is being carried out continuously or with interruptions: one in Europe (Finland), two in Asia (Ceylon and India) and one in Latin America (Chile). Mention might also be made of Syria. The main inferences that can be made from this practical experience of unity of the working-class and democratic movement in the 1960s and 1970s are, in our opinion, as follows:

1. Despite all the differences in the special national features and internal policy of the different

countries and various continents, unions of Left-wing forces are feasible almost throughout the capitalist world. It is being demonstrated that the establishment of such unions is now becoming not only possible, but also necessary under the most diverse geographical and political conditions. It is quite probable that future historians will note this fact as one of the most curious and significant phenomena of the last third of the 20th century.

2. When Communists and Socialists decide in our day to join forces in the struggle against reaction they are usually also supported by other democratic forces in the given country, including the moderate, liberal parties which represent the petty and middle bourgeoisie. As a result of such unification the Left-wing forces poll a majority of votes in elections and in a number of cases form their own governments. But the workers' parties are the kernel of the Left-wing forces. Without their cooperation with each other it is, as a rule, either impossible or extraordinarily difficult to form powerful political associations to win the struggle against the Right-wing forces.

3. When Communists form unions of Left-wing forces they do not anywhere claim any priority for themselves, but are satisfied with positions corresponding to their parliamentary weight. The same thing is observed when Left-wing governments are formed. The first head of such a government in Finland was a Social-Democrat who was superseded by the leader of the liberal-bourgeois Centre Party; in Ceylon—a representative of the party affiliated with the Socialist International; a Socialist was elected president in Chile; in India the Communists support the government of the Indian National Congress which is considered a bourgeois party. In the Indian State of Kerala the

government is headed by a Communist, but here his party is followed by most of the voters.

In other words, the multi-party system is retained everywhere. The apprehensions of some socialist circles that the Communists will take advantage of the Left-wing forces coming to power in order to establish their "dictatorship" have been in vain in every case. If the Communists do not agree in principle with any measures of the government, in which they participate, they withdraw from it, as was the case, for example, in Finland in the spring of 1971. And when a government of Left-wing parties loses the election, as it occurred still earlier in Finland (in May 1970), it resigns in accordance with the constitution and returns to power only if it has a clear majority in parliament. The unions of Left-wing forces thus act strictly according to democratic principles. This does not, of course, mean that they allow the reactionaries to violate these principles by conspiracies and putsches.

4. Having come to power the Left-wing governments of the Socialists, Communists and their allies do not confine themselves to superficial measures and palliatives, but immediately set about introducing important economic and social reforms expected by the people. This is especially important; it is the chief aim of the Left-wing alliances; it determines their future and distinguishes them from other political groups. Wherever there is a problem of landless or land-hungry peasants and farm labourers the Left-wing governments carry out a decisive land reform aimed at fundamentally improving the situation in the countryside. This is already taking place in Ceylon, in Chile and Kerala, and is being prepared all over India. In the very same former colonial

and semi-colonial countries, nationalisation of foreign-owned companies, which plunder these countries, is under way or is being planned, measures are being taken to stabilise and raise the workers' wages, and a broad programme of industrialisation is being worked out for the purpose of ensuring the country's economic independence and doing away with unemployment. Through nationalisation of the natural resources and other sources means are allocated for public education and the medical care of the population on a scale unprecedented in such countries. This also consolidates the position of the Left-wing governments. In the field of foreign policy these countries pursue a course of neutrality, non-alignment and anti-imperialism.

Here, too, the Communists forming part of the union of Left-wing forces make no attempts at establishing "communist states", but confine themselves to a programme of reforms which are similarly advocated by Socialists.

5. It is being confirmed that the coming of Left-wing governments to power peacefully, by parliamentary means does not anywhere mean that the reactionaries are laying down their arms. On the contrary, in every country where a government of Socialists, Communists and their Left-wing bourgeois allies is formed, the Right-wing forces immediately launch furious counter-attacks. The reactionaries stop at nothing. Military plots are hatched, parliamentary intrigues behind the scenes are carried on, provocations and attempts upon the lives of Left-wing leaders are organised, and the help of imperialist powers is solicited. For example, in the summer of 1971 the reactionaries tried to create an atmosphere of chaos in Chile. It becomes completely clear that a parlia-

mentary victory alone does not suffice to carry into effect the programme of the united Left-wing forces. The Left-wing unions find it necessary to organise the broad masses for repelling reaction nearly everywhere. Not in a single country where the Left-wing parties have won can they risk resting on their laurels.

6. One ought not to think that with the formation of Left-wing alliances and Left-wing government coalitions, the differences between Communists and Socialists are automatically eliminated. We have already seen this in the case of Finland. The differences in their views on many questions of principle, as well as of practice, remain, and the controversies continue and will continue. This is but natural. The unity of communist and socialist action does not in any way mean that either of these parties renounces its convictions in favour of the other. No ideological "unification" takes place. Even a break-up of any Left-wing alliance is possible if the differences become aggravated.

But it is true that such alliances afford the workers' parties an invaluable opportunity to check up on their points of view in practice. The experience of the Left-wing blocs helps the Communists and Social-Democrats to bring their points of view nearer and eliminate their differences in a businesslike manner, and it teaches them to differ in opinions without sharp conflicts which play into the hands of the reactionaries.

These are, as far as we can judge today, the main recent lessons of cooperation between the Socialists and Communists, the lessons of the first attempts made in this direction on a large scale in the last 20 odd years. What honest advocate of socialism will venture to deny that these lessons are of a positive character and that they

must at least give both workers' parties plenty of food for thought?

In the beginning of this chapter we raised the question as to whether it may be considered that present-day Social-Democracy has no future and that it is doomed to continue marking time, losing positions and being thrown increasingly further back. We emphasised that, in our opinion, this was not the only prospect the Social-Democrats had. They also have a road that will lead them forward if only they want to take it.

The steps taken by a number of Social-Democratic parties of late show that this road is a unification of the forces and actions of the working-class movement, cooperation between its parties in the struggle against reaction and the forces of war.

But the questions arise: is not what we observe in Finland, in Ceylon, in Chile and India due exclusively to the character of these countries? Is the experience of Social-Democracy in these countries applicable to other countries?

We shall endeavour to answer also these questions on the basis of concrete facts.

6. WHAT UNITY OFFERS

Are there any reasons to believe that a turn to a courageous, new policy, a policy of working-class unity is also possible today for the main parties of international Social-Democracy, the "strongholds" of the Socialist International?

We think there are. In some of these parties signs of such a turn are in some measure already in evidence. They, too, are beginning a reappraisal of values.

Of course, the process of the mutual attraction of the forces of the working-class movement in the large capitalist countries is much slower than in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries, because it encounters greater difficulties. Here the positions of the conservative, diehard wing of Social-Democracy are, as a rule, much stronger and the traditions of militant anti-communism

much firmer. The old leaders who for decades have played the parliamentary game with bourgeois parties and have made a career of it are afraid of the young, and are horrified at the thought of a new way of working-class unity. Quite a few of them would do anything, even betray their own party, to prevent cooperation with Communists.

Nevertheless, the process of the concentration of the forces of the working-class movement is beginning to draw in even such old Social-Democratic parties as were formerly considered invincible bastions of the extreme Right wing of reformism. Something new and fresh is breaking through here, too. Several parties can be named already today. And what is particularly noteworthy is that in a number of cases not only the local organisations, but also the leadership of the socialist organisations take part in the contacts with the Communists and in preparing for establishing alliances of Left-wing forces.

The first example is France. Not so very long ago the French Socialist Party could in no way be regarded as forming the Left wing of the Socialist International. This is common knowledge, and there is no need to recount the history of the postwar years. But some time ago it began to change its positions. The same leaders have remained at the head of the Socialist Party, and no revolution has occurred in their ideology and theoretical theses. Here, too, life itself began to drive the Socialists in quest of new political ways, although the situation in France differs fundamentally from that in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The personal power regime in France defeated the Socialists, who at one time had almost in-

variably participated in bourgeois governments and had played no unimportant role in parliamentary and state affairs. It became clear not only to the rank and file, but also to some leaders of the Socialist Party that their position of definite, militant anti-communism was preventing them from making headway, and that this position doomed them to complete isolation and decay. From 1947 to 1958 this party lost 75 per cent of its membership; in 1971 its membership decreased to approximately 80,000* and today does not exceed 100,000 (the French Communist Party has a membership of nearly 400,000). In the parliamentary elections of the 1950s and 1960s the Socialists polled 16-19 per cent of the workers' votes, while 36-49 per cent of the workers voted for Communists.

In December 1965 the French Socialists together with Left-wing bourgeois organisations, which had also been pressed back in the Fifth Republic, took a step that inspired many of the French people, who remembered the deeds and aspirations of the Popular Front of the 1930s, with great hopes; the Communists, Socialists and other Left-wing organisations united in an election bloc which nominated a single candidate for president. The agreement justified itself; for the first time since the establishment of the personal power regime in France the Left-wing forces managed to press back the Right-wingers. François Mitterand, the candidate of the Socialists, Communists and Left-wing bourgeois groups polled 45.5 per cent of all the votes.

* *The International 1969 to 1971. General Secretary's Report to the Helsinki Council Conference of the Socialist International, 25-27 May 1971, London, p. 32.*

The lesson was learned. At the extraordinary congress of the French Socialist Party Claude Fuzier, one of the leaders, stated: "There is no future without a union of all the Left-wing forces aimed at winning power and forming a joint government."^{*} At the same congress Guy Mollet, General Secretary of the party, appealed to the French Socialists to "do all they could to make a union of the Left-wing forces possible and, in any case, to do nothing that may hamper it".^{**} It turned out there was nothing impossible about it.

Direct contact, which replaced the former estrangement, enabled both parties to coordinate or, at least, bring their points of view nearer on many questions of daily political struggle that had formerly caused heated and, at times, stormy discussions. At first the Communists and Socialists (who together with Left-wing bourgeois groups formed the Federation of Democratic and Socialist Left-Wing Forces) concluded a new agreement on cooperation in elections and later agreed on a common platform on a number of important political and economic problems. The Communists and Socialists declared that they would jointly struggle for the destruction of the personal power regime, the improvement of working people's conditions, the prohibition of atomic weapons, the establishment of atom-free zones in Europe, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, the organisation of collective security and the unconditional cessation of American bombing in Vietnam.

That was a good deal. If we recall how far

^{*} *Le Populaire de Paris*, October 31-November 1, 1966.

^{**} *Ibid.*

apart the French Communists and Socialists were as recently as the 1950s and even in the early 1960s, the agreement on these points can be called a great event. Neither of the two parties forced anything on the other. Neither of them demanded any repentance or renunciation of principles. On a number of important points, in the field of foreign policy in particular, the differences between the Communists and Socialists persisted, and reservations were made, for example, on the question of "European integration", the relations with the USA and the terms on which the Israeli troops were to be withdrawn from the Arab territories. But these differences did not hamper the main agreement on the joint struggle; and that was a new development. The French Communists and Socialists were demonstrating in practice that in our time the two parties of the working-class movement could meet each other halfway despite all the obstacles.

The events of 1968 showed that only the first step towards the unity of the French working-class movement has been made and that there are still many difficulties ahead. This came to light already during the powerful strike movement in May and the parliamentary elections that followed it when the French reactionary forces launched a furious general offensive. On the eve of the elections the French Communists did all they could to demonstrate once again their loyalty to the idea of unity. Advocating replacement of personal power by a people's government of the democratic union they declared that they claimed no power for themselves alone and that they would take the place they merited in the people's government. Moreover, they affirmed that in the event of advent to power they would agree on

the existence of many parties under conditions of socialist democracy.

That was a direct answer to the opponents of unity of whom there are still quite a few in France. Nevertheless, the Socialist Party rejected the communist proposal to put forward a common programme of the union of democratic forces in the elections. This undoubtedly helped the personal power regime to win the election battle and consolidate its rule. Nor can it be denied that during those critical days the Socialist Party leadership manifested no loyalty with respect to the Communists; they made attempts to form a new government over the heads of the Communists. Nevertheless, the results of the 1968 parliamentary elections in France showed that, if the Socialists had faced the voters alone, outside the bloc with Communists, they would have suffered very grave defeat. This is an incontestable fact. The French Communists did everything to strengthen the Left-wing bloc, but did not allow and never will allow anybody to use them as a mere tool.

A year later the leaders of the French Socialist Party were given another lesson which precisely reproduced the first one. In June 1969, when it came to new presidential election, the Communists proposed the nomination of a single candidate of the Left-wing bloc, for whom all the progressive forces in the country could have voted. The Socialists disagreed and nominated their own candidate—Gaston Defferre, a representative of the extreme Right wing of their party and an irreconcilable foe of unity of the working-class movement. Then the Communists nominated their candidate—the veteran of the Communist Party Jacques Duclos. “If I succeed in getting at least

one more vote than Duclos, I shall be the happiest man,”^{*} said Defferre on the eve of the election. It is this game that the Right-wing reformists regard as the aim of the Socialist Party.

The French people gave an immediate answer. Duclos polled 4,788,000 votes, Defferre—1,130,000, i.e., one-fourth as many. Moreover, in this election Defferre polled less than half the votes the Socialists had received in the previous parliamentary election. The leader of the ruling party Georges Pompidou became President of France during the second election round. It was once more confirmed that by splitting the working-class movement the extreme Right-wing reformists not only display amazing irresponsibility and folly from the point of view of the *common* interests of this movement and play into the hands of the big bourgeoisie, but also seriously harm the Socialist Party itself.

This is increasingly better understood by its most far-sighted leaders and functionaries. At the Extraordinary Congress of the Party in Epinay-sur-Seine in June 1970 a real battle broke out between them and the extreme Right wing. The Right-wingers with Defferre among them bitterly opposed any further contacts with Communists and advocated playing duets with bourgeois parties. The past again spoke with their voices. Most of the delegates, however, said their decisive “No”, and this majority was headed by Alain Savary and Guy Mollet. The long-term “plan of action” adopted by the Congress, much to the surprise of many delegates, clearly read that the aim of the party was “to reorganise present-day society into a socialist society”. But even more

^{*} *L'Humanité*, May 31, 1969.

noteworthy was the fact that a direct and most important political inference was made from this new platform. The decision of the Congress read that the French Socialists realised they could not come to power on the strength of their own forces alone. Because of this the party thought it necessary to strive for unity with "organisations advocating Social-Democracy". Rejecting "any compromise with forces representing capitalism"* the French Socialists affirmed their willingness to continue the dialogue with the Communists.

The significance of this decision cannot be underrated. The French Socialist Party differs essentially from the Socialist parties of Asia and Latin America; nor does it resemble the Social-Democratic Party of Finland. It is one of the oldest, "classical" reformist parties of Europe. Ever since the First World War it has almost uninterruptedly cooperated with the parties of the Right. Its leaders—Pierre Renaudel, Paul Faure, Marcel Sembat and Léon Blum—were considered the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, who always marched in step with the British and German Social-Democrats. Their fear of communism was well known. Now this old Social-Democratic Party with its leaders at the head announced its decision to give up its deals with the bourgeoisie and to cooperate with the Communists. There was no need looking for any reasons; the French Socialists had convinced themselves that they had no future if they followed the old course. They did not want to disappear altogether or dissolve in the bourgeois world. Hence their change of attitude. The alliance of the Left-wing forces opened a way into history for them.

* *L'Humanité*, June 22, 1970.

The French Communists at once responded to this new appeal by the Socialists. Speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the middle of October 1970 Georges Marchais, Deputy General Secretary of the Party, said: "There is but one way that corresponds to the aspirations of the popular masses and makes possible the fundamental political reforms which France needs. This is the unity of the Left-wing forces, the union of the workers' and democratic forces. The French Communist Party will continue its efforts to create favourable conditions fostering such a union, the union with the Socialist Party in the first place."

He also emphasised that the Communists were thinking of a union "which would unite the partners with equal rights and duties ensuing from their commitments" and that the Communists "did not claim a dominant role. The members of the union had to work out a joint government programme."** Still earlier, at the Congress of the French Communist Party, Marchais stated that "not a single organisation that wanted to join it" should be excluded beforehand from the union of all workers' and democratic forces.** Waldeck Rochet, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, said as early as 1968 that the new theses adopted by the 18th Congress of his party "make it possible to map out a peculiar French way of transition to socialism with many parties under conditions of socialist democracy"***

Equal rights, equal duties, multi-party system, no discrimination, no claims to "hegemony". We

* *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1970.

** *L'Humanité*, February 5, 1970.

*** *L'Humanité*, July 10, 1968.

see that in France, too, where their number is five times that of the Socialists the Communists are not seeking any privileges. *Both* workers' parties need a union of Left-wing forces, and today it is really becoming possible. But has it any chances of success? It has. This can be demonstrated with figures. Even in so old a European country as France, where there is no problem of a poverty-ridden countryside or an undeveloped economy, a victory of united Left-wing forces in parliamentary election is quite possible today.

At first sight this does not seem to be true. Today the situation in France does not appear to be in favour of the Left-wing forces. After the election in the summer of 1968, when the Philistines frightened by the May events abruptly turned to the Right, the conservative camp in France considerably strengthened its positions by polling 43.7 per cent of the votes as against the 36.5 per cent cast for the Left-wingers. In the beginning of 1970 the keys to power were still in the hands of the Right-wing forces, but their success in 1968 was a Pyrrhic victory just the same.

The fright in the ranks of the voters passes, the class struggle intensifies again. Three-quarters of the country's able-bodied population are wage-earners who cannot reconcile themselves to a deterioration in their living conditions and the autocracy of the monopolies. The French never submit to reaction. But there is also something else. There are forces in France today, which want to drive France back, return the country to NATO, to resume the "Atlantic" policy. But the people of France, including large sections of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, are against it.

It should not be forgotten that in the 1965 presidential election the candidate of Communists,

Socialists and Left-wing bourgeois groups polled 45.5 per cent of all the votes, that in the 1967 parliamentary election the same parties polled only half a million less votes than the ruling parties and that even in 1968, at the time of serious difficulties for the Left-wingers, they polled more than 8 million votes as against the 9.6 million votes cast for the Right-wingers.

This is already confirmed by the results of municipal election that took place in France in March 1971. In most of the country's towns with a population of more than 30,000 the Communists, Socialists and other Left-wing organisations formed a united front and achieved a good deal of success. It turned out once more that unity enabled the Socialists to retain most of the municipalities where they were seriously threatened by the Right parties. Wherever the Socialists refused to cooperate with the Communists, however, they often lost their positions. The same thing happened during the September 1971 by-elections to the senate: the Socialists retained their seats largely due to communist support. There is every indication that in the future, too, the Socialist Party may time and again find itself in a similar situation.

Of course, today we can speak only of the rudiments of a real Left-wing bloc in France. No final decisions have as yet been made. It must also be admitted that the French Socialist Party has retained many of its anti-communist prejudices. Two antagonistic wings continue to struggle against each other within its ranks; the Left wing advocating cooperation with Communists, the Right wing willing to enter into an alliance only with bourgeois opposition groups. At the Socialist congress in Epinay-sur-Seine in May 1971, the

majority favoured a dialogue with the Communists, but the party leadership continued to put off the talks. In October the French Communists advanced a concrete programme for the formation of a democratic government of popular unity. As the Communists see it, such a government would establish a progressive democratic regime in the country which would open the way to socialism through the nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, improvement of the standard of living, and introduction of democratic reforms in the fields of taxation, education and state administration, and ensure France's national sovereignty and her withdrawal from NATO. "We are prepared," said Georges Marchais on November 21, 1971, "to immediately conclude a stable long-term agreement in the form of a common programme of struggle and a government programme, with other democratic organisations, particularly with the Socialist Party."

What will be the Socialists' response?

Undoubtedly, a great deal still has to be done by both the Socialists and Communists to clear the way for effective unity. A good deal has already been done. The importance of a powerful democratic front in France to European and world politics cannot be denied. This much is clear to everybody.

Let us cast a glance at another important European country—Italy. This is also an old state of a purely "Western" type with a traditional Socialist Party which would often manifest anti-communist tendencies. At the same time Italy is one of the key countries of NATO's infra-structure, the South European citadel of the Atlantic bloc. A good deal depends on what forces will rule this

country in the near future—those who are helping the cold war or those who are against it. And this is decided, in its turn, primarily by the relations obtaining between the Italian Communists and Socialists.

At the present time the internal struggle in Italy has reached boiling point. Two camps with nearly equal forces oppose each other in the country. The reactionaries, instigated by their overseas patrons, are trying to transform Italy completely into an imperialist bastion in the Mediterranean. The working class, a large part of the peasantry and the intelligentsia demand the consolidation of peace, withdrawal from NATO and the carrying out of a number of urgent social reforms.

The struggle embraces the whole country and does not subside for a single day. One Right-Centrist or Left-Centrist government in Rome succeeds another; more than a dozen such governments have been in power in the last decade, and since the end of the war (until 1971) 32. The masses are in a state of ferment, the workers strike, the students demonstrate, and the pro-fascist generals hatch plots expecting at the right moment suddenly to seize power in the "Greek" manner. And it is clear that any turn in the Italian events will immediately make itself felt in the international situation. If reaction gains the upper hand, similar forces may become active all over the Mediterranean and encourage those who are dreaming of NATO's dictatorship in this area. If democracy prevails, the chances of a peaceful coexistence will considerably increase not only in the Mediterranean, but also all over Europe. Today domestic policy is more than ever inseparable from international policy.

Can the democratic forces in Italy win? They undoubtedly can. The way to victory is again through unification of the Left-wing forces. This is now resolutely advocated not only by Communists and Left-wing Socialists, but also by Left-wing Catholics. As in France, an alliance of the Left-wing forces in Italy is becoming quite feasible.

In the last elections to departmental councils in June 1970 the ruling Christian Democrats and the small Republican Party that cooperates with them together polled 40.8 per cent of the votes, the Communists, Socialists and Left-wing Socialists polling 41.5 per cent and the extreme Right-wing Social-Democrats (former "Unitarian Socialists") who had broken away from the Socialist Party—7 per cent. In other words, if the Communists and all Socialists in Italy cooperated, they would already now have a clear, almost absolute majority. Moreover, it is important to remember that Left-wing sentiments are growing in Italy even within the ruling party of Christian Democrats. Its progressive wing supported by workers who are believers and the intelligentsia is also in favour of peace and social reforms. It can hardly be doubted that, if a democratic front of Communists and Socialists is formed, as it was in Chile, the Left-wing Christian Democrats would also join it, in which case a Left-wing government in Italy would be ensured. Who holds the keys to such a turn in this country? The answer is obvious: the Italian Socialists. If they decide to embark on the same path that is already being followed by Chilean Socialists the problem will be solved. Meanwhile the chronic political crisis in Italy is continuing and the bourgeois Centrist governments which supersede each other continue

now and then to demonstrate their helplessness.

The Italian Communists unhesitatingly expressed themselves in favour of the cooperation of all the Left-wing forces in the country, including the Left-wing Catholics, and the formation of a parliamentary government supported by them. Such a government would have two tasks: to carry out thorough-going reforms in the country and to free it from NATO fetters. Permanent contact has already been established between the Communist Party and the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity. The Left wing of the Christian Democratic Party has also come out in favour of a dialogue with the Communists. Now it is the turn of the Socialist Party.

Without waiting for the decisions of their leaders a number of provincial organisations of this party started cooperating with the Communists after the departmental elections in the summer of 1970. Not everybody knows that today three important Italian departments—Tuscany, Umbria and Emilia-Romagna—are ruled by departmental governments (juntas) of united Left-wing forces. Of the 8,000 Italian communes a Left-wing majority is operating in about 1,500. Supported by this majority Communists became the heads of the provincial councils of Florence and Parma, Socialists are mayors of the cities of Pisa and Grosseto, the head of the departmental council of Umbria is also a Socialist, and the mayor of the city of Bologna is a Communist. In the December 1971 presidential election the Communists voted for the socialist candidate Francesco de Martino. As in the northern country—Finland—the workers' parties of Italy are accumulating experience of joint work. It should be noted that the resolu-

tion adopted by the 11th Congress of the Socialist International in June 1969 and demanding that all Social-Democrats relinquish their contacts with Communists was not approved by the Italian Socialist Party.

Nobody will venture to say what Italy will be like tomorrow and whether or not that country will be headed for the first time in its history by people who have firmly decided to embark on the path of socialist revival. It is common knowledge, however, that the Italian reactionaries fear such prospect. An attempt at a sudden coup d'état by the Right-wing forces in this country cannot be excluded. That is why the question of relations between the Communists and Socialists in Italy is really assuming world importance.

The third important West European country where the new may supplant the old in the nearest future is Spain. Here the situation is different from that in Italy and France, but this part of the continent must on no account be forgotten. Francoism has now been ruling beyond the Pyrenees for the fourth decade; the country under Franco's rule remains, as it were, in the backyard of Europe, the Spanish people are deprived of freedom, and some superficial observers completely forget about their existence, as if these people have dropped out of the world game. Such observers will probably be surprised because tomorrow Spain may find itself in the centre of attention, and then the question as to who rules it will become one of the most important questions in European politics.

Franco's regime has grown decrepit. The 79-year-old dictator has already appointed Prince Juan Carlos Bourbon as his successor. It is useless to guess how the change of power in Spain will

emerge, but one thing is clear—the Spanish people will not hear of prolonging the dictatorship in any form. No new fascist, semi-fascist or military group will be able to cope with the Spaniards and consolidate power for any length of time. There may as yet be some storms over the Pyrenees, but Spain will not go back. Its people are awaiting the beginning of a new era in their history. Who will rule the country after the fall of Franco's regime?

The Spanish Communists advocate the formation of a bloc including all the democratic, anti-Franco forces. It is hard to believe that the Spanish Socialists and other Left-wing parties will not avail themselves of the opportunity history offers their country in the 1970s. It is perfectly clear that, if a democratic government comes to power in Madrid, Spain's role in Europe will immediately change. The Spanish Socialist Party, one of the oldest in Europe—it was founded as far back as 1888—at one time played quite an important role. The governments of the Spanish Popular Front were headed in the 1930s by Socialists Caballero and Negrin. This party has not yet recovered from its utter defeat. According to the figures of the Socialist International, in 1970 its émigré members numbered 9,000.* Now it has a chance to get on its feet again. But it can do this only through a unity of forces intending to form a new democratic government. There are reasons to believe that such a union—of Communists, Socialists, progressive Catholics, Basque nationalists and a number of bourgeois parties—is already being organised. The Communists are doing their best to facilitate this process. As in

* *S.I.I.*, June 1970, p. 92.

France and Italy, new prospects are beginning to show here.

It is interesting that similar phenomena may also be noted in so small and "stable" a country as Luxembourg, where, in 1971, a large part of the old Social-Democratic Party openly came out in favour of cooperation with Communists. The Right-wingers responded by splitting the party and forming a new one. Fresh winds are beginning to blow even in "patriarchal" Switzerland, the old bulwark of reformism. In April 1971 Communists and Socialists cooperated in the elections to the Geneva city council and achieved success.

An absolutely unexpected lesson on the subject of "the unity of action of the working-class movement" was taught in the autumn of 1970 in Sweden, country No. 1 on the list of the Socialist International. For decades it was considered that the Swedish Social-Democrats could afford to pay no attention to Communists at all; the party for which half the country's voters cast their votes could apparently ignore the existence of the party on the Left. That was precisely how the leaders of the Swedish Social-Democrats treated the Communists year in year out. Moreover, on the eve of the election to the Riksdag in September 1970 they made an attempt completely to eliminate the Communists from the parliamentary arena. A law was passed in accordance with which a party that polled less than 4 per cent of the total votes in election was deprived of the right of being represented in parliament. In 1968 the Swedish Communists polled 3 per cent of the votes. How did things work out?

In the September 1970 election the Swedish Social-Democracy suddenly lost its absolute

majority, the three parties of the bourgeois opposition having one more seat than the Social-Democrats. But the Swedish Communists were not only not eliminated from the Riksdag, but by polling nearly 5 per cent of the votes received 17 seats instead of the former four. In other words, to save their government, the Social-Democrats now had to seek the support of those very same Communists they wanted to drive out of parliament.

And they received this support. Regardless of what had happened the Swedish Communists supported the Social-Democrats in parliament and the government of the Social-Democratic leader Olof Palme remained in power. In the following communal elections the necessity of unity was confirmed once more. In a number of cities, including Stockholm, where the bourgeois parties had formerly had the majority in the municipalities the leadership passed to the workers' parties.

What does this lesson show? It shows that even the strongest and proudest Social-Democratic party in the world cannot, in the face of the attacking reaction, afford to ignore the help of the Left-wing party of the working class. And sooner or later the reactionary forces try to assume the offensive everywhere.

This has already happened in two other Scandinavian countries—Norway and Denmark. In the second half of the 1960s the Social-Democratic parties in both these countries, also considering themselves invincible and needing nobody's help, lost their power. At first the Norwegian Labour Party, which was in power for 30 successive years, suffered serious defeat in elections and retired from the government. The main reasons for this were the pro-NATO course of the

Right-wing leaders, their indecision in internal policies, concessions to the bourgeois parties and refusal to unite with the Left-wing forces in the struggle for social reform. In other words, it was again the same old sins of reformism for which so much had already been paid. In the 1969 election the Norwegian Labour Party polled more votes and in March 1971 returned to power, but for a firm majority in parliament it needed two more seats. The least change in the parliamentary balance of forces, the fortuitous absence of one or two deputies might again jeopardise the Socialist government. The Communists proposed to unite all the Left-wing forces of the working-class movement to defend the fundamental interests of the working people, stop the chronic rise in prices, put an end to the housing crisis and withdraw the country from NATO. Will the Norwegian Social-Democrats learn from the lesson of their Swedish brethren?

In 1968 the Social-Democratic Party of Denmark temporarily fell from power. It even failed to get a single post in the new coalition government; the bourgeois parties managed without it. But then the Left Radicals more than doubled their seats in the Danish parliament in the election; it is a bourgeois party but the bulk of its membership was against the country's participation in NATO. The Danish Social-Democrats returned to power only in September 1971 when they took part in the election with a more sober foreign policy platform.

The position of the "powerful Scandinavian Social-Democracy" is no longer as stable as in the past. This is now clear to everybody, even to itself. The future elections may bring some changes in election statistics, but one thing can hardly be

doubted: Scandinavian Social-Democracy will scarcely be able to consolidate its position by remaining in "splendid isolation".

France, Italy, Spain, Scandinavia—a turn to the Left at least in these countries and areas would undoubtedly be enough decisively to alter in Europe and thereby throughout the world the balance of forces in favour of peace and progress. It is not only a matter of these countries as such. It is also a matter of the influence that the coming of powerful democratic fronts into existence in such large bourgeois states would exert on Social-Democracy in the rest of Western Europe.

It is hard to suppose, for example, that the shift to the Left in France, Italy, Spain and Scandinavia will not make itself felt on the British Labour Party which suffered a stunning defeat at the hands of the Conservatives in 1970, a defeat undoubtedly due to the cowardly, non-socialist policies of the Labour Government. But a few years previously the Labour Party, which controlled almost half the votes in its country, considered itself the most successful, if not the largest, of all the Social-Democratic parties, except the Swedish. Now it, too, has to count the cost and consider what is to be done. Not only the leaders are considering this—they are used to swinging on the parliamentary pendulum—but also the rank-and-file members of the Labour Party, even the most moderate ones. The trade unions, the intelligentsia and the young people are particularly anxious. They are the kernel of the party. The people forming this kernel are becoming more clearly aware and are speaking more and more loudly of the fact that Right-wing Labour hinders the party from developing and marching in step with life. Right-wing Labour

has grown decrepit. It, too, can be rejuvenated, but only by turning Left and moving forward with courageous steps. It is common knowledge that the British, including the Labour Party, are cautious, practical people, loyal to tradition and not given to extremes. But they, too, including Labour, break with the old and turn to the new when life convinces them that it cannot be otherwise.

What Right-wing Labour fears most is the reappraisal of values now taking place in the ranks of trade unions. All the policies and the whole of the organisation of the Labour Party since the very day of its establishment in the beginning of the century have been based on the trade unions. Its leaders—James MacDonald, Philip Snowden, James Thomas, Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Ernst Bevin, Hugh Gaitskell—ruled the party with the aid of the trade union bosses. The latter did what the former wanted them to do. Now the opposition in the Labour movement has been joined by precisely the most important, most numerous trade unions, namely, the almost 1.5-million-strong Union of Transport and General Workers, at one time headed by Bevin himself, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Union of Boilermakers, the Union of General and Municipal Workers, the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, etc. The trade unions are seething. The Conservative Government that came to power after the defeat of Labour is not only lowering the living standards of the workers, but it is also threatening them with a law which would put the trade unions almost in the same position in which they were under Queen Victoria 100 years ago. This is too much even for the "cautious", moderate British

Social-Democrats. Labour youth and the Labour intelligentsia are also anxious.

In March 1971 at the Extraordinary Conference of the British Congress of Trade Unions in Croydon representatives of four million union members voted for a general strike against the government's anti-labour bill. In September that year the 103rd Trade Union Congress in Blackpool vigorously opposed the anti-labour bill of the Conservatives, their foreign policy and Britain's entry into the Common Market. A month later the annual Labour Party Conference condemned the government's economic policy, called for a relaxation of international tension, the convocation of a European conference and a reduction of armed forces. The leader of the Amalgamated Engineering Union told the conference that the policy of the future Labour government should rest on socialist principles and that the working class would no longer allow the government, even a Labour government, to curtail trade union rights. Now the whole of Britain is agitated.

There is no point in predicting where the Labour Party will go in the 1970s; too many such predictions made in the past failed to come true. One thing is clear, however: it won't mark time much longer and it is moving to the Left.

That is why, to watch the process from which new developments in the European working-class movement will emerge is a thrilling task for any historian of our time. A good deal may turn out differently from what he expects. Forecasting even for only 10 years is a risky business. It must not be assumed, of course, that Left-wing fronts will form everywhere. The movement to the Left takes different forms in different areas. Here and there the situation may suffer unexpected com-

plications; the leaders of the democratic forces are not ensured against miscalculations and errors themselves. It is more important to avoid them now than ever before. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that tomorrow the historian may be able to say: "The ice has broken."

And it has broken not only in Europe. Let us take another look at Asia. We have already dealt with the Socialist Party's turn toward cooperation with the Communists in Ceylon. In the Lebanon cooperation between the Communists and the Progressive Socialist Party is consolidating, while in Iraq the Communists have proposed formation of a National Front which, in addition to their party, is to include the Baathists, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and all of the country's progressive democratic forces. It is well worth going back to the largest Social-Democratic Party in Asia—the Japan Socialist Party which controls 10 million votes and, but a few years ago, controlled nearly 13 million. This is a lot more than is controlled by any other Social-Democratic Party in the world except the West German Social-Democrats and the British Labour Party.

In Japan, as in India, one bourgeois party has for many years now been exercising undivided rule; it is the Right-wing Liberal-Democrats who are completely dependent on the financial oligarchy and are cooperating with the USA. Until 1970 this party had 274 of the 486 deputy seats. After the election in December 1969 the rule of the Liberal-Democrats seemed to grow even stronger, the number of their deputies in the lower chamber increasing to nearly 60 per cent. But, if we look ahead, we shall see that the Japanese working-class movement has significant new prospects.

The parliamentary picture in Japan is misleading; things are different under the surface. Although the Liberal-Democrats control three-fifths of all the seats, in the last election they polled not more than 47.6 per cent of the votes and only 32 per cent of the electorate. Thus already today most Japanese are not supporters of this party. The people cannot forget either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Japan does not want to become an American spring-board in a thermonuclear war. If, however, she remains shackled to the agreement concluded with the USA by the Liberal-Democrats, by which American bases remain on Japanese territory, one day Japan may find herself on the brink of national suicide. By collusion with the USA Japan is being militarised at full speed, and the country is rapidly becoming an American aircraft carrier, but only not an unsinkable one. Can a party advocating continuation of such a policy remain in power indefinitely?

Repudiation of the agreement with the USA is favoured by four Japanese opposition parties—Communist, Socialist, and in some measure the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and the Buddhist Komeito (Clean Government) Party. Today the opposition is acting in an uncoordinated manner. By joining its forces it would immediately represent nearly half the voters. It can hardly be doubted that, if such a united Left-wing bloc put the question of war and peace point-blank to the people and resolutely advocated neutralisation of the country, most Japanese would side with it.

The Japanese Communists, who are supported by more than 4.8 million voters, almost 12 per cent of the total, have already proposed the for-

mation of such a bloc. It has been demonstrated that wherever the Socialists go together with them both parties achieve great successes. The Socialists and Communists began, already in 1970, to cooperate in 12 of the country's prefectures in which more than half of the Japanese voters live. In 63 towns they formed a united front. This bore fruit. In the election to the local government bodies in April 1971 the bloc of workers' parties won a sensational victory. Its candidates were elected governors of Tokyo and Osaka, two of the largest Japanese cities. Still earlier the candidate of the same parties had become governor of Kyoto, the country's third largest city. This disturbed the whole of Japan. M. Ishibashi, General Secretary of the Japan Socialist Party, stated that the joint struggle of the Communists and Socialists brought much greater results than a mere arithmetical addition of their forces. The leader of the Japanese Socialists is right.

One more thing was demonstrated. By acting separately the Japan Socialist Party loses voters. In the December 1969 election it lost at least 2.5 million votes, while the Communists won a million votes and polled more than ever before.* Nevertheless, the Socialist Party also acted separately in the election to the upper chamber of the Japanese parliament in June 1971. The semaphore is nonetheless clear. The unity of the working-class movement in Japan is becoming all the more important and urgent since the ruling party of Liberal-Democrats has by collusion with the financial oligarchy and the USA of late clearly taken the course of restoring the old army. Japanese imperialism that plunged the country into

* *Morning Star*, January 6, 1970.

an abyss a quarter of a century ago is again baring its teeth. Most of the ordinary people in Japan cannot fail to understand what this means and what it will lead to. It is quite possible that in the nearest future millions of voters in the country will decide to turn Left. But voters have to be guided and given a clear political alternative. Will the Japanese Socialists venture in the face of all difficulties and obstacles to help the people take the fate of the state into their own hands at the critical moment in the history of the country of the rising sun? This nation has no other way out.

We are trying to refrain from too optimistic estimates and cheerful hopes. But facts are facts, and we have been working with facts. If, in the course of the 1970s, the alliances of Left-wing forces are consolidated at least in three Asian countries—India, Japan and Ceylon—this will constitute a no less important factor than the success of the Left-wing associations in Italy, France and Spain for Western Europe. It is enough to take a good look at the map to understand it.

By gazing into the future we have arrived at the conclusion that in the 1970s the capitalist world may in a number of important countries become unlike what it was in the 1950s and 1960s. A struggle for power is in the offing and it may predetermine a good deal in the international arena.

On the one hand, the reactionary forces are preparing a furious attack by striving at all costs to continue the race towards a world war. On the other hand, chances for uniting the broad democratic sections—from Communists to Left-wing

bourgeois parties inclusive—with the aim of repelling reaction, ensuring peaceful coexistence and carrying out pressing social reforms, are beginning to show. Such chances are offering themselves for the first time in many years. The entire history of our century may proceed along a different channel if the democratic forces avail themselves of these chances.

Are such assumptions substantiated? Can we really pin serious hopes on the 1970s?

The answer, as we have seen, very largely depends on Social-Democrats. If they do not miss the chance history offers them this time, these hopes may be realised. There is nothing unrealisable in alliances of Left-wing forces any longer, at least in a number of capitalist countries. It is just as clear that by coming to power with the support of the majority of the people they can change a good deal not only at home, but also on the vast international stage, and change it for the better.

People with a good memory will probably ask: how will such alliances differ from the popular fronts that existed before the Second World War, for example, in France and Spain? It is well known that, although these fronts for some time helped to stem the avalanche of reaction and fascism in their countries, they did not exist very long and in the final analysis were unable to gain a firm foothold. Are there any reasons to believe that in our day the alliance of Left-wing forces will have a different fate? What is it that this time justifies the political researcher's greater optimism?

These are legitimate questions which cannot, of course, be answered on the basis of the latest election statistics alone. It is in the nature of the

figures offered by such statistics to vary and change; tomorrow they may, under the influence of events, be different from what they are today. But there is another, truer and more reliable criterion; it is the barometer of the sentiments of the *class forces* that support the political parties. It is in these sentiments that the true answer to the above questions lies.

What is a bloc of Left-wing forces in a bourgeois country if we x-ray it? As a rule, it is an alliance of four classes or social strata—the working class, small farmers, intelligentsia and petty urban bourgeoisie. In some Western countries they are joined by part of the middle bourgeoisie, and in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries—by the progressive part of the national bourgeoisie. Any political party that enters the alliance of the Left-wing forces relies on one or a few of these strata, derives its strength from them and, if it wants to live, moves along with them. It has always been thus and it is thus that politics are made today.

In the beginning of the 1970s the political barometer shows, that in a number of bourgeois countries the majority or at least a large part of the four above-mentioned social strata are tending toward supporting the Left-wing alliances. This will come to pass if such alliances put forward a courageous, resolute programme of lasting peace and social reforms.

The alliances of Left-wing forces now have a chance, and this is a sign of the times.

The sentiments of the people may be differently appraised and their views differently construed, but we cannot fail to take into account the vital interests of large social groups, which are clear to everybody.

Where, for example, is such a social stratum in the West as the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, to turn in the 1970s? This is precisely the stratum which nearly everywhere still tips the election scales in capitalist countries one way or the other. On their Right the grasping hands of fascists and other extreme conservatives are reaching out for them today as they did in the past. But fascism means war, and this time not the usual war, but a thermonuclear war. Even a hidebound petty bourgeois is aware of this today. He has had some experience with both hot and cold wars.

The alliances of Left-wing forces meet him halfway. They advocate not only a secure peaceful coexistence, cessation of the arms race and a maximum reduction of military expenditure, but also protection of small farms from the arbitrary rule of the monopolies, extension of credits and all forms of state aid to peasants. Today such a programme is much more acceptable to the greater part of the petty bourgeoisie than the hazardous plans of the extreme conservatives; it is also more acceptable than the risky, ambiguous programme of the usual Right-wing, NATO-trend parties. The lumpen-bourgeois will continue gravitating toward fascists, especially in the event of an economic recession. But for the average petty bourgeois things are different today.

We must not delude ourselves. The transition of the petty bourgeoisie to the Left-wing camp is slow, uneven, not always consistent and not everywhere equally stable. As usual the man in the street hesitates, looks about and readily changes his attitude. But his sentiments are no longer what they were in the 1950s or even in the first half of the 1960s. The shadow of the thermonuclear bomb has altered a good deal for him.

That is why such parties and groups in Western Europe as many Radical-Socialists in France, the Left-wing Catholics in Italy and Spain and the Centre Party in Finland are inclined or have already agreed to participate in the alliances of the Left-wing forces. All these trends comprise large sections of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. In Asia and Latin America, where the same sections encounter big national capital and imperialism, they push to the Left the Congressists in India, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in Ceylon, the Left-wing Buddhists in Japan, the Radical Party and the Left-wing Catholic Movement of Popular Action in Chile and similar organisations in other countries. With the small numerical differences between the Left- and Right-wing parliamentary forces in many capitalist countries the role played by such parties and organisations cannot be underestimated.

Special mention must be made of another social group which may in no small measure help the working class in forming alliances with Left-wing forces. It is the intelligentsia, an incomparably more conscious and progressive section of the population than the petty bourgeoisie. In the course of the scientific and technological revolution the intelligentsia has developed into a big and influential force directly connected with production and thereby with the working class. Its thinking is becoming increasingly more imbued with socialism. The intelligentsia loathes fascism; hatred of fascism has become its distinguishing characteristic. It, too, is very clearly aware of the prospects of a thermonuclear war. It has nothing to expect from the Right-wing forces save irreconcilable animosity, continuous distrust and direct persecution. On the Left—an alliance with

the working class offers the intelligentsia extensive opportunities in economic, social and political life.

To be sure, student youth, which is contiguous to the intelligentsia, is so impatient when waiting for this turn to the Left, that they acquire a propensity for dangerous and senseless anarchist adventures. And still the future for the intelligentsia of the capitalist world lies only in cooperation with the mass working-class movement; it has no other alternative. Experience proves it time and again. That is why in a number of bourgeois countries this section of the population is beginning to take an active part in preparing Left-wing blocs.

But the key for their formation is still in the hands of the two parties of the working-class movement—the Communist and Social-Democratic parties. Without their cooperation this aim cannot be achieved.

As has already been stated, it is not an easy task for these two parties to find a common language in the capitalist world, but no one has any right to postpone it any longer.

Without the Communists no living, dynamic power can be breathed into the Left-wing alliances. This needs no proof; it is absolutely clear to whoever follows political events in our century. Nor can Left-wing fronts hardly anywhere do without the Socialists who are still followed by millions of industrial and office workers, part of the petty bourgeoisie and part of the intelligentsia. As has already been stated, the number of people who vote for them all over the world exceeds 73 million. Without the participation of the Socialist parties it is, as a rule, hard or impossible to win a parliamentary majority. If, however, the cooperation between these two parties is achieved,

the kernel of a union of the Left-wing forces is on hand.

Pointing at the experience of the past very many strategists of the capitalist world assume that such cooperation is impractical. But is this the case in the 1970s? It is only the united action of the working-class movement that can solve the world problems which have become so important and urgent in our times that to measure them only with the old yardstick and deal with them only according to past experience is now inadmissible, and even criminal.

Lenin, the founder of the modern communist movement, was the great proletarian leader who drew an extremely clear line between the Communists and Social-Democrats. He did not spare the Right-wing Social-Democrats, castigated their leaders and compared the Social-Democratic party to a "closed room" where representatives of the bourgeoisie conducted their propaganda among the workers. But it was precisely Lenin who as far back as half a century ago insisted on a rapprochement between the Communists and the Social-Democratic workers.

When a conference of three Internationals—the Third (Communist), Second (Right-Wing Socialist) and "Two-and-a-Half" (Centrist)—was anticipated in 1922 Lenin advised the Comintern delegation to raise only the "least controversial questions considering an attempt at particular, but joint actions of the working-class masses" to be the aim of the conference. He recommended the Comintern delegation to be at the preliminary session of the Internationals "particularly discreet until the hope of achieving the aim is lost".*

* *Voprosy Istorii* No. 4, 1958, p. 51.

Such was Lenin's advice half a century ago, long before nazism, before the invention of the thermonuclear bomb, before the threat of a world catastrophe. Today his advice sounds more convincing than ever before. The Chinese Wall that divides the working-class movement and has played so tragic a role in modern history must be demolished.

It is no secret that the Social-Democratic leaders of the extreme Right are categorically opposed to unity of action and fear Left-wing alliances. Even now these leaders do not want anything except a collusion with the bourgeoisie and do not see any other course for themselves. Right-wing socialist leaders are petrified people. They do not even see what threatens their own parties in the event of there being no unity. At the most decisive moment in history they are again looking back only. There are some such leaders in the Social-Democratic parties of Italy, the FRG, Britain and many other countries. But history cannot too long put up with political corpses; sooner or later it sends them to the grave. The turmoil now observed in many Socialist parties proves that living forces are striving to make headway in them.

Yes, there are still quite a few obstacles in the way of unity of action of the two workers' parties. It is always harder to unite than break up. It was never easy, nor is it easy now, to surmount these obstacles, and it is no less difficult to learn today than it was in Lenin's time. But an English proverb says: where there is a will there is a way.

Nobody can deny one thing and that is that, whatever has happened between the two parties in the last 50 odd years, both Communist and Social-Democratic workers essentially want the

same things—peace and socialism. The main door to alliances between Left-wing forces has to be opened by them jointly. If they open it, the class basis of such alliances will become so strong and stable that the reactionaries will be unable to defeat it. The main forces of the people will rally round the working class. It is not only a matter of making use of election campaigns, but also of engendering mass movements.

Let us repeat: we must not forestall events, build castles in the air and indulge in daydreams. It is always easy to say pleasant things when giving political appraisals, but not always helpful. Nevertheless, when the aim is correctly set, it is still more harmful to see everything in the worst light, not to believe in anything, and always to predict failure. Without surmounting difficulties there can be no good politics and it is only in surmounting these difficulties that good politics are born. Does this still have to be learned?

It is very important to consider what alliances of Left-wing forces could offer the world if they succeeded in the nearest future at least in the aforementioned countries of Western Europe, Asia and Latin America where the ground is already being cleared for them.

They would make it much easier to take decisions concerning European security. It would become much easier to ensure the security of Asia. They would considerably facilitate the settlement of the most important international issues, the dissolution of military blocs and the cessation of the arms race in the first place. A decisive step would thereby be made in the direction of preventing a third world war. And in our day this would be a tremendous, an immeasurable achievement.

The entire atmosphere in the world would change for the first time in many years, sharply, seriously and for the better. Besides fascists, the "hawks" who are possessed by the idea of war, and the no less possessed "super-revolutionary" semi-anarchists, there would be no people in the world who would not heave a sigh of relief. The legalised growth of neo-fascism and revanchism, and the threat of new military-dictatorial regimes appearing in Western Europe would be done away with. Many important and complicated problems, which are not so easy to solve, would remain on the agenda. But a beginning would be made; the world that could get a chance to breathe could also deal with these things. Of course, the reactionary forces would not give up their positions and might attempt new desperate adventures. The class struggle would undoubtedly intensify. But the balance of forces would be against reaction and against the imperialist "hawks". The most important is the qualitative effect of the multiple changes. Only a *single decade* of stable and confident peaceful coexistence could help make the last third of our century a boon to all of mankind and to the cause of socialism.

We dare not go any farther in our forecasting; we are leaving the forecasts for the next century to cybernetics. Some people in the West may not like the prospects we have touched upon. Optimism not only always irritated professional sceptics and whimperers, but also particularly got on the nerves of the philosophers of departing classes. Whoever believes in man, in socialism and in historical progress cannot be a pessimist. But only to believe and hope is not enough. The advocates of progress and socialism must act—not in ten years nor in five, but now.

7. THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

In the two preceding chapters we dealt with nearly all large Social-Democratic parties in the world, but side-stepped one, the largest—the Social-Democratic Party of the FRG (SDPG). We did this intentionally. The question of the German Social-Democratic Party is perhaps the most important part of the whole problem of European Social-Democracy, at least of its orthodox, conservative wing. Since the SDPG came to power in 1969 all the Right-wing and "moderate" Social-Democrats in the world have been treating it with the same deference as they formerly treated the British Labour Party. In the FRG the SDPG has a following of 14 million voters, 42.7 per cent of all the voters of the country. The same party exerts no small influence on the Austrian, Dutch and Scandinavian Social-

Democracy, as well as on several other reformist parties. In London, in the Bureau of the Socialist International, the SDPG is invariably heeded. Willy Brandt is vice-chairman of this International, while Bruno Pittermann, an Austrian and head of the International, is known for his old connections with Brandt's party.

It goes without saying that for international Social-Democracy a very great deal will depend on which way its party in the FRG goes in our days. That is why it merits a special chapter. And it must be dealt with not only in connection with West German affairs, but also in connection with the international political situation.

In the last 20 years (up to 1970) Bonn has undoubtedly been the most dangerous and most disturbing city in Europe. The political radiation emanating from there charged the atmosphere all over the continent. The German postwar problem has given the people no rest. Bonn was against cessation of the cold war, against renunciation of the arms race, against dissolution of the military blocs, against removing the spectre of the atom bomb—against everything that could give the people a chance to breathe and enable them to live without fear. Bonn exerted an influence on Washington, brought pressure to bear on London, and from time to time got on the nerves of Paris.

It seemed that dead Hitler continued to threaten Europe, this time from the Rhine, giving Europe no chance to forget the world war, and that this would go on for a long, long time. How long, nobody dared to predict.

Now the situation has apparently changed. Other winds are blowing in Bonn. The party of Adenauer-Kiesinger-Strauss that ruled for 20

years was superseded in power by a party many members of which had in Hitler's time been committed to extermination camps. It is hard to believe that such a party should take the old Bonn road. The overwhelming majority of its voters are sure today that another road is open to them.

Yes, the road *is* open. West German Social-Democracy that has for so long a time been on the extreme Right flank of international reformism now has the opportunity of making an important change in its policy. It is, nevertheless, not so easy to predict unconditionally that it will march along the new road with firm strides and will stay on it. Let us once more recall the past. It is a question of a party with a rather strange fate.

A long time ago, as far back as the beginning of the current century, German Social-Democracy considered itself the greatest Socialist party in the world. On the eve of the First World War it had a membership of more than one million. It was followed by the bulk of the German working class. In the parliament of the Kaiser's Germany it had more seats than any other party. In the course of 34 years, from 1878 to 1912, the number of its voters increased 90-fold. Every third voter cast his vote for it, three out of four voting for it in Berlin. A single word of the party sufficed to get the workers out on strike or a demonstration. Its organisational machinery worked like a clock. A large part of the German people believed in it, while other Socialist parties respected it and tried to learn from it.

Already then, 60 years ago, the German Social-Democrats declared that they were making ready to take Germany's fate into their hands. This was also expected in the other countries. It was be-

lieved that having come to power German Social-Democracy would work wonders; that it would set an example for all the Socialists in the world and would play a decisive role in the history of Europe. Nothing seemed to be able to stop it on its way to glory. Millions of people believed in it.

We know that nothing of the kind took place; everything turned out the other way round. After gathering a vast number of adherents and becoming a leading parliamentary party, German Social-Democracy went from one defeat to another. It hardly ever managed to do anything worth-while. What it won one day it lost the next day. No sooner did it come to power than it lost it. After mobilising millions of voters it did not know where to take them or took them where they had to mark time. After making one step ahead it took two steps back. It was forced out of one government after another. German Social-Democrats were promised greatness, but they suffered humiliation. Their party, at one time the most powerful, the best organised and the proudest in the Socialist International, now and again found itself relegated to the background.

That is essentially how things were with it from decade to decade down to our own times. In 60 years German Social-Democracy was unable to win the support of the nation, consolidate its position in the world and become a big, positive European force.

Why? What was the matter?

Can anyone say that history let the German Social-Democrats down by never giving them, as it often happens in the life of individual people, a chance to justify the people's expectations and at the same time prove their own worth?

Not by any means. Not many political parties in the world have had during the period of their existence so many brilliant, truly incomparable chances to perform and justify their mission as the German Social-Democratic Party had. At times these chances followed one another. History itself seemed to clear the way to German Social-Democracy, and everything was up to the Social-Democrats themselves. All they had to do was to make up their minds, draw up a plan of action and go to it without retreating. But in all that time German Social-Democracy really learned only one thing—to retreat.

We do not want to make unsubstantiated statements. It is a thing of the well-known past. It would be foolish to base a serious analysis on unjust assertions. To understand, one must deal with what actually is; to criticise, one has to proceed from facts and not emotions, otherwise one can easily fall into error.

Here are a few incontestable facts. Their enumeration shows that in the last 50 odd years German Social-Democracy missed unique historical opportunities at least six times.

1914. German militarism pounced on Europe and unleashed an unprecedented war. The fate of the German people was at stake. Ahead was a chain of defeats that ended in a national catastrophe. Everything was decided in the very first days of the war.

If German Social-Democracy had opposed the war and rallied the people, if it had voted in the Reichstag against the military credits to the Kaiser, Germany could have been saved and the Social-Democratic Party could simultaneously have wrested the helm from the hands of the Kaiser and the big bourgeoisie, could have stopped

the war before the catastrophe and could have remained at the head of the nation.

But this did not take place. All the Social-Democrats, except Liebknecht, voted for the military credits. The position of the Kaiser and the maddened German soldiery was consolidated for a few years, and the war continued and demanded ever heavier sacrifice. Germany bled white and four years later, humiliated and desperate, knelt before the Entente. The Social-Democratic Party could have prevented the national catastrophe and changed the march of events, but did not do it.

1918. The Kaiser was overthrown—not by the Social-Democratic Party, but by the people—and fled from the country. The whole old state edifice collapsed, the power was in the hands of revolutionary workers and soldiers, and a new Communist Party of the Spartacists resolutely advocated socialism. The bourgeois parties were swept off the stage in the very first days, and the generals were still helpless. Suddenly, without the least expecting it, the Social-Democrats found themselves at the helm.

The people demanded radical social changes, those for which the Social-Democratic Party had been founded. Everything indicated that the time for them had come. Millions of German workers again looked ahead with faith in the Social-Democrats.

The Right-wing and Centre Social-Democrats formed a government and almost the very next day handed the actual power over to counter-revolutionary generals. Losing no time the military mercilessly dealt with the revolutionary workers and soldiers. The young Republic was tied hand and foot. German Social-Democracy missed history once again.

1920. The Kaiser's military recovered their strength and decided that the time to strangle the revolution and restore the monarchy had come. The Kapp Putsch broke out and the generals seized power in Berlin. The Social-Democratic government fled to Stuttgart and did not know what to do. The workers declared a general strike on their own, paralysed the transport system and for several days delivered the Republic from the generals. The Social-Democratic government returned to Berlin.

Now everything depended on whether or not the Social-Democrats would at last decide to set to work and actually consolidate the Republic. There was nothing easier now than that—the power in the country was actually again in the hands of the people and counter-revolution was retreating in disorder. There was still enough time to bar the way to reaction and start a new chapter in German history without putsches, without adventures and without wars. Germany could still have become a democratic country and a factor of peace in Europe. It was again up to the Social-Democrats. Did they do in 1920 what they could have done?

No, they did not. On their return to Berlin the Social-Democratic government ordered the workers to discontinue the general strike, disarmed the workers who were fighting the putschists in Ruhr and left the counter-revolutionary generals in their headquarters. The Reichswehr was handed over to Seeckt, one of the most dangerous of these generals. Three months later the Social-Democrats yielded the power to a purely bourgeois government—the first such government in the Weimar Republic. The way for reaction was cleared.

However, not all as yet was lost. Came the hard year of 1923. Ruled by Cuno's conservative cabinet, Germany was in the throes of another crisis. A fantastic inflation followed; with the wages received in the morning a worker could not buy anything in the evening, a modest dinner costing one billion marks. To live or not to live? At the same time Germany was faced with another threat from without: Ruhr, the country's main industrial area, was seized by the French. The postwar German state fell to pieces.

The Communists offered to unite with the Social-Democrats and called upon the people for action and the formation of a workers' government. The Right-wing Social-Democrats turned them down and merely sat by and waited to see what would happen. They did not have to wait very long. Stresemann, a conservative politician, came to power and in another two years Hindenburg, who sympathised with the fascists, became the Reichspresident.

1930. Hitler was at the door. It was now a question of a direct threat to the life of Germany and all of Europe. To continue the retreat or remain idle meant to perish. Only the blind could fail to see and understand this.

Despite all that had happened German Social-Democracy was still strong enough to change, jointly with the Communists, the march of events. If it had united with the Communists and taken part in an all-out attack against fascism, Hitler could not have come to power. That was a feasible prospect.

In the 1930 election to the Reichstag the Social-Democrats and Communists together polled 13.2 million votes, the nazis—6.4 million. Social-Democratic ministers were still ruling in Prus-

sia; they could outlaw the nazi party and arrest its leaders. In those days everything was being decided for many years to come. If the German Social-Democrats had exercised their prerogatives there would have been no Hitler and no Second World War.

Patient history once more threw the doors open to them. But Right-wing Social-Democracy did not enter. Its party unconditionally supported the new Brüning government which did not even stir a finger to stem the attack of the nazis. This stand of the reformist leaders pushed the Communists, who were still fettered by the erroneous Left-sectarian theories, away from the Social-Democrats. Drawing their own conclusions from the situation that had arisen multitudes of philistines sided with the nazis who put forward a revanchist programme. Three more years and Hitler became Reichschancellor. Another six years and the world was on fire. Thousands of Social-Democrats from the party that had but recently ruled Germany now met in concentration camps. All that this party had achieved in 20 years was lost.

But that was not yet the end of the tragedy of the German Right-wing Social-Democrats. The most surprising thing was that it continued, after the war too, as though by inertia.

1945. Germany was routed as never before; the reckoning for nazism had come. The German bourgeoisie was ruined once more. It seemed the time had at last come for the Social-Democrats to get firmly on their feet, let bygones be bygones and start moving ahead. That is precisely what happened in the eastern part of Germany. Here the Social-Democrats with Otto Grotewohl at the head united with the Communists in the Social-

ist Unity Party of Germany and took part in the construction of a socialist republic. Otto Grotewohl became its first Prime Minister. Beyond the Elbe the question was settled differently. Here, in the presence of the troops of the Western powers the leaders of Social-Democracy acted as though nothing at all had occurred in the world since the 1930s. No understanding of what was to come. The worst traditions of their party remained in force. The vicious circle began all over again.

The establishment of a new state—the FRG—was being prepared on the fragments of the Third Reich. Who would rule it? The “Atlantic” powers staked on Adenauer, Right-wing Christian Democrat, who had no other policy save cold war. But, if West German Social-Democracy had come out against this policy, offered the people radical social reforms and decided to act, everything in the FRG might have taken a different course. In this case many voters might quite possibly have withdrawn from Adenauer.

But Right-wing Social-Democracy again did the opposite, this time already after the war, and lost its chance. Its new programme hardly differed from that of Adenauer except in being indefinite. The Bonn Social-Democrats were also in favour of the cold war, also for NATO, also against an agreement with the GDR, also against recognising the real state of affairs in Europe. The voters were offered no alternative and they voted for those whose programme appeared more distinct.

Adenauer's party stayed in power for 20 years. The chance to alter the march of events on the Rhine, to shunt the FRG in good time onto a peace track and thereby help all of Europe was

not taken advantage of. The Bonn Social-Democrats acted exactly the way the Weimar Social-Democrats had before them. It looked as though some law hung over them as it had over their predecessors—a law of permanent retreat.

More than 70 years have elapsed since the beginning of the century, and they are still in the same place. Why? Is it perhaps because their leaders are preoccupied more with safeguarding the state of an aggressive bourgeoisie than with socialism? Is not this the reason for the continuous, successive deals with bourgeois parties, capital, the military, for this pathologic fear of Communists, this devotion to their patron—Western imperialism? And is not this the policy that is covered up with words about some “third way” for Social-Democrats, a way which, in the epoch of the decisive struggle between the two systems, does not exist?

Such a policy can, apparently, be pursued for years and even decades. But not even the Social-Democrats will manage to live this way all through the 20th century.

We have recalled all that happened in the 1910s, 1920s, 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. All that has passed; we are living in a different time. The past may and even must sometimes be forgotten, if it is done for the sake of the present and the future.

But in that case the question arises precisely about the present and the future. Can it be taken for granted today that, having come to power, having signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, having recognised the postwar borders and—*de facto*—the GDR, and having proclaimed its striving to embark on the path of peaceful co-existence, West German Social-Democracy has really once and for all done with its past?

To ask this is not a sign either of ill-will or pedantry. Life does not tolerate fixed, doctrinaire conservatism. The question now is only about what is new, and it is the new that matters. It has often happened that after accumulating experience and paying a high price for it, political parties have pondered over their fate and sought new ways.

And it is not only leaders who begin to think. It should not be forgotten that the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party of the FRG include a large part of the country's working class. The loyalty which millions of workers retain to this party despite all that has happened is really a unique fact that must be taken into account.

People not only vote, but also think; and today they think much more than before. The Socialists among the rank-and-file industrial, office and professional workers in bourgeois Germany have always been well disposed even when they allowed themselves to be led astray. Today they undoubtedly and very sincerely want lasting peace and social progress, and this makes itself felt on the events in the FRG.

Their sentiments cannot fail in some measure to influence the policy of their leadership, whatever the resistance of the Right-wing forces in the party. Everything indicates that the fresh ideas and suggestions, which were included in the 1969 election programme of the West German Social-Democrats and helped them to win, penetrated there precisely under the pressure of rank-and-file members and the course of events.

It is also true that Brandt's Social-Democratic Government has already carried out a number of important measures which were expected from

it by the working class of the FRG. A treaty of nuclear non-proliferation and a treaty with the USSR, which in its essence is equivalent to an official renunciation of revanchism and marks the beginning of normalisation of USSR-FRG relations, have been signed. Brandt stated publicly that this treaty "may become the turning point of postwar history".* A treaty has been signed with the Polish People's Republic, and agreements are apparently envisaged with other socialist countries. All these are correct, wise decisions, and nobody must underrate their importance. But at this point the consistent and judicious policy for the FRG does not terminate.

Those, to whom the interests of peace and socialism are dear, have a right today to ask the West German Social-Democrats a few direct, concrete questions, namely:

Will they this time bar the way to German reaction? Will they really bar it with all possible determination, not with words, but with deeds? As a matter of fact, the Right-wing forces in the FRG are not only alive and still strong, but are also openly preparing for a furious counter-attack. If they are not stopped today, they may grab the Social-Democrats by the throat tomorrow. Where is the guarantee that the West German Social-Democrats will not repeat the terrible mistake of their Weimar predecessors?

Are they ready this time at last to curb German militarism, the force that has caused so much evil to the German people? Or will they let themselves be curbed once again? As a matter of fact, it is clear that the policy of militarisation is in the

* W. Brandt's address in Kempten, September 11, 1970.

end pernicious to the Social-Democrats of the FRG themselves. It is very well known that the conservative Bundeswehr generals, former Hitler's colonels, do not intend to stop the construction of the new Wehrmacht they have started by collusion with the Pentagon. Will the militarisation of the FRG continue under the rule of the Social-Democrats?

Will they decide to do now what they did not do in the 1920s and 1930s, namely, outlaw the fascist party? This party now bears a different name: from that it bore under Hitler, but it remains the same mortal enemy of socialism and democracy it was then. It is common knowledge that the NDP "Führers" are now chiefly concerned with helping Strauss, revanchist No. 1, to overthrow the Social-Democratic government. What are the Social-Democrats doing to protect the country from the threat of neo-nazism?

Will they fight the influence of the military-industrial complex—the powerful monopoly forces in the FRG which instigate from behind the scenes the conservative CDU and Strauss' revanchist CSU, the neo-nazi NDP and the "hawk" generals in the Bundeswehr? Will they respond to the demands of millions of West German workers and young people to increase the taxation of the big capitalists? Does Mr. Brandt remember the words he said as far back as the Second World War in his article "Concerning the Postwar Policy of German Socialists", namely: "If we want to break the power of militant monopoly capital, we must place the monopolies and finance companies under public control. The thing is that we must clearly understand that we need a determined break with the traditional policy [of Social-Democracy—*Ernst Henry*] primarily in the

interests of the German people themselves."* Today all sincere Socialists and Communists will agree with these words.

Will the West German Social-Democrats venture—seriously and not merely in words, permanently and not for a period—sincere peaceful cooperation with the German socialist state east of the Elbe? Cooperation on equal terms and without ulterior motives? Will they do all they can to prevent sliding into a world war which they were unable to prevent the last time? Is it not clear that the historical mistakes made by German Right-wing Social-Democracy were due in no small part to the effects of short-sighted and fallacious foreign policy principles?

The map of Europe must no longer be looked at as it was by Ebert, Scheidemann, Noske, Wels and other grave-diggers of the German working-class movement during the prewar decades. Nor can the part of Europe between the Elbe and the Oder be looked on as it was by Schumacher, Ollenhauer and other Bonn Right-wing Socialist leaders during the first two postwar decades.

And, lastly, coming back to the main theme of this work, we have one more important question for the West German Social-Democrats. Will they come forward, within the framework of international Social-Democracy, for the policy of unity of action of the working-class movement or against it? In this most important question will they support the Finnish, French, Chilean, Ceylonese and Swedish Socialists, or those who are striving to perpetuate the split in the working-class movement?

And will they understand that the same ques-

* *Horizont* No. 20, 2. Maiheft, 1970.

tion of unity will inevitably arise in their own country? "We are often asked," said Kurt Bachmann, Chairman of the German Communist Party, at the party's Congress in Düsseldorf in November 1971, "about the attitude of CPG to the government headed by Social-Democrats. As we have said at the beginning, we shall adhere to our position of supporting the government's positive measures aimed at implementing a realistic foreign policy and counterposing the intrigues of nationalistic and reactionary circles. But we shall oppose any government measures which clash with the interests of the working people. . . . The CPG will as before work for joint actions of Communists and Social-Democrats in the struggle for the working people's interests and for the cause of peace."

Wanting to be definite we have asked quite a few questions. We could have asked even more. These questions will have to be answered one way or another and rather soon. But, of course, it is not so much a matter of answering each question separately, as of clarity with regard to its *general* line in the near future. It is necessary to decide on the whole and in a real manner. If its decision to embark on a new path is firm and sincere, it will find answers to these questions anyway and without any outside influence. A correct, as also an incorrect, policy has its own logic and consistency. If, however, German Social-Democracy will, as before, fear socialism, fear its own shadow, even separate changes in its position on any particular question will hardly help it.

We have mentioned six chances the Right-wing Social-Democrats missed in the first half of our century. Now, in the last third of the century this party is taking another big examination.

History has been very generous to German Social-Democracy, although German Social-Democracy itself has not been very considerate of history. Hardly anybody else has ever been granted such concessions; without them it could not have survived. Its members are wondering whether or not it will pass the new examination. Today it has all it needs to pass it satisfactorily and thereby be given a new start in life. The Bundeskanzler of the FRG is a Social-Democrat, the President is a Social-Democrat and 12 of the 15 members of the government are Social-Democrats.

People are waiting. The international working-class movement is waiting. Europe is waiting. Will West German Social-Democracy be called a party of lost chances in the 1970s as well? And, if so, will it ever have another historical chance?

I am not venturing to answer this question. I know one thing, though, and that is that not a single party can squander its basic capital for too long a time. And it seems to me that very many honest Social-Democrats in the FRG ask themselves these days: is it not at last high time to recall the ideals which more than 100 years ago brought about the establishment of their party?

Is it not high time to realise the aim of the existence of the working-class movement and its might?

What next, Comrade Socialists from the FRG?

8. FOR AND AGAINST

The dialogue between Communists and Social-Democrats on unity of action in the working-class movement has been continuing for a fairly long time. This question is a subject of discussion in various countries, on different continents, both in the lower and upper strata of the working-class movement. There is hardly any country in the capitalist world where this question would not attract general attention. Lately, the discussion has been causing an ever more lively and even passionate response. This problem is obviously becoming a most urgent present-day question. In our time, when the monstrous spectrum of thermonuclear war is still looming above the horizon, when the forces of reaction and monopolies are openly preparing for a new general offensive, and even fascism is raising its head in

many parts of the world, the necessity of unity cannot but become clear, sooner or later, to all the Lefts, no matter which party or trend they belong to. One should remember the 1930s, and once again consider the great harm the rift in the Left camp did in the past. It is much more dangerous, however, to repeat the old errors in the 1970s. Nearly all honest and sober-minded people realise this.

That is why the first thing to do is to get a clear idea about the essence of the discussion, to think it over calmly, in a businesslike manner, casting away bitter feelings caused by the past. There is much to talk about. One should reflect on the arguments of both sides, consider the pros and cons, verify how strong their mutual attraction is and how serious the differences hindering unity are; what tilts the balance and where the points of view draw closer together. Is an agreement feasible, or is the dialogue in vain? Are those Social-Democrats who assert that it is impossible or, at any rate, extremely dangerous, to come to an agreement with Communists, right, or are they wrong?

Of course, it would be wrong to give a general answer mechanically to such a question of world importance ignoring specifically national features. The situation in different countries is by no means identical; the economic, social and political conditions in one country frequently differ sharply from those in another. But there is one important factor which we can rely on.

In the sphere of cooperation between Communist and Socialist parties, considerable practical experience has been accumulated in various countries. At present these parties, jointly with other Left organisations, are in power in Chile

and Ceylon, in several big states of India, and until recently have participated in the government of Finland. Communists help Social-Democrats to hold power in Sweden; they collaborate at municipal elections with Socialists in France and Japan; they work side by side with Socialists in a number of district and town municipal bodies in Italy; support the Indian National Congress, which has taken the path of progress; seek an agreement with Socialists and other Lefts in many bourgeois Latin American states; cooperate with Social-Democrats in Luxembourg and in the Swiss city of Geneva. These facts speak for themselves.

The experience accumulated is not enough, however, to lead to any final and undisputable conclusions. History does not solve big and complex problems so promptly, even in our fast-moving time. But some important aspects have already become clearer, and many questions have been answered. The dialogue between Communists and Socialists is continuing, and it deserves attention.

We should note that not all Social-Democrats take the same stand in the dialogue. The difference in their approach to the problem is obvious. There are Social-Democrats who in their arguments on the possibility of joint action with Communists still proceed from the theses of the 1920s and the 1930s, as if nothing has changed in the world since then. Their attitude to the present situation is still determined by their blind, irreconcilable and inexhaustible hatred of Communists, as enemy No. 1. On the other hand, there are Social-Democrats who believe that one should not only look into the past, but first of all consider the present and the future.

Where Communists hold strong positions, Social-Democrats very often adopt a different tone when speaking with them from that which they use when Communists are in a weak position. In countries where reaction is in office or appears to be preparing to seize power, Social-Democrats, apparently under the influence of the popular masses, exchange views with a Left party more willingly than in countries with a "stable" bourgeois democracy, although in this case, too, they do not give up their opinions and continue to debate vigorously. In Latin America and Asia, Social-Democracy is very often less fettered by deep-rooted biases and prejudices than in Western Europe, the traditional stronghold of reformism.

In Western Europe, too, however, Social-Democrats no longer speak a common language. The Finnish Social-Democratic Party, one of the oldest in Europe, which only recently stood on the extreme Right of the Socialist International, today maintains relations with Communists which in no way resemble those of the likewise "classic" Social-Democratic parties in the FRG, Britain or Austria. One is likely to find varying views on unity of action, ranging from categorical "No", to conventional, and even persistent "Yes" among Italian, Belgian, Scandinavian, Japanese, and even French Socialists. On the question of unity, such Left Socialist parties as the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity or the Socialist Party of Chile have long since passed from words to deeds, and we shall not dwell on their position here.

In short, it is impossible to point to a single pattern of the attitude of Socialists to the dialogue with Communists. But if one is to analyse the

reasoning of irreconcilable opponents to Left unity and of extreme Right leaders of international Social-Democracy, one can single out several major arguments.

To begin with, they assert categorically, at times even aggressively, that any cooperation with Communists is impossible on grounds of principle. The contradictions between the two parties of the working-class movement, they say, are so deep and infinite that there can be no question of any cooperation in general: the idea of unity is, in their opinion, a heresy as far as Social-Democrats are concerned.

They declare this straightaway and in such a definite tone, that their tactical aim is immediately clear: they intend to nip in the bud any attempt to start even preliminary talks with Communists.

Here is one example. The document "Social-Democracy and Communism", adopted by the Social-Democratic Party of West Germany (SDP) early in 1971, says:

"The Social-Democratic Party of Germany will never agree to obliterating or glossing over the fundamental differences in the aims, concepts and methods of solving the problems facing the Social-Democrats and the Communists.... No peace-loving policy, no foreign policy, aimed at cooperation, can eliminate this difference in the nature of the two parties, and no policy should try to ignore this.... There can be neither cooperation nor joint action between the SDPG and the CPG, between the SDPG and the SUPG, or between the Socialist German Working Youth and the Union of Free German Youth." This tirade is followed by a warning that Social-

Democrats cooperating with Communists will be expelled from the party.

Even before the final adoption of this document, one of its authors, Helmut Schmidt, Deputy Chairman of the SDPG and Defence Minister of the FRG, asserted in *Vorwärts*:

"It would be a fatal error to believe that the boundaries between free democracy and communist dictatorship may be considered vague.... The spiritual and political confrontation between the Social-Democrats and the Communists cannot disappear even in conditions of peaceful and neighbourly cooperation among the states."

That is what the West German Right Social-Democrats say. As regards any united action by Left-wing forces they say: certainly not, by no means, never. The Social-Democratic world outlook, they say, strictly forbids it.

The Right leaders of Socialist parties in other countries have been making declarations reminiscent of Papal bulls. Bruno Kreisky, head of Austrian Social-Democracy and Prime Minister of Austria, stated in 1970, in his article "Prospects of Social-Democracy in the 1970s", published by the magazine *Die Neue Gesellschaft*: "Social-Democracy will never become an ally of Communist dictatorship." Social-Democracy, he said, is an alternative to communism, with which it is incompatible. An old leader of the Italian Socialist Party, Pietro Nenni, said at the Plenum of the Party Central Committee on November 13, 1970: "The ideological frontier, dividing us [Socialists and Communists—*Ernst Henry*] as long as half a century, is still where it was."

It might also be mentioned that the 11th Congress of the Socialist International, held in June 1969 in Eastbourne, adopted a resolution solemnly

confirming the impossibility of any conciliation with Communists.

How do Communists reply to the assertion that the ideologies of the two parties in the working-class movement are "incompatible"?

Their position is quite clear. Communists by no means consider their cooperation with Socialists to be impossible in principle. They do not believe in "papal bulls" and do not recognise political conservatism.

Communists even do not think of denying that profound ideological differences exist between them and Social-Democrats (although this does not mean that they should not discuss these differences or try to overcome them to some extent). In our day, this is basically true, for otherwise there would have been no split in the working-class movement. Communists remain Marxists, while Right Social-Democrats often renounce Marxism quite openly, and consider their party, as the Godesberg programme of the SDPG formulates, "a community of people of different world outlooks and beliefs".

That is so. However, it is not a question of merging ideologies and programmes of both parties, but of joining together in the day-to-day struggle for the people's vital needs, against monopolies, reaction, and the threat of another world war. Do not the interests of both parties coincide here? We do not speak now about more important problems. Should we substitute stagnated sectarianism for the vital policy necessary for the whole of society?

The fact is that Social-Democrats in many countries have for many years been acting in coalition with purely bourgeois and even Right-wing parties, considering this quite natural for

themselves. The Social-Democratic Party in West Germany today participates in a coalition with the Free Democratic Party, whereas a very short while ago it was in coalition with the outspoken reactionary clerical CDU/CSU. The Italian Socialists and Social-Democrats are in the cabinet, headed by the clerical Christian-Democratic Party. The Socialists of Belgium, Switzerland, Iceland and Israel are in similar blocs and the Socialists of Austria were until recently. Why are agreements with Right-wing parties acceptable for Social-Democrats in principle and with Communists not acceptable? Or maybe Social-Democrats do admit today that their ideological differences with the bourgeoisie have disappeared?

It is difficult to find any logic in such purely dogmatic dispute. Argument No. 1, put forward by Right-wing Social-Democrats against unity of action, is not only patently weak, but runs counter to common sense which Social-Democrats appreciate so highly.

In response to the SDPG's document "Social-Democracy and Communism", the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany stated on February 23, 1971:

"...We are prepared to discuss fundamental differences. The Party Council of the SDPG, however, wants something different. It declares that Social-Democrats and Communists must never act jointly, even on specific matters. So, from the very beginning any discussion is considered impossible and unnecessary. Thus, the division of the working class is raised to the level of principle. But this contradicts any logical argument, any sense of responsibility, and is in conflict with general historical development. We

are aware that many Social-Democrats, trade union leaders and especially young Socialists, like ourselves, hold the view that the verdict of the SDPG Council on "irreconcilability of contradictions between Social-Democrats and Communists" can only favour the exploiting class and will never benefit the working-class movement."

Our aim, the Statement says, "is to cooperate with Social-Democrats everywhere, particularly in industrial enterprises and trade unions, so as to wage war against employers' arbitrary actions and in defence of our common interests, insistently explaining all questions pertaining to the situation in the working-class movement, and new methods of fighting for the sort of progressive democracy which will break down the excessive power of super-concerns because of the growing influence of the workers, their trade unions, and all democrats engaged in production and in all spheres of social life. Only if the working class sets itself tasks which simultaneously pave the way to socialism, will it be able to overcome the past, rebuild the present and conquer the future."

E. Glückauf, member of the CPG Central Committee, wrote in his article "Social-Democracy and Communism", published in the Berlin magazine *Horizont* (No. 8 for 1970):

"We Communists are always prepared to discuss with Social-Democrats everything that has bearing on our fundamental disagreements, honestly, patiently, and in a businesslike manner. On the other hand, it becomes clear that in addition to the above disagreements other differences have also been artificially stimulated to show that never and under no circumstances will any agreement between Communists and Social-Democrats be possible. We, however, are of the

opinion that disagreements should be patiently discussed and expounded... If this is done properly and in a comradely way, far from driving a wedge between us, it will help to mobilise all the forces against reaction, against revanchism and neo-nazism in all their forms."

Commenting on the anti-communist document of the Social-Democratic leadership, the author wrote:

"Once again they draw no lessons from the history of the Weimar period. Our reply is: our attitude should be different! We are in favour of such discussions and such agreements which will help all of us—all West German democrats and all who are on the side of peace—to prevent by our joint efforts a new great danger, which threatens us only from the Right, and to pursue a progressive internal policy, a policy of peaceful coexistence with all other countries."

Reason instead of dogmatism; tolerance and a comradely attitude instead of blind enmity, a businesslike approach instead of phrase-mongering, concrete discussion instead of general talk—this is the basis for a dialogue that the Communists of the FRG offer the Social-Democrats.

The same approach has been taken by Communists of other countries. Differences, however, exist and will continue to exist. Everything points to the necessity of exchanging views, discussing questions, arguing when necessary, and primarily, revealing, in the course of such talks, what unites rather than what disunites the two parties. And there is much that unites them today, and tomorrow there will probably be more. This is the Communists' answer to the first argument of Right Social-Democrats against the unity of Left-wing forces.

The second argument of the Right Socialists has a different approach. It claims that cooperation with Communists is not only incompatible with the ideological views of Social-Democrats, but it is of no political value to them. Strange as it may seem, it is exactly the way some reformist leaders often argue, and not in Britain or the FRG alone.

It points out that Social-Democrats, acting independently and concluding no agreements with Communists, are already occupying leading positions in a number of countries, and that they are rallying around them a considerable number of voters. They, therefore, do not need any alliance with Left-wing forces or cooperation with the Communists. This argument turns the truth upside-down.

It is true that Social-Democrats hold important parliamentary positions in some countries today. But does this mean that they need no help from the Left? Quite the contrary.

Today there are only three countries in the world where the parties associated with the Socialist International enjoy an absolute parliamentary majority: the islands of Madagascar and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, and the small Latin American republic of Costa Rica. In all the other countries of the world Social-Democrats have not got an absolute majority, and in order to achieve victory and have any political power they have to seek the support of other parties. This can easily be checked in a reference book.

The Swedish Social-Democrats had an absolute majority in parliament not so long ago, but in the autumn of 1970 they lost it, as we have mentioned above. There is no need to dwell on the causes of this failure once again. What is of importance

for us is the fact that even the strongest and proudest of all the Social-Democratic parties was forced, in a crucial moment, to realise the practical need of an ally from the Left, i.e., to appeal for help to the Communists. This experience has already been recorded in history.

Should the "Swedish episode" be considered an exception? No. The same situation may arise for Social-Democrats at any time, and even very soon, in a number of countries where their parliamentary forces are more or less equal to those of the Right and Right-Centre parties.

In the FRG, for example, 42.7 per cent of the electorate voted for the Social-Democrats at the last elections, and they remain in power because of the support of the Free Democratic Party which vacillates between the Right and the Left. It is possible that the reactionary CDU/CSU Party, which has at its disposal 46.1 per cent of votes (3.4 per cent more than the Social-Democrats have), may succeed at some time or another in increasing its share of votes by a few per cent, or in coming to terms with the Free Democrats on the re-establishment of the old Right-Centre coalition in Bonn. Of course, we cannot rule out such a turn of events in West Germany in the 1970s. If this happens, help from the Left will become an urgent necessity for the West German Social-Democrats, too, whether or not they realise this today.

In France, the Socialists are backed by 14.5 per cent of the electorate, while Communists by 20 per cent. The Socialists, therefore, can defeat the ruling parties of the Right and come to power only in alliance with Communists and other Left-wing forces. In Italy, the Socialists are supported by 10.4 per cent of the electorate, Right Social-

Democrats by 7 per cent, and Communists and Left Socialists together by 31.1 per cent; the situation here is approximately the same as in France. In Norway, Socialists poll 46.7 per cent of the votes; in Denmark, 34.2; in Austria, 47.9; in Belgium, 28; in Holland, 23.6; in Switzerland, 23.5; in Japan (the two Socialist parties together), 39.1; in Australia, 47; and in New Zealand, 44.3 per cent.

In other words, there is no country in the world where Socialists can achieve power, relying on their own parliamentary forces alone. It is, of course, impossible to predict to what extent electoral statistics will change in any of these countries in the next few years. However, it is quite possible that events may go against Social-Democracy in one country or another.

The argument that Social-Democrats need no alliance with the Left-wing forces does not hold water. It is simply a lie. This argument has no connection with reality. The fact is that the situation in many major capitalist countries is quite the opposite.

The third argument put forward by the Right Social-Democrats against unity seems more substantial at first glance. Their leaders usually assert with indignation that Communists apparently plan to use alliances with Left-wing forces for imposing the "hegemony" of the Communist party on its allies and even absorbing them.

"When Communists do their utmost to achieve unity of action with Social-Democratic parties," reads the resolution of the 11th Congress of the Socialist International, held in June 1969, "their ultimate aim is always to establish the hegemony of the Communist party and secure its one-party

domination. The purpose of a communist-type popular front is to take advantage of the democratic forces participating in it and to demolish them as independent organisations."

Assertions of this kind are reiterated by the Right-wing Social-Democrats every day. Their press overflows with them. But this argument, too, far from being corroborated by reality, is groundless and even essentially dishonest.

Concepts must not be confused. It is one thing to try to be in the vanguard of the working-class and Left-wing movement, and quite another thing to attempt to set up the hegemony or dictatorship of one party over another. A party can achieve the role of being the vanguard only by the force of its convictions, the clarity of its programme, the farsightedness of its policy, the determination of its members and their readiness to sacrifice themselves. Communists do not in the least deny that they are striving for that. They do not renounce the idea of the guiding role of Marxist-Leninist parties. That is their right. They will do their best to win the confidence of the masses in this natural way, but not by imposing their will on their allies by force.

What prevents other Left-wing parties from striving for the same aims, and competing with Communists within the framework of the Left blocs? This is their legitimate right. Anyone can be in the vanguard of a social movement if he wants to and is fit for it. The leading role in politics is not a position which a party reaches by agreement, it is something that is won through popular support in the course of democratic elections.

As for the alleged "plans" to set up a one-party dictatorship with the aid of Left-wing blocs, this

is an invention which has been utterly refuted in a number of countries.

In Finland, a government of united Left parties and the Centre was in office up to the spring of 1970. It consisted of five Social-Democrats, three members of the Finnish People's Democratic League (Communists and Left Social-Democrats) and seven representatives of other parties. The government was headed by the leader of the bourgeois Centre Party. Still earlier, prior to April 1970, the Finnish government, which also included Communists, was headed by a Social-Democrat. No one in Finland has yet dared to assert that Communists have ever tried to force their will on the government of that country. When their motion on price control was rejected in 1971, they quietly gave up their posts in the cabinet.

In Ceylon, after the victory of the People's United Front, a government came to power, consisting of 21 ministers (including only one Communist). It is headed by the leader of the Left-wing bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom Party. In Chile since the Popular Unity Bloc took over, President and four ministers have been Socialists, three ministers—Communists, there have been three ministers from the Radical Party, associated with the Socialist International, and five ministers represent other parties. In none of these governments have Communists had a majority.

These are the facts. Whenever Communists participate in Left-wing blocs, they never demand priority for themselves, and are satisfied with the position corresponding to their numerical strength. The multi-party principle in the Left governments is observed everywhere. When such a

coalition government fails at the election, as was the case in Finland in March 1970, it resigns, in accordance with the Constitution, and comes back to power only if the new Left bloc has an absolute majority in the newly elected parliament. The assertion contained in the resolution of the 11th Congress of the Socialist International has not been confirmed in any country.

The Chilean Radical Party stands to the Right of the Socialist Party, headed by Salvador Allende, and adheres to the Socialist International. When insinuations about the "dictatorial plans" of the Chilean Communists began to spread in the West, Carlos Parra, a representative of the Chilean Radical Party in the Socialist International Bureau, published an article in the London organ of the Socialist International, obviously in response to the suspicions of his colleagues in the Socialist International Bureau. He cited the first clause of the Chilean Popular Unity Bloc's programme:

"The victory of the Left forces will not be the electoral success of only one candidate [to the post of President—*Ernst Henry*]. It should usher in the most democratic regime in Chilean history. The new state will guarantee the full exercise of democratic rights, and the people will become a really decisive force. The government will be made up of many parties, and it will respect the rights of the opposition so long as they are exercised within the framework of the law."^{*}

This programme is being carried out today in Chile in spite of frenzied intrigues and provocation from the reactionaries. The victory of the united Left forces in this country benefits the

* *S.I.I.*, August 1970.

whole of the Left wing, and not just the Communists or any single party. That is why it is only natural that the Left-wing parties in certain other Latin American countries, such as Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, express their desire to follow Chile's example today.

We do not speak here about some sort of special phenomenon, peculiar to Latin America. The democratic principles of the Chilean Popular Unity Bloc are fully applicable to Western Europe. In July 1968, Waldeck Rochet, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, said at the CC Plenum:

"With regard to France's transition to socialism, our 18th Congress adopted new resolutions which draw on the experience of the international working-class movement and are designed to provide for a special French way of passing over to socialism, with many parties existing in conditions of socialist democracy."

Pointing out that the French Communists are striving to draw the Socialist Party, the United Socialist Party, the Convention of Republican Institutions and the Radical Party into an alliance of workers' and democratic forces, Georges Marchais, Deputy General Secretary of the French Communist Party, said at the 19th Congress of the FCP on February 4, 1970: "Indeed, we have no intention of closing the door to any organisation wishing to enter the indispensable union of democratic forces.... We stand for unity of action and cooperation with all organisations, prepared to carry on a real struggle against monopoly power and for the working people's interests, for democracy, peace and socialism."

Georges Marchais stressed that the struggle for unity is a "patient and stubborn struggle which

has to be conducted without sectarian narrow-mindedness and opportunist deviations; it is a struggle for imbuing the masses with a striving for unity and turning it into an invincible force". At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party on October 17, 1970, he emphasised once again: "Advocating a unity of the Left forces, the French Communist Party is working to establish an alliance that would unite partners who have equal rights and duties derived from the commitments they have undertaken. It does not claim a dominant role in such an alliance. The participants in this alliance should work out a joint political programme."

The Italian Communist Party is guided by the same principles in its cooperation with the Italian Socialist Party and the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity in district and city juntas. We could cite other examples, but the matter is perfectly clear. The aim of Communists in setting up alliances of the Left forces is not a one-party dictatorship, but a partnership "with equal rights and duties". Their programme is not a hegemony, but socialist democracy. The third argument of Right-wing Social-Democrats against unity does not stand up to criticism.

Sometimes, Right-wing Social-Democrats put forward an argument that cooperation with Communists is dangerous, because it threatens to involve Social-Democrats into reckless adventures—political plots, civil war, foreign policy complications and so on. They cite no facts to prove this thesis; and this is only natural, for the facts prove the opposite.

No plots or acts of violence have been committed by the Left-wing alliances in a single country

where Social-Democrats cooperate with Communists. There have been attempts to stage a coup in these countries, but only by the other side, i.e., on the initiative of reactionaries, who, infuriated by the Left majority's lawful rise to power, try to foil social and economic changes by means of violence.

When the people are in power there is no need for plots. On the contrary, they are interested in maintaining law and order, so as to carry out necessary reforms as painlessly as possible. Communists stand for democratic order, they are opposed to adventurists. Lenin wrote many years ago: "Replying to the anarchists' objections that we are putting off the socialist revolution, we say: we are not putting it off, but are taking the first step towards it in the only possible way, along the only correct path, namely, the path of a democratic republic. Whoever wants to reach socialism by any other path than that of political democracy, will inevitably arrive at conclusions that are absurd and reactionary both in the economic and the political sense."^{*}

The international position of the countries, where Communists cooperate or cooperated with other Left parties in the government, far from having deteriorated, has been considerably strengthened. Finland, Chile and Ceylon may serve as examples. The internal progressive changes in these countries have consolidated their independence.

Communists want no adventures, but are we certain that there are no adventurers among the opponents of unity? It is worth-while in this context to refer to the past, which very often makes

^{*} V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 29.

many things much clearer. Is it not true that the unwillingness of the German Social-Democrats in the years of the Weimar Republic to set up a united front with the Communists proved ultimately to be the most terrible adventure in their history? Did not the discord in the German working-class movement at the time facilitate, as probably nothing else could have, the victory of nazis? And has the threat of a fascist or some other reactionary dictatorship been removed today from the agenda everywhere? Sometimes, there are political adventurers hidden among those who are trying to detect such adventurers. It is impossible to demand that Communists should renounce the policy which they have never thought of pursuing.

Another demand that may be mentioned in passing, is propounded particularly frequently by the opponents of unity in connection with the dialogue with Communists. Right-wing Social-Democrats declare that only if the Communists in the Western countries took up anti-Soviet attitudes or, at least, "disassociated" themselves from the CPSU, would it be possible to cooperate with them.

One can clearly see the purpose of this demand, which has nothing to do with the struggle of the working-class movement against monopolies, reaction and the threat of war. It is to frustrate this cooperation at all costs. Characteristically enough the real authors of this thesis are very often Social-Democrats, who belong to no party, i.e., former leaders of reformist organisations in socialist countries, who had fled abroad. These people represent nobody, but do much harm to the cause of Left-wing unity wherever and however they can.

Speaking at the 11th Congress of the Socialist International, one of these political corpses, Anna Kethly, demanded that world Social-Democracy should not recognise the existing state of affairs in Europe and that the socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe should be incorporated into a "European federation", i.e., that Social-Democrats should side with the most aggressive, bellicose anti-Soviet forces! In that case, how could they cooperate with Communists? Everyone knows that nowhere in the world will Communists break with the country of the October Revolution, which has made, and continues to make, a decisive contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle. A Communist cannot be anti-Soviet. Contacts with the Soviet Union are, indeed, important for Social-Democracy itself.

One has to be a realist. To want Communists to adopt anti-Soviet attitudes means virtually to rule out any possibility of serious talks on co-operation. But this dialogue must be serious and honest. No one is interested in idle talk.

That is the way Right-wing Social-Democrats speak when the question of the Left forces' unity arises. They do not want unity.

We have discussed here only the most current of their arguments, but there are many others. They vary them, according to the situation in any given country. But from the point of view of the common interests of the working-class movement, none of these arguments can be considered cogent.

This apparently is recognised by many leaders of Social-Democracy, not to speak of its lower ranks. They oppose the termination of the dialogue. At a seminar of the Socialist International on the relations between Socialists and Commu-

nists, held in Vienna in December 1970, Giuseppe Tamburrano, member of the CC of the Italian Socialist Party, said: "We can say that the dialogue between Communists and Socialists cannot be considered as over; on the contrary, it is just beginning." Speaking in Toulouse on November 27, 1971, Deputy General Secretary of the French Communist Party Georges Marchais emphasised that this party does not lay claim to a leading position in an alliance of Left-wing forces. He said: "Ours is not a programme which should be either accepted or rejected. But there are conceptions which are unacceptable for us. We shall not participate in a government to manage the affairs of the bourgeoisie. We want to occupy our place in a government which would carry through far-reaching social, economic and political reforms paving the way for socialism precisely within this framework. Only in that way can we conduct negotiations." Indicating the difficulties in the way to the establishment of an alliance of Left-wing forces, Georges Marchais expressed confidence that they would be surmounted.

There is no doubt that further talks in these or those countries will lead to new contacts. Old prejudices will be discarded, and difficulties that seemed insurmountable will be overcome. It is significant that young Socialists, trade union activists and intellectuals are most resolute champions of unity in the ranks of Social-Democratic parties. The dialogue continues, and this alone is good enough. It is clear to every thinking person how much mankind can benefit from the mutual understanding between Communists and Socialists in the last third of the century. Indeed, there are reasons for believing that this is the major issue of our time.

Neither Social-Democrats nor Communists should approach the question dogmatically; nor should they be influenced in the dialogue by bitter memories of past experiences; they should look forward. History, and especially contemporary history, is progressing so rapidly that it does not allow the honest leaders of the working-class movement to live and shape policy from retrospective positions. What lies ahead is much too important and much too new to make the past the sole criterion for the present and for the future.

The Main Document of the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties says: "Communists, who attribute decisive importance to working-class unity, are in favour of cooperation with the Socialists and Social-Democrats to establish an advanced democratic regime today and to build a socialist society in the future. They will do everything they can to carry out this cooperation."

That is how Communists approach the question in our day.

9. TWO ROADS

The thought which this book hopes to convey is a very simple one: unity of action of the working-class movement benefits *all* its participants, whether Socialists or Communists. We have attempted to prove this by citing reasons and drawing on facts from various countries. Who, then, is opposed to unity, and why?

It is essential to ascertain where in the international Social-Democratic movement lies the source of resistance to this course, a course which is proving its effectiveness in practice.

The greater the urge of the Social-Democrats for unity the greater becomes their resistance to unity. All those who are acquainted with the matter know this. Clearly there are forces, and by no means of secondary importance, within the Social-Democratic movement, which are prepared to go to any lengths to impede cooperation with the Communists. They care neither for princi-

pled and businesslike arguments, nor for the opinions and sentiments of the rank-and-file members. They oppose unity under all and any circumstances. The forces in question constitute the extreme Right wing of the Social-Democratic movement.

We have repeatedly mentioned them in this book. Every Social-Democratic party has influential groups that have become welded to hundred per cent anti-communist positions from which they are unable to budge, and are only capable of moving still further to the Right. As a rule, they are diehard veterans of the reformist bureaucracy, people, who, in effect, have long since defected to the side of an alien class, for Social-Democratic politicians and officials have much closer links with capital than with the people. And some younger ones adhere to exactly the same positions. But let us examine our question on a world scale. Can we assert that the hundred per cent anti-communist camp within the Socialist International is at present chiefly associated with particular Social-Democratic groups or parties?

Yes, we can. There are extreme Right-wing parties in the Socialist International which are unwilling to relinquish their positions under any circumstances. First and foremost, they are either parties that had broken away from the main Social-Democratic organisations in their respective countries and had swerved sharply to the Right, or "mythical" parties which have no members other than a handful of emigrants, but which, nevertheless, have considerable influence in the London Bureau of the Socialist International.

This International includes so-called Social-Democratic or Socialist parties of Poland, Bul-

garia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. These parties have in effect ceased to exist. All that has remained of them are their former leaders who had fled to the West from the socialist countries where they are no longer remembered. Nevertheless, these people attend all congresses and meetings of the Socialist International at which they deliver blustering anti-communist tirades and do their best to confound any step towards the unity of the working-class movement. Some of them are special advisers to prominent Right-wing functionaries of the international Social-Democracy. Can it be expected that these people will change their views one day and speak up for unity? Of course not. They are political corpses and consequently are absolutely unconcerned with the demands of the times.

Here is a case in point. Anna Kethly, a Social-Democrat who had fled from Hungary in 1956, addressing the 11th Congress of the Socialist International in the summer of 1969 as a representative of one of the dead Social-Democratic parties, demanded that the Social-Democrats should under no circumstances become reconciled to the European *status quo* and should not confirm it in international treaties. In other words, the West must not cease the cold war, the FRG must not come to an agreement with the Soviet Union and the USA must not discontinue its conspiracies and subversive activity directed at the socialist countries. She added that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe must be regarded as "belonging to a United Europe",* that is, to a West European "federation", which anti-Soviet forces hope

* S.I.I., October 4, 1969, p. 208.

to establish. Kethly and her associates are fully aware that such an attempt to revise the European map would lead to a third world war. What do people who advocate such a policy in our nuclear era have in common with socialism? Yet they are among the policy-makers of the Right wing of the Socialist International.

Other political corpses adhere to almost identical positions. They are the chiefs of the extreme Right-wing Social-Democratic parties of Asia—the Socialist Party of Indonesia, the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the People's Socialist Party (Aden) and some other organisations—which, in effect, no longer exist. We have witnessed how they had discredited themselves in the eyes of their people, and had been swept off the political scene. But they, or rather their chiefs, want to live even if they are dead, and recognise only one policy: extreme, rabid anti-communism. More than anything else they fear the idea of unity. And it is only natural that we should find the Israeli Social-Democrats among them. Their party continues to rule the country putting its future at stake. This party exists. But is it possible that a party which has placed itself at the service of US imperialism would be inclined to support the unity of the world's Left-wing forces?

This camp in the Socialist International also includes Right-wing Social-Democratic organisations which had broken away from the old Social-Democratic parties considering that even the latter's positions were much too Leftist for their liking. Such are the Social-Democratic (former Unitary) Party of Italy and the Democratic Socialist Party in Japan. Both are continuing their vicious fight against the main Social-Democratic

parties in their countries. Both, nevertheless, are still in the Socialist International, and both, naturally, are vigorously opposed to united actions of the working-class movement.

It should not be surprising, therefore, that all these parties, dead and half-dead, blind and half-blind, keep on pushing the reformist leaders of international Social-Democracy further and further to the Right. Needless to say, it is not the Hungarian, Indonesian or Israeli Social-Democrats who dominate its Right wing and map out its policy. This is done by the leaders of the bigger and more influential Social-Democratic parties which have long since occupied leading positions in the Socialist International.

Its Right wing is still lending a very attentive ear to the successors of "Austrian Marxism", that is, to the leaders of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. In recent years the organisational guidance of the London International has been turned over to them. But to this day they are playing the role of hereditary theoreticians of reformism and that alone is enough to prevent them from relinquishing their positions. It was not by chance that their chief postwar ideologist was Benedikt Kautsky, son of the patriarch of reformism Karl Kautsky, who advocated the growing of socialism into capitalism and capitalism into socialism. Adhering to such positions it is difficult to shake off the past and perceive the new in the working-class movement. Half a century has passed since Otto Bauer and other theoreticians of "Austrian Marxism" sought to substantiate the differences between the Social-Democrats and Communists. Their followers failed to turn Austria into a reformist country; they even failed to achieve what the Swedish Social-Democrats had managed to

achieve. Austria is still a land of monopoly capitalism and during the past half a century has been almost invariably ruled either by clericals or by fascists. Yet to this day the decrepit Austrian reformism is pushing the international Social-Democracy backward.

It is common knowledge that the majority of the present leaders of the Social-Democratic parties in the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain still entertain the old reformist views and sentiments. Fear of communism colours their mentality and their policy and at the same time they have become fully adapted to capitalism. The members of these parties are perceptibly moving to the Left and are expecting at least a partial overhaul of party policy. Nevertheless, Social-Democracy in Britain and West Germany in the seventies remains on the same flank as Austrian Social-Democracy on the chief issues of the working-class movement. It can be said that these three parties are in full control of the Socialist International. And it should not be overlooked that they are the same parties whose present leaders bear a large share of the blame for fascism's successful advance in the first three and a half decades of the 20th century. Today the direct successors of the leaders of those years are taking upon themselves the responsibility for sustaining Social-Democracy's alliance with US imperialism and the big bourgeoisie in individual countries.

Others that should also be included in the Right-wing or Right-Centrist group are the former leader of the Italian Socialist Party Pietro Nenni (now Vice-President of the Socialist International) notorious for his pathological hatred for Communists, and some of the leaders of the

Belgian, Dutch and Swiss Socialists. For many years now they have had firm reciprocal bonds with bourgeois, particularly clerical, parties with whom they always cooperate in coalition governments. The idea of *Left-wing* coalition governments throws them into panic and fright. If we take all these parties and groups together we shall see that in spite of the fresh winds that are blowing in many Social-Democratic parties, the influence of the Right-wing elements in the Social-Democratic camp should as yet by no means be underestimated.

The world has lived through a historical period singular for its dynamism and upheavals. But it appears that at least the Right-wing Social-Democrats have been oblivious to everything. They have learned practically nothing and there is practically nothing that they would like to learn. As was the case several decades ago when Hitler was standing at the gates of Europe, anti-communism outweighs and dominates all their thoughts and aspirations. They close their eyes to the prewar and postwar experience of millions of ordinary Social-Democrats, and are prepared to look in any direction but not ahead. For the Social-Democratic parties the principle of "rise and fall, rise and fall" is still inviolable and the idea of eternal capitalism (under the guise of "neo-capitalism") is still immutable. The working-class movement can no longer count on these functionaries, many of whom are closely bound to the monopoly bourgeoisie not only by political but also financial ties. Without looking into the future, the extreme Right-wing reformists are living in the past and they are destined to vanish into the past as did the Russian Mensheviks in their time.

So far, however, they do not intend to relinquish their positions. In January 1967, the leaders of the European Social-Democratic parties met in Rome to discuss relations between Socialists and Communists. Although they gathered behind closed doors, it came to light that the President of the Socialist International Bruno Pittermann of Austria opposed any contacts with Communists.* Some time earlier Albert Carthy, Secretary of the Socialist International, member of the British Labour Party, declared that any Socialist party which came into contact with Communists could be expelled from the International. The Labour Party of Malaya was expelled on these grounds. In August 1968, after the Czechoslovak events, these circles passed an anti-Soviet resolution at a meeting of the General Council of the Socialist International.

In June 1969, the 11th Congress of the London International spoke in favour of "European integration", that is, the formation of a capitalist "super-state" in Western Europe, and reaffirmed the anti-communist resolutions passed at the congresses of the International in 1951, when the cold war was at its height, and in 1962. It accused the Communists of proposing cooperation with the Social-Democrats with a view to establishing their "hegemony" over them and securing their "one-party domination". Though the experience of the Left-wing governments in Finland (and the experience of similar governments in Ceylon, Chile and Kerala) completely refutes this allegation, the Congress passed a resolution which said: "The purpose of the Communist type of popular front is to exploit the participation of democratic

* *Le Monde*, January 7, 1967, p. 3.

forces in order to eliminate them as independent bodies."** This is an obvious, established falsehood. Anyone who reads the newspapers can see that this is so but that did not prevent the Right-wing Social-Democrats from pushing their resolution through.

They do not desire to promote the unity of the working-class movement, and thus bring it closer to power and to socialism. But have they an alternative programme? What is the true goal international Right-wing Social-Democracy today is seeking to attain?

This is not an easy question. There is no general Social-Democratic programme. The following formula was adopted at the Congress of the Socialist International in June 1969: Socialists "want to complement political democracy by new forms of economic and industrial democracy, with a view to attaining social democracy".**

A beautiful phrase in which the word "democracy" occurs three times. But what does it really mean?

What does "social democracy" mean in this context? Are Right-wing Social-Democrats striving to eliminate the capitalist system as the founders of their parties had striven to in their time? If that is so, then why is nothing said about it?

Are they contemplating the creation of a classless society, which all Socialists had dreamed of creating from the inception of their movement and for which millions of the foremost Socialists had fought and died? There is not a word about this either.

Is it or is it not their intention to put an end

* *S.I.I.*, July 26, 1969, p. 148.

** *Ibid.*

to the monopolies, military-industrial complexes, and imperialism? If we disregard the words and phrases we shall be unable to say precisely what type of society they wish to build and when—in this century, or in the next, or perhaps at some indefinite time.

Nothing is clear. Actually they can answer this question as they think fit, depending on what they want to say and who does the answering. Sleek formulas and vague phrases, however, cannot lead the socialist movement forward in our critical era. They can only be employed to make it mark time for another 50 years. Yet history will no longer wait for the Right-wing Social-Democrats for such a long period.

Among Right-wing Social-Democrats there are more outspoken people than those who had drafted the resolution of the Socialist International in June 1969. They conceal neither their thoughts nor their objectives. Some of them unequivocally call upon Social-Democracy to shift irrevocably to the Right and thus create an unbridgeable chasm between the Social-Democrats and the Communists. With this end in view they advocate a final and open break with socialism. "In many countries," declared the West German Social-Democrat Günter Bartsch, "Socialists have already decisively contributed to the democratisation of the state and society and have proved how unnecessary the 'new society', that is, socialism, is."^{*} This refers to a society where the first place is occupied by monopoly capital, the second, by revenge-seeking militarism, and the third is shared by the clericals and Social-Democrats. It is impossible to move further to the Right.

^{*} *Geist und Tat*, No. 11/12, 1966, S. 362.

When the Social-Democratic Party of the FRG adopted its new programme a dozen or so years ago at its Congress in Bad Godesberg, Ulrich Lohmar, one of its theoreticians, wrote that the Social-Democrats had deposited Marxism as a philosophical, economic and social doctrine into their historical archives. At the time the influential *Washington Post* wrote that West German Social-Democracy had ceased to be socialist in the true sense of the word. Such, in fact, is the ideological visage of the extreme Right-wing reformists today, too.

There is every indication that this wing of the international Social-Democratic movement will oppose working-class unity to the very last. But whether it will succeed is another matter.

Time is working against the Right-wing Social-Democrats. By blocking cooperation between Socialists and Communists, the need for which is dictated by history itself, these forces are unwillingly accelerating the process of polarisation within the Social-Democratic movement. They are encountering opposition from the trade unions, the youth and the intelligentsia, which are precisely those three social groups on which Social-Democracy had built and is building its political power and without which it can have no future. None of these groups can reconcile itself to the threat of another war, to the imperialist intrigues, to the economic injustice and to the programme of Right-wing Social-Democracy itself. In effect this programme gives nothing to a modern progressive individual. It is vague and contradictory; discourses about "political", "economic", "industrial" and "social" democracy are incom-

patible with the capitalist system which the Social-Democrats continue to support. Finally, and that is most important, it has no prospects. A party which sees no future is incapable of leading people.

That is why in a number of countries, including Britain and the FRG, the trade unions are ever more frequently entering into open conflict with the Right-wing Social-Democratic leadership. And one must not forget that the trade unions in Britain number nine million members and those in the FRG—six million. That is why young people in some countries are threatening a mass exodus from the Social-Democratic parties, and the socialist intelligentsia, disregarding all bans, is seeking contacts with Left-wing functionaries and movements. In West Germany, for example, in 1971, young Socialists, while insisting on their right to make a decisive turn to the Left and refusing to follow the anti-communist path, "mutinied" against the Right-wing Social-Democratic leadership.

But there is another factor that has to be taken into account. In some Social-Democratic parties, besides the Right-wingers, there are still many irresolute, vacillating people, including workers, who do not know what positions to adhere to, or which way to follow. The Social-Democratic movement has always abounded in such people and today too the Right-wingers are turning this to their advantage. Could it be that only another imperialist explosion, which would bring mankind to disaster, would make the irresolute Social-Democrats open their eyes and see where they are being led?

In the eyes of the modern world the Social-Democratic movement is reassessing its values much

too slowly. This movement, which was never given to acting with speed and resolve, is developing at a much faster rate now than it did before the war. There is no denying that the majority of Social-Democrats have learned a great deal in the past 50 years, particularly in the past quarter century. It would be wrong to think that the storms which have raged in the world have not left their mark on the Social-Democratic parties. Above all, this applies to the trade unions, young people and the intelligentsia, the three basic contingents of the modern Social-Democratic movement we have already mentioned above. Neither of these contingents wants a repetition of the performance which the reformists had staged in the first half of the century. And it is these forces that in the final count determine the destiny of Social-Democratic parties in all countries. It is necessary to realise that not only the world has changed; people, including Social-Democrats, are changing, too.

There is another important circumstance. The Social-Democrats, who are willing to cooperate, have of late received greater understanding on the part of the Communists than ever before. The conditions for this cooperation have become much more favourable since the second half of the fifties. In his speech "Fifty years of Great Achievements of Socialism" Leonid Brezhnev said: "For the working class division of its ranks has been, and remains, the main stumbling block on the road to victory. But the experience accumulated by the working-class movement shows that unity is a vital necessity. This experience proves that differences in views between Socialists and Communists must not be an obstacle to uniting the ranks of the working class against

the monopolies, against the war danger, and in the struggle for socialism.”*

The following observation was made in *Veliky Oktyabr i mirovoi revolyutsionny protsess* (*The Great October Revolution and the World Revolutionary Process*), a book published by the Moscow Institute of the International Working-Class Movement in 1967:

“...the Communists take into account the historical roots of Social-Democracy and the place it occupies in society. One must not forget that Social-Democratic parties lead a definite section of the working people and consequently cannot be unconditionally identified with bourgeois parties. The Communist parties bear in mind that the Social-Democratic movement has definite achievements to its credit, chiefly in the struggle for the working people’s economic and political rights.

“Any manifestations of sectarianism are detrimental to the communist movement...”

*“Being the most consistent fighters for democracy, the Communists are naturally moved into first place in the serried ranks of the democratic forces. Yet it should be noted that Marxists-Leninists cannot imagine a victorious democratic movement without comradely, fraternal relations between its participants. To promote working-class unity it is essential to take into account the entire range of interests of its various strata, traditions of different political trends and to respect the views of class brothers.”***

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin’s Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 45.

** *The Great October Revolution and the World Revolutionary Process*, Moscow, 1967, p. 280 (in Russian).

In the middle of May 1968 talks were held in Moscow between a delegation of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party led by its chairman Rafael Paasio and a CPSU delegation led by Leonid Brezhnev. In a joint statement published on May 21, 1968, the two sides noted: “The delegations of both Parties were pleased to note that contacts and frank discussions between various trends are developing in the international working-class movement and hope that these would continue since they are conducive to united actions in defence of peace, against the danger of a world war, and in support of social progress... Opinions were exchanged on the possibilities and prospects of cooperation between Communist and Social-Democratic parties both on an international and national scale. It was also noted that in conditions of international tension, when the unification of the efforts of all peace-loving nations, political parties and social organisations in the fight against the danger of a world thermonuclear war acquires special importance, unity of action within the international working-class movement would, despite ideological differences, have a positive effect.”*

All these documents contain one and the same thought: differences about the ways and methods of fighting for socialism should not stand in the way of unity.

In recent years the mobilisation of anti-Soviet forces in capitalist countries following the events in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, has raised fresh obstacles to a rapprochement between Communists and Socialists. Right-wingers in the reformist parties have intensified their activity

* *Pravda*, May 21, 1968.

and resumed their attacks on the Communists all along the line. Extreme Right-wing Social-Democrats in Italy, Britain, the FRG, Austria and other countries have raised their heads and reverted to the phraseology typical of the late forties and early fifties. But does this mean that it is necessary to discard the idea of working-class unity and to turn back, as these people insist?

A person who remembers the past but looks ahead will unhesitatingly say, "No". One cannot agree that there is not nor will there be any way out of the existing difficulties. Too much is at stake today for the working-class movement and the whole of mankind.

Lack of unity in the thirties prevented the European working class from dealing with fascism and averting the Second World War. Today Communists and Socialists *cannot* afford to repeat the old mistakes. Any participant in the working-class movement is obliged to take into account the state of the world today, and first and foremost, the very real threat of a third world war. This threat is neither imaginary nor exaggerated. To be more exact, its significance has yet not been grasped fully enough. The truth is that never in the history of the working-class movement has there been such an imperative need for unity as there is today.

Whatever the differences over specific issues, and they, of course, continue to exist, it is obvious that they recede into the background in the light of the danger of a global thermonuclear catastrophe. No less obvious is the fact that this catastrophe can be averted if Communists and Socialists throughout the world, and above all in Europe, will unite over the major issues.

No champion of socialism, whether from among the rank-and-file or the top leaders, should forget this or confine himself to mere words or hopes that things will turn for the better. It is necessary to act before it is too late. The main obstacle to unity is still the anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes of Right-wing Social-Democracy. But Communists are aware that Social-Democrats, or at least their vast majority, are not to be identified with social-democratism. Despite their reformist illusions, true Social-Democratic workers are regarded by the Communists as their class brothers, and Social-Democrats must bear in mind that not a single crucial problem of the contemporary world can be solved without Communist participation.

Dealing with the question of mutual relations between Communists and Social-Democrats, General Secretary of the CC CPSU Leonid Brezhnev said in his address to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969:

"It cannot be said that the consistent communist policy of promoting the unity of the working-class movement has been fruitless. The differentiation in the Social-Democratic movement is now more pronounced, and a certain section of it, including a few leading personalities, is departing from anti-communist positions. The ties between trade unions of different orientation in separate countries and on an international scale have been activated. Instances when agreement and united action have been achieved by trade union centres of different orientation are now more numerous. Recent events in many capitalist countries have shown how deeply the masses desire unity in their practical struggle against the monopolies and

their governments. However, this sound trend is running into stubborn resistance from many Social-Democratic leaders.

"The leadership of a considerable number of Social-Democratic parties, especially those prominent in the Socialist International, still consider fighting communism, fighting the socialist countries, their main task. We are aware that for some of them anti-communism is a way of disguising the failure of their own reformist policy, and for others a total renunciation of socialist aims and surrender to state-monopoly capitalism....

"That is why we avail ourselves of this forum to again remind the Social-Democratic leaders at this grave hour for the world that they and their anti-communism are responsible for the fact that the possibilities of the present-day working class in the fight against imperialism are not fully used!

"Our stand in relation to Social-Democracy could not be clearer. We are combating and shall continue to combat our ideological and political opponents in its ranks from the principled positions of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, we agree to cooperation, to joint action, with those genuinely prepared to fight imperialism, for peace, for the interests of the working people. There are vital issues in regard to which the need for unity of action by working-class parties, including those responsible for the policy of their countries, is now particularly timely. Above all, this concerns questions related to averting a world war, building up a system of European security and combating the threat of fascism."*

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, pp. 164-65.*

Two years later, on March 30, 1971, Leonid Brezhnev told the 24th Congress of the CPSU:

"In accordance with the line laid down by the 1969 International Meeting, the CPSU is prepared to develop cooperation with the Social-Democrats both in the struggle for peace and democracy, and in the struggle for socialism, without, of course, making any concessions in ideology and revolutionary principles. However, this line of the Communists has been meeting with stubborn resistance from the Right-wing leaders of the Social-Democrats. Our Party has carried on and will continue to carry on an implacable struggle against any attitudes which tend to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of monopoly capital, and to undermine the cause of the working people's struggle for peace, democracy and socialism."

In his speech on May 14, 1971, at the anniversary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, Leonid Brezhnev returned to the problem of the possibility of cooperation with the Social-Democrats:

"Working for international security and peace, against the aggressive encroachments on the independence and legitimate rights of nations, we are prepared to cooperate with all organisations and parties who are genuinely striving towards the same objectives. In particular, at the Congress we reiterated our positive attitude concerning the possibility of joint actions with the Social-Democratic parties on the international scene."

Touching upon the session of the Council of the Socialist International scheduled for the end of May 1971 in Helsinki at which it was to discuss

European security, the Middle East and Indochina, Leonid Brezhnev noted:

"These are acute problems whose just solution would largely determine the entire international situation. And the approach of the participants in the session to these problems will show whether they intend to take practical steps to reduce international tension and consolidate peace.

"The interests of the working-class movement, the interests of world peace demand that those who will be taking decisions in Helsinki will not forget the monstrous crimes of the imperialist aggressors in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and on the seized territories of Arab countries. The interests of European security demand that they will not forget the will of their own nations who want to see the elimination of the consequences of the cold war and the speediest creation of an atmosphere of cooperation and good-neighbourliness in Europe. Otherwise the participants in the session will merely confirm that their 'International' still heeds the architects of NATO policy rather than the voice of the masses."

What actually took place at the session of the Council of the Socialist International confirmed that there are heterogeneous forces which are in collision with one another at all levels of modern Social-Democracy. The Right-wing leaders have redoubled their efforts to undermine the unity of action of the working-class movement even in such a clear-cut issue as the struggle for peace. They managed to have the session introduce all sorts of amendments and vague phrases of the usual reformist type into its resolutions on crucial international policy issues.

At the same time another thing came to light. This time the Right-wing leaders encountered

serious opposition from the Finnish and Swedish Social-Democrats, representatives of two of the most influential parties of the Socialist International, and what is most important, two Social-Democratic parties with some experience of cooperating with the Communists. Väinö Leskinen, a prominent Finnish Social-Democrat, declared: "We have proposed to establish contact with the leading parties of the East European socialist countries." On some issues the Right-wing leaders failed to come to an agreement also with representatives of the French and Canadian Socialists.

It has to be stated that international Social-Democracy is still guided by reformists of the old anti-communist school. This is true at least of the West European Social-Democratic parties. They are barring the way to unity and will keep up their efforts until their way is barred by members of their own parties.

Communists know how to wait, but history has no time to spare. They do not demand that the Social-Democrats surrender their independence; they do not demand that they copy their programme or agree with their philosophy; they do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the Social-Democratic parties. Communists do not want to use the Social-Democratic movement to further some sort of secret objective of theirs, no more than they would let anyone use them or would discard their philosophy for someone else's sake. Their only aim is unity of action in the struggle for the *common* objectives, and no one can doubt that both parties have common interests vitally important for each of them.

The first thing on which both Communists and Social-Democrats see eye to eye is the need to

avert another world war. Second—to prevent a resurgence of fascism in any form. Third—to fight for better living conditions for the working people on all continents. Fourth—to ensure the peaceful coexistence of different social systems.

There are many issues on which the viewpoints of Social-Democrats and Communists come close together and could be unified. But their agreement to fight for peace and social progress is enough to justify unity of action. For this is what mankind needs most today.

Let Social-Democrats and Communists continue their philosophical and theoretical polemic. It will probably end only when socialist society has been built in the whole world. But they cannot postpone doing what life imperatively demands of them all to do *today*.

Communists and Social-Democrats *can* cooperate in the fight for the vital interests of the working class. Moreover, they can work together and build a socialist society. "The Communist parties," it is written down in the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "favour cooperation with the Social-Democratic parties not only in the struggle for peace, for better living conditions of the working people, and for the preservation and extension of their democratic rights and freedoms, but also in the struggle to win power and build a socialist society."^{*}

The historical destiny of Social-Democracy has not been decided as yet, and will have to be decided by millions of its supporters. Will it take the old road that will carry it further and further away from socialism and hasten its decline and degeneration, or will it choose, before it is too

late, the other road and work for the unity of the working-class movement?

The present and the future are more important than the past, but each Social-Democrat who looks into the future would do well to think over the past. The last fifty years have furnished the answer to the questions which history has posed in the argument between Communists and Social-Democrats. The argument continues, but its outcome is already clear to all. Lenin, and not Kautsky, was right.

Communism has made a decisive step forward along the road of building a new world society about which people had dreamed for millennia and for the sake of which the socialist movement has been founded. Reformism has remained behind in the camp of the old, doomed society and is tortuously striving to consolidate itself there. Social-Democracy is paying heavily for its historical errors. How much longer will it continue to pay? Its Right wing is doing its best to make it repeat the old mistakes in the last, perhaps the most dramatic and decisive, third of the century. Communists shall always remain on Lenin's positions and will never surrender them.

This means that the door to cooperation in the working-class movement, cooperation in the fight against the forces of capital, reaction and war, remains open. Already now Communists and honest Social-Democrats can march shoulder to shoulder along the road to peace and socialism.^{*}

^{*} *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 487-88.

^{*} The book ends with May 1972.—*Ed.*

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Ernst Henry is a well-known Soviet publicist, the author of several books on world politics. He began to appear in print long before the Second World War. His books *Hitler Over Europe* and *Hitler Over the USSR* have found a broad response and roused lively interest in many countries.

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